CVE-2026-40113 — praisonai
HIGHCVE-2026-40113 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.4) CWE-88 vulnerability in praisonai. A fix is available for praisonai — see the affected versions and patch details below.
PraisonAI has an Argument Injection into Cloud Run Environment Variables via Unsanitized Comma in gcloud --set-env-vars
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-40113.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-40113 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
praisonaiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
deploy.py constructs a single comma-delimited string for the gcloud run deploy --set-env-vars argument by directly interpolating openai_model, openai_key, and openai_base without validating that these values do not contain commas. gcloud uses a comma as the key-value pair separator for --set-env-vars. A comma in any of the three values causes gcloud to parse the trailing text as additional KEY=VALUE definitions, injecting arbitrary environment variables into the deployed Cloud Run service.
Grep Commands and Evidence
Step 1. Confirm the vulnerable string construction at line 150
grep -n "set-env-vars\|openai_key\|openai_base\|openai_model" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
Expected output showing unsanitized interpolation:
150: '--set-env-vars', f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model},OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key},OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}'
Step 2. Confirm no comma validation exists before this line
grep -n "comma\|assertNotIn\|ValueError\|sanitize\|strip\|replace" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
Expected output: no results related to input validation
Step 3. View the full context of the vulnerable construction
sed -n '140,165p' \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
This block shows the gcloud command list where the three values are
joined into one comma-separated string passed as a single argument
element. gcloud receives this string and applies its own
comma-based parsing, which the subprocess list form cannot prevent.
Step 4. Confirm subprocess is called without shell=True
grep -n "subprocess\|Popen\|shell=" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
This confirms shell=False (default), meaning the injection is at the
gcloud argument level, not the shell level. The comma delimiter is
parsed by gcloud itself, not by /bin/sh.
Step 5. Confirm no existing advisory covers this file
grep -rn "deploy.py\|set.env.vars\|openai_base" \
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
Vulnerability Description
File:
src/praisonai/praisonai/deploy.py
Vulnerable line:
150: '--set-env-vars', f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model},OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key},OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}'
The three values openai_model, openai_key, and openai_base originate from environment variables or user-provided configuration and are interpolated directly into a single f-string without validation.
The subprocess call uses a Python list without shell=True. This means there is no shell injection. The subprocess module passes the f-string as one complete argument to gcloud. gcloud then applies its own internal parsing to the value of --set-env-vars using a comma as the delimiter. This parsing is entirely outside Python's control.
If any of the three values contains a comma, gcloud splits on that comma and creates an additional KEY=VALUE environment variable from the text following it. There is no error or warning from gcloud when this occurs.
The three values are attacker-controllable in any scenario where environment variables can be set before the deploy command runs. This includes compromised dotenv files, poisoned CI pipeline secrets, and local developer machines where an attacker has shell access.
Proof of Concept
attacker-controlled openai_base value:
export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-legitimate-key"
export OPENAI_MODEL_NAME="gpt-4"
export OPENAI_API_BASE="https://api.openai.com/v1,INJECTED=attacker_value"
Run the deploy command. The string constructed at line 150 becomes:
OPENAI_MODEL_NAME=gpt-4,OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-legitimate-key,OPENAI_API_BASE=https://api.openai.com/v1,INJECTED=attacker_value
gcloud parses this as four key-value pairs and creates all four as environment variables in the Cloud Run service. INJECTED=attacker_value is a real environment variable available to every request the service handles.
Verify the injection after deployment:
gcloud run services describe praisonai-service \
--region us-central1 \
--format "value(spec.template.spec.containers[0].env)"
The output includes INJECTED alongside the three legitimate variables.
API key override:
export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-real,OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-attacker"
The constructed string contains OPENAI_API_KEY twice. In gcloud versions where the last-defined value takes precedence, the deployed service uses sk-attacker for all LLM API calls. All agent traffic routes through the attacker-controlled API account.
Impact
An attacker who can influence any of the three environment variables before deploy.py runs can inject arbitrary environment variables into the deployed Cloud Run production service without triggering any error.
Injection scenarios include a malicious git hook that modifies a dotenv file before deployment, a compromised CI pipeline secret, or any local access that allows setting environment variables in the deploy shell session.
Consequences include overriding the API key used by the production service, injecting proxy settings that redirect all outbound LLM traffic, setting debug or verbose flags that write sensitive data to Cloud Run logs, and overriding any security-relevant variable the service reads from its environment.
The API key override scenario is the highest-impact case. All production LLM calls made by the deployed service are billed to and logged by the attacker's API account, giving the attacker full visibility into every agent prompt and response processed in production.
Recommended Fix
Pass each variable as a separate --update-env-vars flag so each value is an isolated argument and gcloud never performs comma-based parsing across multiple values:
Before:
['gcloud', 'run', 'deploy', 'praisonai-service',
'--set-env-vars',
f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model},OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key},OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}']
After:
['gcloud', 'run', 'deploy', 'praisonai-service',
'--update-env-vars', f'OPENAI_MODEL_NAME={openai_model}',
'--update-env-vars', f'OPENAI_API_KEY={openai_key}',
'--update-env-vars', f'OPENAI_API_BASE={openai_base}']
Each --update-env-vars element is a separate string in the subprocess list. The subprocess module passes each as a distinct argument to gcloud. gcloud receives three separate single-variable assignments and performs no cross-argument comma parsing.
Add pre-flight validation as a secondary control:
for label, value in [
("OPENAI_MODEL_NAME", openai_model),
("OPENAI_API_KEY", openai_key),
("OPENAI_API_BASE", openai_base),
]:
if "," in value:
raise ValueError(
f"{label} contains a comma and would corrupt "
f"--set-env-vars: {value!r}"
)
References
CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command gcloud run deploy documentation for --set-env-vars KEY=VALUE comma delimiter specification
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | praisonai | all versions | 4.5.128pip install --upgrade 'praisonai==4.5.128' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update praisonai to 4.5.128 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-40113 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-40113 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-40113. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-40113 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-40113 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.