CVE-2026-41663 — admidio/admidio
LOWCVE-2026-41663 is a low-severity (CVSS 3.5) Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in admidio/admidio. A fix is available for admidio/admidio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Admidio: CSRF on Admin Preferences Triggers Unauthorized Backup, .htaccess Write, and Email Send
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41663.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-41663 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Several administrative operations in Admidio's preferences module (database backup, test email, htaccess generation) fire via GET requests with no CSRF token validation. Because SameSite=Lax cookies travel with top-level GET navigations, an attacker forces an authenticated admin to trigger these actions from a malicious page.
Details
In modules/preferences.php, the backup, test_email, and htaccess modes accept GET parameters with no CSRF token check:
// modules/preferences.php - backup mode
case 'backup':
// Creates full database dump and serves as download
// No CSRF token validation
$backupFile = $gDb->backup();
// ... sends file to client
break;
case 'test_email':
// Sends test email from the server
// No CSRF token validation
break;
case 'htaccess':
// Writes .htaccess file to disk
// No CSRF token validation
break;
The save mode in the same file validates CSRF via getFormObject(), confirming the developers intended CSRF protection but did not apply it to these other modes.
Because these are GET requests, SameSite=Lax browsers include session cookies on top-level cross-origin navigations, making CSRF exploitation trivial.
Proof of Concept
Simplified attacker page (csrf.html hosted on attacker origin):
<html>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<!-- Trigger backup creation on victim's browser -->
<script>window.location = 'https://target-admidio.example.com/adm_program/modules/preferences.php?mode=backup';</script>
</body>
</html>
When an administrator visits this page, the browser navigates to the Admidio backup URL with full session cookies. The server generates a database dump and serves it as a download to the victim's browser. Note: the backup downloads to the victim's machine, not to the attacker. The attacker cannot read the response cross-origin.
For htaccess mode, the CSRF overwrites the .htaccess file on the server, disrupting the application. For test_email mode, it triggers email sends from the server, which an attacker can abuse for spam or to probe internal email infrastructure.
Impact
An attacker tricks an Admidio administrator into visiting a malicious page that triggers state-changing operations on the server:
- Backup creation: forces the server to generate a full database dump. The backup downloads to the victim's browser, not to the attacker. However, repeated backup triggers can cause disk I/O and storage pressure on the server.
- htaccess modification: overwrites the server's
.htaccessfile, breaking URL routing or disabling security headers. - Test email: fires email sends from the server, usable as a spam relay or to probe internal mail configuration.
The core issue is that state-changing operations run via unprotected GET requests. The victim only needs to visit a single attacker-controlled page while logged in.
Recommended Fix
- Change
backup,test_email, andhtaccessoperations to require POST requests. - Add CSRF token validation using the existing
getFormObject()mechanism. - As defense in depth, set
SameSite=Stricton session cookies or add a confirmation step for destructive operations like database backup.
Found by aisafe.io
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | all versions | 5.0.9composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.9 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.9 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-41663 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-41663 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-41663. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-41663 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-41663 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.