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CVE-2026-54150 — next-video

Fix: muxinc/next-video@73abf1d

CVE-2026-54150 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in next-video. A fix is available for next-video — see the affected versions and patch details below.

next-video: Unauthenticated arbitrary file read via /api/video request handler

Also known asGHSA-2p39-2jf3-fv2q
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-54150.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs34th percentile — riskier than 34% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

4other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
next-videonpm
47Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

The HTTP route handler exported by next-video/request-handler — which the README instructs consumers to mount at /api/video — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary .json files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup.

The handler's GET endpoint accepts a url query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for ^https?://. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, .json is appended, and the file is read with fs.readFile and returned in the HTTP response — with no authentication, no path canonicalization, and no traversal guard.

On a typical Next.js deployment this exposes, at minimum:

  • The Next.js Server Actions AES encryption key (.next/server/server-reference-manifest.json)
  • The Next.js Preview/Draft Mode keys (previewModeId, previewModeSigningKey, previewModeEncryptionKey)
  • Internal build manifests, route registries, and absolute runtime paths
  • Application-specific asset metadata (e.g. Mux uploadId, assetId, playbackId values stored in videos/*.json)

Any application that mounted /api/video following the documented one-liner is affected.

Patches

2.8.1

Workarounds

Until a patched version is available, wrap the exported handler in your own route file and validate the url parameter before passing it through:

  • Reject any url value that does not begin with https://, or that does not match a known allowlist of trusted remote hosts.
  • Alternatively, remove the /api/video route entirely if your application only uses build-time import of local video files and does not use <Video src="https://..."> with string URLs at runtime.

References

  • src/request-handler.ts — the vulnerable GET handler
  • src/assets.ts — getAssetPath(), where the local-vs-remote branching occurs
  • src/utils/utils.ts — isRemote(), the sole guard between the two branches
  • src/config.ts — loadAsset(), which performs the unconstrained fs.readFile

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmnext-videoall versions2.8.1npm install next-video@2.8.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for next-video, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update next-video to 2.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-54150 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact The HTTP route handler exported by `next-video/request-handler` — which the README instructs consumers to mount at `/api/video` — allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary `.json` files from the production filesystem of any application following the documented setup. The handler's `GET` endpoint accepts a `url` query parameter and uses it to locate and serve a JSON asset descriptor from disk. The only guard between "remote URL" and "local file path" is a regex check for `^https?://`. Any value that does not match that prefix is treated as a local path, `.json` is
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-54150: next-video — Fixed in 2.8.1 | O3 Security