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Maven
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-53752

HIGH

CVE-2026-53752 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) remote code execution vulnerability in org.docx4j:docx4j-core. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-53752 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

docx4j: Stack Overflow via Cyclic `w:basedOn` Style Chain leads to Denial of Service

Published
Aug 17, 2026
Updated
Aug 17, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 17, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
org.docx4j:docx4j-core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

docx4j's PropertyResolver and several adjacent helpers recursively walk the OpenXML style inheritance chain (w:basedOn) without cycle detection.

A WordprocessingML document containing a cyclic style chain (for example, Style A based on B and Style B based on A) causes unbounded recursion and a java.lang.StackOverflowError within the property-resolution code path.

These helpers are used by operations that require effective style resolution, including common conversion and TOC-related paths. As a result, most server-side pipelines that accept a user-supplied docx and process it through docx4j can likely be crashed by a file containing a cyclic style reference.

Details

Representative snippet: PropertyResolver.fillPPrStack

private void fillPPrStack(String styleId, Stack<PPr> pPrStack) {
    Style style = liveStyles.get(styleId);
    ...
    // if it is based on, recurse
    if (style.getBasedOn() == null) {
        log.debug("Style " + styleId + " is a root style.");
    } else if (style.getBasedOn().getVal() != null) {
        String basedOnStyleName = style.getBasedOn().getVal();
        fillPPrStack(basedOnStyleName, pPrStack);   // ← unbounded recursion
        ...

Impact

This is a denial of service against a server-side application that processes untrusted docx files via docx4j.

An upload causes the processing thread to be terminated with StackOverflowError which may crash the worker thread, degrade the thread pool, or evade normal per-request CPU and heap-memory safeguards in containers and serverless functions (because the failure mode is thread-stack exhaustion rather than gradual resource consumption).

The attack depends on the host application's access controls and requires no user interaction beyond submitting the file. Detection is difficult because the file is a well-formed OOXML package containing ordinary style elements, and passes standard antivirus and content-inspection rules.

Severity: High for server-side applications that process untrusted DOCX files using docx4j style/property resolution (unless the application catches StackOverflowError, isolates conversion in disposable worker processes, restarts workers cleanly, and the practical impact is only failure of one request). Severity may be Medium where document upload requires authentication, processing is isolated, or the failure is limited to a single request/worker.

Credits

Thanks to Koh You Liang (@Isopach) for responsibly disclosing this issue.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.docx4j:docx4j-coreall versions11.5.14

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.docx4j:docx4j-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.docx4j:docx4j-core to 11.5.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-53752 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-53752 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-53752. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary docx4j's `PropertyResolver` and several adjacent helpers recursively walk the OpenXML style inheritance chain (`w:basedOn`) without cycle detection. A WordprocessingML document containing a cyclic style chain (for example, Style A based on B and Style B based on A) causes unbounded recursion and a `java.lang.StackOverflowError` within the property-resolution code path. These helpers are used by operations that require effective style resolution, including common conversion and TOC-related paths. As a result, most server-side pipelines that accept a user-supplied docx and proces
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-53752 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-53752 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.