CVE-2026-35570 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.4) Path Traversal vulnerability in @gitlawb/openclaude. A fix is available for @gitlawb/openclaude — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenClaude has Sandbox Bypass via Early-Exit Logic Flaw that Allows Path Traversal
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-35570.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, a proxy for how much of the ecosystem is exposed.
@gitlawb/openclaudenpmDescription
A logic flaw exists in bashToolHasPermission() inside src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an allow result immediately — before the path constraint filter (checkPathConstraints) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../../../etc/passwd) to bypass directory restrictions entirely.
Affected Component
- File:
src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts - Function:
bashToolHasPermission - Location: ~line 1445 (sandbox auto-allow block)
Vulnerable Code Flow
bashToolHasPermission()
│
├─ [~1445] Sandbox auto-allow block
│ └─ No deny rule found → return ALLOW ⚠️ Early exit
│
└─ [~1644] checkPathConstraints() ❌ Never reached
The sandbox block was designed to skip interactive permission prompts in sandboxed environments. However, it unintentionally also skips the path traversal filter, which is a separate and critical security control.
Impact
Any process or user operating in a sandboxed session with no explicit deny rules can:
- Read arbitrary files outside the sandbox boundary (e.g.,
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow,.envfiles, SSH private keys) - Write to arbitrary paths (subject to OS-level permissions)
- Fully defeat the filesystem isolation that the sandbox is intended to enforce
Steps to Reproduce
- Enable sandbox mode:
SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() = true - Enable auto-allow:
SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() = true - Ensure no explicit deny rules are configured for the session
- Submit a bash command with a path traversal payload:
cat ../../../../../etc/passwd - Observe that the command receives
behavior: allowwithout triggeringcheckPathConstraints
Recommended Fix
The sandbox auto-allow block should never short-circuit the full permission pipeline. It may suppress interactive prompts, but path constraint validation must always execute.
Option 1 — Preferred: Continue pipeline on allow
Only return early for deny or ask behaviors. Let allow fall through to checkPathConstraints:
if (
SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
shouldUseSandbox(input)
) {
const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(
input,
appState.toolPermissionContext,
);
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'allow') {
// Only block or prompt — never skip path checks on allow
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
// If 'allow', continue to checkPathConstraints below
}
Option 2 — Defense in depth: Run path check before returning
Run checkPathConstraints explicitly inside the sandbox block before returning:
if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
const pathCheck = checkPathConstraints(input, appState.toolPermissionContext);
if (pathCheck.behavior !== 'allow') {
return pathCheck; // Block traversal attempts even in sandbox
}
return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}
Option 3 — Minimal change: Move sandbox block after path check
Reorder the function so checkPathConstraints always runs first, and the sandbox block only handles the prompt-suppression logic afterward.
Credit: Elvin Latifli (@Rickidevs )
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @gitlawb/openclaude | all versions | 0.5.1npm install @gitlawb/openclaude@0.5.1 |
Affected Products
openclaudegitlawbDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @gitlawb/openclaude, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update @gitlawb/openclaude to 0.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35570 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-35570 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.