CVE-2026-50180
Fix: langroid/langroid@00b7dd7CVE-2026-50180 is a Path Traversal vulnerability in langroid. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-50180 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Langroid: SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-50180.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
langroidReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, SQLChatAgent in langroid ships a _validate_query defense-in-depth layer whose _DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family pg_read_file(), pg_stat_file(), pg_ls_logdir(), pg_ls_waldir(), pg_current_logfile() (and similar SELECT-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server OPENDATASOURCE and SQLite ATTACH '<file>' AS x (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary SELECT queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (allow_dangerous_operations=False, allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a SELECT) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via SQLChatAgent.run_query. Version 0.64.0 contains a patch for the issue.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | langroid | all versions | 0.64.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for langroid. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update langroid to 0.64.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-50180 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-50180 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-50180. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-50180 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-50180 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.