# CVE-2026-54168: pipelines-as-code — Fixed in 0.37.8

🐹

🐹 Go

Not in CISA KEV

MEDIUM severity

# CVE-2026-54168 — pipelines-as-code

MEDIUM [Fix: tektoncd/pipelines-as-code@0017828](https://github.com/tektoncd/pipelines-as-code/commit/001782829e82b83ecb3da903f5a024ca0826b64c)

CVE-2026-54168 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code. A fix is available for github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Pipelines-as-Code: Unscoped GitHub App installation token allows unauthorized access to private repositories via remote task resolution

Also known as[GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28](/vulnerability/GHSA-6f2p-296r-cc28)GO-2026-6263

Published

Sep 15, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

4 pkgs

Patched

4 / 4

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

## Exploitation Status

### No confirmed exploitation observed yet

-   CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54168.

## EPSS Exploitation Probability

[via FIRST.org ↗](https://www.first.org/epss/)

0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs49th percentile — riskier than 49% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

0.09%0.42%0.75%1.09%0.6%0.6%0.6%Oct 26Nov 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from [FIRST.org EPSS](https://www.first.org/epss/).

## How urgent is this, really

## Where this sits among everything scored

## Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected

🐹`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code`🐹`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code`🐹`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code`🐹`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code`

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

## Description

#### Impact

When Pipelines-as-Code is configured with a GitHub App installed across multiple repositories, the installation token issued during webhook processing is not scoped to the triggering repository by default. The token retains access to all repositories in the GitHub App installation.

This allows a user with push access to any repository in the installation to craft a PipelineRun with a remote task annotation pointing at a private repository in the same installation:

```
pipelinesascode.tekton.dev/task: "https://github.com/org/private-repo/blob/main/.tekton/secret-task.yaml"
```

Pipelines-as-Code resolves and inlines the remote task using the unscoped token, exposing the contents of the private repository's Tekton definitions. This is a read-only confidentiality breach, no write access is exposed.

#### Patches

The fix extracts the repository ID from the webhook payload during initial parsing so that it is available for later use. It then adds a fallback in the client setup path so that when no explicit scoping configuration is present and `ScopeTokenToListOfRepos` returns empty, the token is re-issued scoped to the triggering repository's ID rather than retaining access to the entire installation. The initial token remains unscoped so that the extra-repos lookup can still discover and resolve additional repositories when configured.

The fix is available in v0.48.0. Supported backport releases will be added here after release tags are published.

#### Workarounds

Limit the GitHub App installation to only the repositories that require Pipelines-as-Code. Avoid org-wide installations or mixed-trust installations where repositories with different access requirements share the same GitHub App. This restricts the blast radius of the unscoped token to only the repositories that are explicitly selected during App installation.

#### Credits

Reported and fixed by the Pipelines-as-Code maintainers.

## Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed

Ecosystem

Package

Vulnerable range

Fix

🐹Go

`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code` 

all versions

0.37.8`go get github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code@v0.37.8`

🐹Go

`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code` 

≥ 0.38.0&&< 0.39.6

0.39.6`go get github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code@v0.39.6`

🐹Go

`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code` 

≥ 0.40.0&&< 0.42.1

0.42.1`go get github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code@v0.42.1`

🐹Go

`github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code` 

≥ 0.43.0&&< 0.48.0

0.48.0`go get github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code@v0.48.0`

## Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

1.  ### Detect
    
    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
    
2.  ### Fix
    
    Update github.com/openshift-pipelines/pipelines-as-code to 0.37.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54168 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
    
3.  ### Workarounds
    
    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
    

## Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

This flaw has a Moderate impact because Pipelines-as-Code GitHub App deployments installed across multiple repositories can issue an installation token that is not restricted to the repository that triggered a webhook. A user with push access to one repository can use a remote-task annotation to read Tekton…

Workaround published by Red Hat

> Limit GitHub App installations to only repositories that require Pipelines-as-Code. Avoid organization-wide or mixed-trust installations that combine repositories with different access requirements under one GitHub App installation.

Source: [Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-54168](https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2026-54168) (CC BY 4.0)

## Frequently Asked Questions

\### Impact When Pipelines-as-Code is configured with a GitHub App installed across multiple repositories, the installation token issued during webhook processing is not scoped to the triggering repository by default. The token retains access to all repositories in the GitHub App installation. This allows a user with push access to any repository in the installation to craft a PipelineRun with a remote task annotation pointing at a private repository in the same installation: \`\`\` pipelinesascode.tekton.dev/task: "https://github.com/org/private-repo/blob/main/.tekton/secret-task.yaml" \`\`\` Pipel

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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