CVE-2026-41133 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-613 vulnerability in pyload-ng. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
pyLoad has Stale Session Privilege After Role/Permission Change (Privilege Revocation Bypass)
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-41133.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pyload-ngReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
pyLoad caches role and permission in the session at login and continues to authorize requests using these cached values, even after an admin changes the user's role/permissions in the database.
As a result, an already logged-in user can keep old (revoked) privileges until logout/session expiry, enabling continued privileged actions.
This is a core authorization/session-consistency issue and is not resolved by toggling an optional security feature.
Details
The WebUI auth flow stores authorization state in session:
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:187-200set_session(...)writes:"role": user_info["role"]"perms": user_info["permission"]
Authorization checks later trust cached session values:
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:134-151parse_permissions(...)readssession.get("role")/session.get("perms")
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:225-230is_authenticated(...)only verifiesauthenticatedandapi.user_exists(user)(existence), not fresh role/permission
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:267-275login_required(...)usesparse_permissions(s)for allow/deny decisions
src/pyload/webui/app/helpers.py:356-365- API session auth path also trusts
s["role"]ands["perms"]
- API session auth path also trusts
Role/permission updates are written to DB but active sessions are not invalidated/refreshed:
src/pyload/webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py:389-434update_users(...)callsapi.set_user_permission(...)and returns
src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:1643-1645set_user_permission(...)updates DB role/permission only
Default exposure window is long:
src/pyload/core/config/default.cfg:47session_lifetime = 44640minutes (~31 days)
Therefore, privilege revocation is not enforced immediately for active sessions.
Note on duplicates:
- This appears distinct from CVE-2023-0227 (session validity after user deletion) because this report is about stale authorization after role/permission changes while the user still exists.
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Repro: stale session privilege after role/permission changes.
This PoC is source-based and leaves no persistent state.
It validates that:
1) Role/permission are cached into session at login.
2) Authorization checks read role/permission from session, not fresh DB values.
3) User updates write DB permission/role without invalidating active sessions.
4) Default session lifetime is long, increasing stale-privilege exposure window.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import pathlib
import re
from typing import Iterable
ROOT = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent / "pyload" / "src" / "pyload"
def read(rel: str) -> str:
return (ROOT / rel).read_text(encoding="utf-8")
def has_any(text: str, patterns: Iterable[str]) -> bool:
return all(re.search(p, text, re.MULTILINE) for p in patterns)
def main() -> None:
helpers = read("webui/app/helpers.py")
json_blueprint = read("webui/app/blueprints/json_blueprint.py")
api_init = read("core/api/__init__.py")
default_cfg = (ROOT / "core/config/default.cfg").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
checks = {
"set_session_caches_role_perms": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+set_session\\(',
r'"role"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["role"\\]',
r'"perms"\\s*:\\s*user_info\\["permission"\\]',
],
),
"is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+is_authenticated\\(',
r'api\\s*=\\s*flask\\.current_app\\.config\\["PYLOAD_API"\\]',
r'return\\s+authenticated\\s+and\\s+api\\.user_exists\\(user\\)',
],
),
"parse_permissions_reads_session_cache": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+parse_permissions\\(',
r'session\\.get\\("role"\\)\\s*==\\s*Role\\.ADMIN',
r'session\\.get\\("perms"\\)',
],
),
"login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'def\\s+login_required\\(',
r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
r'perms\\s*=\\s*parse_permissions\\(s\\)',
],
),
"api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms": has_any(
helpers,
[
r'if\\s+is_authenticated\\(s\\):',
r'"role"\\s*:\\s*s\\["role"\\]',
r'"permission"\\s*:\\s*s\\["perms"\\]',
],
),
"update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation": has_any(
json_blueprint,
[
r'def\\s+update_users\\(',
r'api\\.set_user_permission\\(name,\\s*data\\["permission"\\],\\s*data\\["role"\\]\\)',
r'return\\s+jsonify\\(True\\)',
],
),
"set_user_permission_only_updates_db": has_any(
api_init,
[
r'def\\s+set_user_permission\\(',
r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_permission\\(user,\\s*permission\\)',
r'self\\.pyload\\.db\\.set_role\\(user,\\s*role\\)',
],
),
"default_session_lifetime_long": re.search(
r'session_lifetime\\s*:\\s*"Session lifetime \\(minutes\\)"\\s*=\\s*44640',
default_cfg,
re.MULTILINE,
)
is not None,
}
for name, ok in checks.items():
print(f"{name}={ok}")
stale_privilege_repro_success = all(checks.values())
print(f"stale_privilege_repro_success={stale_privilege_repro_success}")
# Cleanup: this PoC creates/modifies no runtime/data files.
print("cleanup_done=True")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
set_session_caches_role_perms=True
is_authenticated_only_checks_user_exists=True
parse_permissions_reads_session_cache=True
login_required_uses_parse_permissions_session=True
api_session_auth_uses_cached_role_perms=True
update_users_changes_db_without_session_invalidation=True
set_user_permission_only_updates_db=True
default_session_lifetime_long=True
stale_privilege_repro_success=True
cleanup_done=True
Impact
- Privilege revocation is not immediate for active sessions.
- A user can continue using stale, previously granted privileges (including admin) after downgrade/restriction.
- This can allow continued access to privileged WebUI/API actions until session expiry or manual logout/session reset.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pyload-ng | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
pyloadpyloadDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pyload-ng, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of pyload-ng for CVE-2026-41133. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-41133 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.