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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-55419 — reachy-mini

MEDIUMFix: pollen-robotics/reachy_mini@984c772

CVE-2026-55419 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Unrestricted File Upload vulnerability in reachy-mini. A fix is available for reachy-mini — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Reachy Mini: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

Also known asGHSA-m2pc-3q4q-w6jrPYSEC-2026-3916
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-55419.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs39th percentile — riskier than 39% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.33%0.65%0.98%0.3%0.5%0.5%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-55419 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 385,386 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍reachy-mini

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms.
An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks.

Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access

This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system:

  1. Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API <= current finding
  2. Bluetooth Authentication Bypass
  3. Bluetooth Directory Traversal

Description

The root cause of the issue is at the handler located in “src/daemon/app/routers/media.py” file at the “upload_sound” method:

@router.post("/sounds/upload")
async def upload_sound(
    file: UploadFile = File(...),
) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Upload a sound file to the daemon's temporary sound directory.
    The file is saved to ``/tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<original_filename>``.
    If a file with the same name already exists it is overwritten.
    Returns:
        JSON with the absolute *path* of the saved file on the daemon.
    """
    if not file.filename:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Filename is required")
    # Reject path traversal
    filename = Path(file.filename).name
    if not filename or filename in (".", ".."):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid filename")
    os.makedirs(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, exist_ok=True)
    dest = os.path.join(SOUNDS_TMP_DIR, filename)
    content = await file.read()
    with open(dest, "wb") as f:
        f.write(content)
    return {"status": "ok", "path": dest}

This endpoint lacks multiple defence mechanisms:

  1. No authentication mechanism.
  2. No file extension validation.
  3. No file content/size validation.

Additionally, the daemon is bound to the 0.0.0.0 network interfaces (a.k.a. all network interfaces) by default along with permissive CORS ( allow_origins=[“*”] ) meaning the following API endpoint is exposed to every network interface the daemon is connected to.

PoC

  1. Start the daemon in simulation mode (command depends on the installed environment):
 .venv/bin/mjpython -m reachy_mini.daemon.app.main --sim --no-media
  1. After that check that the media upload API endpoint is activated and you can upload a wav file:
curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/file.wav"
  1. Now attempt to create a “.sh” file containing a script and upload it:
curl -X POST http://<daemon_domain>:<daemon_port>/api/media/sounds/upload \
    -F "file=@/path/to/your/script.sh"
  1. Now error message will be received and you will see that the script file was successfully uploaded to disk.

Impact

Due to this issue, an attacker can upload malicious files instead of the intended sounds files, harming the integrity of the stored data and allowing an attacker to propagate a foothold in cases another vulnerabilities would arise.

Fix suggestion

Perform the following check on the API endpoint:

  1. Validate that the file extension contains only desired extensions (allow-list approach).
  2. Validate that the uploaded file’s content matches the desired extension (Magic numbers, and known file structure per file type).
  3. Enforce authentication on the file upload endpoint.

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Natan Nehorai of the JFrog Vulnerability Research team.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIreachy-miniall versions1.8.2pip install --upgrade 'reachy-mini==1.8.2'

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for reachy-mini, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update reachy-mini to 1.8.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-55419 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Treat uploaded files as untrusted until proven otherwise: validate the actual content type rather than the supplied extension, store uploads outside the web root on a volume mounted without execute permission, and rename them to server-generated identifiers so an attacker cannot choose the path a request will later resolve.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Reachy Mini daemon exposes the “/api/media/sounds/upload” endpoint without authentication and file validation mechanisms. An attacker can use this endpoint to upload malicious files into the file system that will propagate in future attacks. ## Compromise Chain: Unauthenticated to Full Root Access This issue is part of a full compromise chain allowing an unauthenticated user to gain root access on the Reachy’s operating system: 1. Unrestricted File Upload in Media Sounds Upload API \<= current finding 2. Bluetooth Authentication Bypass 3. Bluetooth Directory Traversal
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-55419 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-55419: reachy-mini — Fixed in 1.8.2