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CVE-2026-41486 — ray

Fix: ray-project/ray@c02bd31

CVE-2026-41486 is a Code Injection vulnerability in ray. A fix is available for ray — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Ray: Remote Code Execution via Parquet Arrow Extension Type Deserialization

Also known asGHSA-mw35-8rx3-xf9rPYSEC-2026-2272PYSEC-2026-2296
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41486.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs41th percentile — riskier than 41% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.40%0.80%1.20%0.0%0.5%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍ray

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (ray.data.arrow_tensor, ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2, ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls __arrow_ext_deserialize__ on the field's metadata bytes. Ray's implementation passes these bytes directly to cloudpickle.loads(), achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read.

In May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in PyExtensionType-based extension types (issue #41314, PR #45084). In July 2025, PR #54831 introduced cloudpickle.loads() into the replacement extension types' deserialization path, reintroducing the same class of vulnerability.

Impact

  • Affected versions: Ray 2.49.0 through 2.54.0 (latest release as of March 2026). The vulnerable _deserialize_with_fallback function with cloudpickle.loads() was introduced in commit f6d21db1a4 (PR #54831, July 2025), first released in Ray 2.49.0.
  • Affected configurations: Any process that uses Ray Data and reads Parquet files. The extension types are registered globally in PyArrow, so all Parquet reads in the process are affected, including ray.data.read_parquet(), pyarrow.parquet.read_table(), pandas.read_parquet(), etc.
  • Attacker prerequisites: The attacker must place a crafted Parquet file where a Ray Data pipeline reads it. No authentication or cluster access is required. The Parquet file must contain a column with a ray.data.arrow_tensor (or v2, or variable-shaped) extension type name, which makes this a targeted attack against Ray Data users.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIray≥ 2.49.0&&< 2.55.02.55.0pip install --upgrade 'ray==2.55.0'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
rayanyscale
1 version
2.54.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for ray, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update ray to 2.55.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-41486 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

Ray Data registers custom Arrow extension types (`ray.data.arrow_tensor`, `ray.data.arrow_tensor_v2`, `ray.data.arrow_variable_shaped_tensor`) globally in PyArrow. When PyArrow reads a Parquet file containing one of these extension types, it calls `__arrow_ext_deserialize__` on the field's metadata bytes. Ray's implementation passes these bytes directly to `cloudpickle.loads()`, achieving arbitrary code execution during schema parsing, before any row data is read. In May 2024, Ray fixed a related vulnerability in `PyExtensionType`-based extension types ([issue #41314](https://github.com/ray-p
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-41486 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-41486: ray RCE — Fixed in 2.55.0