CVE-2026-44520 — docling-graph
MEDIUMCVE-2026-44520 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.7) Open Redirect vulnerability in docling-graph. A fix is available for docling-graph — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Docling-Graph: SSRF via Missing Internal IP Validation in URLInputHandler
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-44520.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
docling-graphReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
The URLInputHandler class in docling_graph/core/input/handlers.py makes HTTP requests to user-supplied URLs without validating whether the target resolves to a private, loopback, or link-local IP address. The URLValidator only checks for a valid scheme and non-empty netloc, performing no IP-level validation. Additionally, requests.head() was called with allow_redirects=True, allowing an attacker to redirect requests to internal endpoints via an intermediary URL.
An attacker who can control the --source CLI argument or PipelineConfig.source API parameter can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to reach:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (e.g.
169.254.169.254) to steal IAM credentials - Internal services on loopback (
127.0.0.1) or private network ranges (10.x,172.16.x,192.168.x)
This affects deployments where docling-graph processes URLs from untrusted input, such as multi-tenant pipelines or server-side automation.
Patches
The vulnerability is fixed in v1.5.1.
Users should upgrade immediately:
pip install --upgrade docling-graph
The fix adds IP validation via ipaddress and socket.gethostbyname() before any request is made, blocks private/loopback/link-local/reserved addresses, and disables redirect following (allow_redirects=False) with explicit validation of any Location header before following it.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure that all URLs passed to URLInputHandler come exclusively from trusted, internal sources, never from user-supplied or external input. There is no safe code-level workaround short of applying the patch, as the vulnerability is in the library itself.
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | docling-graph | all versions | 1.5.1pip install --upgrade 'docling-graph==1.5.1' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for docling-graph, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update docling-graph to 1.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-44520 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop reflecting attacker-controlled destinations: resolve every redirect target against an allowlist of paths or hosts you own, prefer a server-side key over a full URL in the request, and reject absolute URLs entirely where the flow only ever needs a relative one.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-44520 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.