CVE-2026-46412
CRITICALCVE-2026-46412 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) CWE-506 vulnerability in @beproduct/nestjs-auth. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-46412 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Malicious code in @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19) — Mini Shai-Hulud worm
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-46412.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-46412 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@beproduct/nestjs-authnpmDescription
Summary
Between 2026-05-11 20:19 UTC and 22:56 UTC, an attacker used a compromised npm publish token to publish 18 malicious versions of @beproduct/nestjs-auth (0.1.2 through 0.1.19). The packages contained payloads from the Mini Shai-Hulud npm supply-chain worm campaign described by Aikido Security.
npm Security removed the malicious versions from the registry shortly after publication, but anyone who ran npm install @beproduct/nestjs-auth resolving to any version in the affected range during that window executed the malicious postinstall script and is potentially compromised.
Version 0.1.20 is a clean republish from the original 0.1.1 source tree.
Impact
The postinstall payload attempted to harvest:
- npm tokens (from
~/.npmrc) - GitHub personal access tokens, OAuth tokens (
gho_*), and Actions OIDC tokens - AWS credentials (from environment variables and
~/.aws/credentials) - HashiCorp Vault tokens
- Other secrets present in environment variables
Exfiltration target: https://filev2.getsession.org. The worm also wrote persistence artefacts (tanstack_runner.js, router_init.js, setup.mjs, plus IDE-hook configurations in .claude/ and .vscode/) into the developer's working tree where the malicious install ran.
Indicators of compromise
| Type | Value |
|---|---|
| File name (payload) | tanstack_runner.js, router_init.js, router_runtime.js |
| SHA-256 (tanstack_runner.js) | 2ec78d556d696e208927cc503d48e4b5eb56b31abc2870c2ed2e98d6be27fc96 |
| SHA-256 (router_init.js) | ab4fcadaec49c03278063dd269ea5eef82d24f2124a8e15d7b90f2fa8601266c |
| Exfil endpoint | filev2.getsession.org |
| Cloud metadata probe | 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ |
| npm token endpoint | registry.npmjs.org/-/npm/v1/tokens |
| Vault probe | vault.svc.cluster.local:8200 |
| IDE hook pattern | .claude/settings.json SessionStart hook + .vscode/tasks.json runOn: "folderOpen" running node .claude/setup.mjs or node .vscode/setup.mjs |
Mitigation
If you installed any version in the range >=0.1.2 <=0.1.19:
- Remove the package and clean the npm cache:
npm uninstall @beproduct/nestjs-auth npm cache clean --force - Install the clean version:
npm install @beproduct/[email protected] - Rotate every credential present in the install environment, including:
- All npm publish tokens (
https://www.npmjs.com/settings/<you>/tokens) - All GitHub PATs and OAuth tokens (
https://github.com/settings/applications+https://github.com/settings/tokens) - AWS access keys
- HashiCorp Vault tokens
- Any other secret that was in env vars or config files at install time
- All npm publish tokens (
- Scan affected hosts for the indicators of compromise above. If any are found, treat the host as compromised and reimage.
- Check committed repository history for unexpected additions in
.claude/or.vscode/directories — the worm is known to commitsetup.mjs+ hook configs to PR branches via automated agent runtimes.
Timeline (UTC)
| Time | Event |
|---|---|
| 2026-05-11 20:19:43 | First malicious version (0.1.2) published |
| 2026-05-11 22:56:39 | Final malicious version (0.1.19) published — 18 versions in 2h37m |
| 2026-05-12 ~14:12 | npm Security removes the malicious versions from the registry |
| 2026-05-13 | BeProduct discovers the incident via Aikido's public disclosure |
| 2026-05-14 | Compromised npm publish token revoked; BeProduct GitHub OAuth credentials rotated |
| 2026-05-14 | Clean release 0.1.20 published; this advisory filed |
Root cause
The compromised npm publish token was harvested by a Mini-Shai-Hulud-infected transitive dependency in an automated GitHub coding-agent runtime that had read access to the NPM_TOKEN GitHub Actions secret for an unrelated repository under the same npm publisher account. The publish itself was performed by the attacker against the public npm registry; the source repository for this package was not modified by the attacker.
References
- https://www.aikido.dev/blog/mini-shai-hulud-is-back-tanstack-compromised
- https://www.aikido.dev/blog/checklist-github-actions
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @beproduct/nestjs-auth | ≥ 0.1.2 | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @beproduct/nestjs-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of @beproduct/nestjs-auth has shipped for CVE-2026-46412 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-46412 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to CVE-2026-46412. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-46412 in your dependencies?
O3 detects CVE-2026-46412 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.