CVE-2026-54746 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) CWE-639 vulnerability in github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet. A fix is available for github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Hatchet: Cross-tenant write/DoS to other tenants' workers via Dispatcher gRPC UpsertWorkerLabels and Unsubscribe
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54746.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-54746 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 385,738 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchetReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A cross-tenant write / DoS vulnerability in the Hatchet Dispatcher gRPC service allows any holder of a normal tenant-scoped API token (the lowest credential Hatchet issues — an OWNER of a brand-new tenant) to overwrite the affinity labels of, or disconnect from the dispatcher, any worker UUID belonging to any other tenant on the same Hatchet instance. The two affected RPCs — Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe — read the caller's tenant from the bearer-token context only for analytics and response shaping, and never use it to authorise the worker_id from the request body.
Impact
This CVE requires the attacker to successfully guess the target UUID. Who is impacted. Any Hatchet deployment that hosts more than one tenant on the same instance:
- Hatchet Cloud (multi-tenant SaaS) — every tenant is exposed to every other tenant.
- Self-hosted Hatchet with multiple internal teams / business units sharing one instance — each team is exposed to every other team on the box.
- Any deployment where a single tenant's API token can be obtained by an attacker (e.g. a leaked low-privilege CI token from a single tenant). One token is enough to attack every other tenant on the same instance.
Single-tenant self-hosted deployments are unaffected in practice (the "victim" and "attacker" tenants would be the same).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet | ≥ 0.40.0&&< 0.91.2 | 0.91.2go get github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet@v0.91.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet to 0.91.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54746 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-54746 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.