CVE-2026-44680 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.6) SQL Injection vulnerability in @mikro-orm/sql. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for @mikro-orm/sql — see the affected versions and patch details below.
MikroORM: SQL injection via runtime-controlled identifiers and JSON-path keys
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44680.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
@mikro-orm/sqlnpm@mikro-orm/knexnpmDescription
Summary
MikroORM's identifier-quoting helper (Platform.quoteIdentifier and the postgres/mssql overrides) and its JSON-path emitters (Platform.getSearchJsonPropertyKey, quoteJsonKey) did not properly escape characters that delimit the SQL identifier or string-literal context they emit into. When application code passes attacker-influenced strings to public ORM APIs that expect an identifier or a JSON-property filter, an attacker can break out of the quoted context and inject arbitrary SQL.
Affected APIs
The vulnerability is reachable when application code passes an attacker-influenced string to any of the following documented APIs:
- Multi-tenant
schemaoption —em.fork({ schema }),qb.withSchema(name),wrap(entity).setSchema(name),em.create(Cls, data, { schema }). The schema name is concatenated into the SQL identifier and never had its dialect quote character escaped. em.find/qb.whereJSON-property filters —em.find(Entity, { jsonCol: { [userKey]: value } }). The user-supplied JSON sub-keys cannot be validated against any metadata (JSON columns are schemaless by design), and were spliced into the SQL string literal of the JSON path expression without escaping.qb.where/qb.orderBy/qb.groupBy/qb.having/qb.selectkeys — keys containing.or::bypassed the structured-where metadata validator inCriteriaNode, then flowed through the same brokenquoteIdentifier. Apps that forwarded raw filter keys from request input were already broken on authorization grounds (e.g.{ isAdmin: true }); the SQL injection here is a defence-in-depth failure on top of that.
The vulnerability does not affect documented escape-hatch APIs (raw(), the sql tagged template, qb.raw(), em.raw()) — those are documented as accepting raw SQL and are the application's responsibility to sanitize.
Impact
- Confidentiality — read from any table/schema the database user has access to (cross-tenant data leak in multi-tenant deployments).
- Integrity — on dialects supporting multi-statement queries (MSSQL, MySQL with multi-statement enabled), execute additional arbitrary SQL statements (data modification, in-database privilege escalation).
- Availability — DROP/TRUNCATE via injected statements where the database user has the privilege.
Affected dialects
All SQL dialects supported by MikroORM. The identifier-quoting bug exists in every dialect's quoteIdentifier (the dialect's own quote character — backtick, double quote, or right bracket — was not doubled when embedded in the identifier). The JSON-path bug exists in all dialects' getSearchJsonPropertyKey/quoteJsonKey.
MongoDB driver is not affected (no SQL).
Patches
- v7: upgrade to 7.0.14 or later.
- v6: upgrade to 6.6.14 or later.
Patches:
- Identifier quoting: #7653 (master) / #7654 (6.x)
- JSON-path keys: #7656 (master) / #7657 (6.x)
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- For multi-tenant apps using
em.fork({ schema })/wrap().setSchema()/qb.withSchema(): validate the schema name against a strict allowlist (e.g.^[A-Za-z_][\w$]*$) before passing it to MikroORM. - For applications that pass
where/orderByfilters from request input: validate every key against the entity's known properties before constructing the filter; do not pass keys containing.or::from user input. - For applications that allow filtering on JSON columns from request input: validate every JSON sub-key against an allowlist (or against
^[a-zA-Z_][\w]*$) before passing it toem.find.
Credits
Reported and patched by Martin Adámek (project maintainer) during an internal security review.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @mikro-orm/sql | all versions | 7.0.14npm install @mikro-orm/sql@7.0.14 |
| 📦npm | @mikro-orm/knex | all versions | 6.6.14npm install @mikro-orm/knex@6.6.14 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
MikroORM 7.0.13 - SQL Injection
by cardosource · May 29, 2026
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @mikro-orm/sql, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @mikro-orm/sql to 7.0.14 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44680 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Until you can upgrade, make sure every query built from user input uses parameterised statements or a prepared-statement API rather than string concatenation, and reduce the database account's privileges so an injected query cannot read or alter data beyond what the feature needs.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44680 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.