Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-35570 — @gitlawb/openclaude

HIGHFix: Gitlawb/openclaude@7002cb3

CVE-2026-35570 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.4) Path Traversal vulnerability in @gitlawb/openclaude. A fix is available for @gitlawb/openclaude — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenClaude has Sandbox Bypass via Early-Exit Logic Flaw that Allows Path Traversal

Also known asGHSA-m6rx-7pvw-2f73
Published
Apr 20, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-35570.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs14th percentile — riskier than 14% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-35570 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 378,156 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
@gitlawb/openclaudenpm
11Kdownloads / week

Description

A logic flaw exists in bashToolHasPermission() inside src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an allow result immediately — before the path constraint filter (checkPathConstraints) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., ../../../../../etc/passwd) to bypass directory restrictions entirely.

Affected Component

  • File: src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts
  • Function: bashToolHasPermission
  • Location: ~line 1445 (sandbox auto-allow block)

Vulnerable Code Flow

bashToolHasPermission()
    │
    ├─ [~1445] Sandbox auto-allow block
    │       └─ No deny rule found → return ALLOW  ⚠️ Early exit
    │
    └─ [~1644] checkPathConstraints()             ❌ Never reached

The sandbox block was designed to skip interactive permission prompts in sandboxed environments. However, it unintentionally also skips the path traversal filter, which is a separate and critical security control.

Impact

Any process or user operating in a sandboxed session with no explicit deny rules can:

  • Read arbitrary files outside the sandbox boundary (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, .env files, SSH private keys)
  • Write to arbitrary paths (subject to OS-level permissions)
  • Fully defeat the filesystem isolation that the sandbox is intended to enforce

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Enable sandbox mode: SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() = true
  2. Enable auto-allow: SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() = true
  3. Ensure no explicit deny rules are configured for the session
  4. Submit a bash command with a path traversal payload:
    cat ../../../../../etc/passwd
    
  5. Observe that the command receives behavior: allow without triggering checkPathConstraints

Recommended Fix

The sandbox auto-allow block should never short-circuit the full permission pipeline. It may suppress interactive prompts, but path constraint validation must always execute.

Option 1 — Preferred: Continue pipeline on allow

Only return early for deny or ask behaviors. Let allow fall through to checkPathConstraints:

if (
  SandboxManager.isSandboxingEnabled() &&
  SandboxManager.isAutoAllowBashIfSandboxedEnabled() &&
  shouldUseSandbox(input)
) {
  const sandboxAutoAllowResult = checkSandboxAutoAllow(
    input,
    appState.toolPermissionContext,
  );
  if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'allow') {
    // Only block or prompt — never skip path checks on allow
    return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
  }
  // If 'allow', continue to checkPathConstraints below
}

Option 2 — Defense in depth: Run path check before returning

Run checkPathConstraints explicitly inside the sandbox block before returning:

if (sandboxAutoAllowResult.behavior !== 'passthrough') {
  const pathCheck = checkPathConstraints(input, appState.toolPermissionContext);
  if (pathCheck.behavior !== 'allow') {
    return pathCheck; // Block traversal attempts even in sandbox
  }
  return sandboxAutoAllowResult;
}

Option 3 — Minimal change: Move sandbox block after path check

Reorder the function so checkPathConstraints always runs first, and the sandbox block only handles the prompt-suppression logic afterward.


Credit: Elvin Latifli (@Rickidevs )

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@gitlawb/openclaudeall versions0.5.1npm install @gitlawb/openclaude@0.5.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @gitlawb/openclaude, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update @gitlawb/openclaude to 0.5.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-35570 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-35570 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-35570. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

A logic flaw exists in `bashToolHasPermission()` inside `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts`. When the sandbox auto-allow feature is active and no explicit deny rule is configured, the function returns an `allow` result immediately — before the path constraint filter (`checkPathConstraints`) is ever evaluated. This allows commands containing path traversal sequences (e.g., `../../../../../etc/passwd`) to bypass directory restrictions entirely. ## Affected Component - **File:** `src/tools/BashTool/bashPermissions.ts` - **Function:** `bashToolHasPermission` - **Location:** ~line 1445 (sandb
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-35570 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-35570 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-35570: Path Traversal (High 8.4) | O3 Security