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CVE-2026-52973

HIGH

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default()…

Published
Jun 24, 2026
Updated
Jun 28, 2026
Affected
0 pkgs
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc

Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put

... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at.

Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork(). Excluding vfork keeps the existing paths untouched (no overhead), and we can't race in the first place: either the parent is suspended and the child runs alone, or mm->futex_ref is already allocated from an earlier CLONE_VM.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Vulnerability
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-52973 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-52973 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-52973. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex: Drop CLONE_THREAD requirement for private default hash alloc Currently need_futex_hash_allocate_default() depends on strict pthread semantics, abusing CLONE_THREAD. This breaks the non-concurrency assumptions when doing the mm->futex_ref pcpu allocations, leading to bugs[0] when sharing the mm in other ways; ie: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in futex_hash_put ... where the +1 bias can end up on a percpu counter that mm->futex_ref no longer points at. Loosen the check to cover any CLONE_VM clone, except vfork
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-52973 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-52973 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.