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Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-45674 — netty-resolver-dns

HIGH

CVE-2026-45674 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.7) CWE-345 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-resolver-dns. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-resolver-dns — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Netty Vulnerable to DNS Cache Poisoning via Missing Bailiwick Checks in CNAME Records

Also known asGHSA-676x-f7gg-47vc
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 4, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-45674.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs22th percentile — riskier than 22% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.29%0.57%0.86%0.2%0.3%Jul 26Oct 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
☕io.netty:netty-resolver-dns☕io.netty:netty-resolver-dns

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses.

Details

In io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds.

According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6

Care must be taken to only accept
   data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the
   QNAME or a parent of the QNAME.
   One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is
   part of the domain for which the query was intended.

Impact

DNS Cache Poisoning (Bailiwick Bypass). Any application using Netty's DNS resolver is impacted.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-resolver-dns≥ 4.2.0.Final&&< 4.2.15.Final4.2.15.Finalio.netty:netty-resolver-dns:4.2.15.Final
☕Mavenio.netty:netty-resolver-dnsall versions4.1.135.Finalio.netty:netty-resolver-dns:4.1.135.Final

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
nettynetty
≥ 4.2.0 && < 4.2.15
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-resolver-dns, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update io.netty:netty-resolver-dns to 4.2.15.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-45674 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatImportant

This Important severity flaw in Netty's DnsResolveContext allows a remote attacker to achieve information disclosure or data manipulation. By crafting malicious DNS responses, an attacker could redirect network traffic or intercept sensitive data, impacting applications utilizing Netty for DNS resolution in Red Hat…

Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-45674 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9cryostat/cryostat-reports-rhel9:4.2.0-13RHSA-2026:48151
Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 3.33.2.SP1io.netty/netty-resolver-dns:4.1.135.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2026:26586
Red Hat build of Apache Camel 4.18.1.P1 for Spring Boot 3.5.16netty-resolver-dnsRHSA-2026:37390
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.4.13see advisoryRHSA-2026:30049
Red Hat build of Keycloak 26.6.4see advisoryRHSA-2026:30083
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.27.4.SP1io.netty/netty-resolver-dns:4.1.135.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2026:26018
Red Hat build of Quarkus 3.33.2.SP1io.netty/netty-resolver-dns:4.1.135.Final-redhat-00001RHSA-2026:26017
Red Hat Data Grid 8.6.2netty-resolver-dnsRHSA-2026:41951

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Netty's DnsResolveContext fails to validate the origin (bailiwick) of CNAME records in DNS responses. ### Details In `io.netty.resolver.dns.DnsResolveContext#buildAliasMap`, the resolver processes the ANSWER section of a DNS response and blindly caches all CNAME records it finds. According to https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5452#section-6 ``` Care must be taken to only accept data if it is known that the originator is authoritative for the QNAME or a parent of the QNAME. One very simple way to achieve this is to only accept data if it is part of the domain
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-45674: netty-resolver-dns — Fixed in 4.2.15.Final