CVE-2026-46362 — phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq
CVE-2026-46362 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.
phpMyFAQ - Authorization Bypass in Admin Pages via Non-Terminating Permission Check
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-46362.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq🐘thorsten/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
AbstractAdministrationController::userHasPermission() catches the ForbiddenException thrown when a user lacks a specific permission, sends a "forbidden" HTML page via $response->send(), but does not terminate execution. The calling controller method continues to execute, fetches protected data, renders the full template, and returns it as a Response. The final $response->send() in admin/index.php outputs the protected page content after the forbidden page, leaking all permission-protected admin data to any authenticated admin user regardless of their actual permissions.
Details
The parent class AbstractController::userHasPermission() (phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/AbstractController.php:317-327) correctly enforces authorization by throwing a ForbiddenException when the user lacks the required permission. This exception would normally propagate to Symfony's HttpKernel exception handler, which would return an error response and prevent the controller from continuing.
However, AbstractAdministrationController overrides this method at line 390-399:
#[\Override]
protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void
{
try {
parent::userHasPermission($permissionType);
} catch (ForbiddenException $exception) {
$response = $this->getForbiddenPage($exception->getMessage());
$response->send(); // Outputs HTML but does NOT terminate execution
} catch (Exception $exception) {
$this->configuration->getLogger()->error($exception->getMessage());
// Only logs, no response, no termination
}
}
The critical flaw: after $response->send() at line 396, there is no exit(), die(), return, or re-throw. PHP execution continues normally into the calling controller method.
For example, in AdminLogController::index() (phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AdminLogController.php:45-83):
public function index(Request $request): Response
{
$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::STATISTICS_ADMINLOG);
// ^^^ If user lacks permission: forbidden page is echoed, but execution continues
// ... all of this still executes:
$loggingData = $this->adminLog->getAll(); // Fetches ALL admin log entries
// ...
return $this->render('@admin/statistics/admin-log.twig', [
// ... full admin log data including IPs, usernames, actions
'loggingData' => $currentItems,
]);
}
The entry point admin/index.php then calls $response->send() on the returned Response, appending the full protected page to the already-sent forbidden page in the HTTP response body.
The second catch block (line 397-398) for generic Exception is even worse — it only logs the error without sending any response or terminating, so the protected page renders with no forbidden notice at all.
58 admin controllers extend AbstractAdministrationController and call userHasPermission(), meaning every permission-protected admin page is affected. This includes:
- Admin logs (user IPs, actions, usernames)
- User management (user data, permissions)
- System information (server configuration, PHP info)
- Configuration pages (all application settings)
- Backup pages
- All other admin functionality
PoC
-
Create a test admin user with minimal permissions (e.g., only FAQ editing, no statistics access):
-
Authenticate as the limited admin user and request a permission-protected page:
# Get admin session cookies by logging in
curl -c cookies.txt -d 'faqusername=limited_admin&faqpassword=password&pmf-csrf-token=TOKEN' \
'https://TARGET/admin/?action=login'
# Access admin log page (requires STATISTICS_ADMINLOG permission)
curl -b cookies.txt -s 'https://TARGET/admin/statistics/admin-log' | tee response.html
# The response contains BOTH the forbidden page HTML AND the full admin log:
grep -c 'You are not allowed' response.html # 1 — forbidden page was sent
grep -c 'loggingData\|ad_adminlog_ip' response.html # matches — admin log data also present
# Access system information (requires CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission)
curl -b cookies.txt -s 'https://TARGET/admin/system-information' | tee sysinfo.html
# Contains PHP version, extensions, database info, server configuration
- The HTTP response body contains the forbidden page HTML followed by the full protected page HTML, including all sensitive data.
Impact
Any authenticated admin user — even one with zero administrative permissions beyond basic login — can access every permission-protected admin page by simply requesting its URL. The permission check sends a forbidden page but does not stop execution, so the protected content is always appended to the response.
Exposed data includes:
- Admin logs: All admin users' IP addresses, actions, and timestamps
- User management: User accounts, email addresses, permissions
- System information: PHP configuration, database details, server paths
- Configuration: All application settings including security-sensitive values
- Backups: Database export functionality
This effectively renders the entire admin permission system non-functional for the 58 page controllers using AbstractAdministrationController.
Recommended Fix
Add return after sending the forbidden response, and re-throw for the generic Exception case:
#[\Override]
protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void
{
try {
parent::userHasPermission($permissionType);
} catch (ForbiddenException $exception) {
$response = $this->getForbiddenPage($exception->getMessage());
$response->send();
exit; // Terminate execution to prevent controller from continuing
} catch (Exception $exception) {
$this->configuration->getLogger()->error($exception->getMessage());
throw $exception; // Re-throw to prevent controller from continuing
}
}
A cleaner architectural fix would be to not swallow the exception at all, and instead let it propagate to the Symfony HttpKernel exception handler (which already handles ForbiddenException via WebExceptionListener):
#[\Override]
protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void
{
// Simply delegate to parent — let ForbiddenException propagate
// to the WebExceptionListener which renders the appropriate error page
parent::userHasPermission($permissionType);
}
Or remove the override entirely, since the WebExceptionListener registered in the Kernel already handles exception-to-response conversion.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.2composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-46362 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-46362 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-46362. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-46362 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-46362 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.