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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-34935 — praisonai

CRITICALFix: MervinPraison/PraisonAI@47bff65

CVE-2026-34935 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) OS Command Injection vulnerability in praisonai. A fix is available for praisonai — see the affected versions and patch details below.

PraisonAI: OS Command Injection in MCPHandler.parse_mcp_command()

Also known asGHSA-9gm9-c8mq-vq7mPYSEC-2026-471
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 5, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-34935.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs58th percentile — riskier than 58% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.50%0.99%1.49%0.0%0.8%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍praisonai

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The --mcp CLI argument is passed directly to shlex.split() and forwarded through the call chain to anyio.open_process() with no validation, allowlist check, or sanitization at any hop, allowing arbitrary OS command execution as the process user.

Details

cli/features/mcp.py:61 (source) -> praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py:345 (hop) -> mcp/client/stdio/__init__.py:253 (sink)

# source
parts = shlex.split(command)

# hop
cmd, args, env = self.parse_mcp_command(command, env_vars)
self.server_params = StdioServerParameters(command=cmd, args=arguments)

# sink
process = await anyio.open_process([command, *args])

Fixed in commit 47bff65413beaa3c21bf633c1fae4e684348368c (v4.5.69) by introducing a command allowlist:

ALLOWED_COMMANDS = {"npx", "uvx", "node", "python"}
if cmd not in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
    raise ValueError(f"Disallowed command: {cmd}")

PoC

# tested on: praisonai==4.5.48
# install: pip install praisonai==4.5.48
# run: praisonai --mcp "bash -c 'id > /tmp/pwned'"
# verify: cat /tmp/pwned
# expected output: uid=1000(...) gid=1000(...) groups=1000(...)

Impact

Any deployment where the --mcp argument is influenced by untrusted input is exposed to full OS command execution as the process user. No authentication is required.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIpraisonai≥ 4.5.15&&< 4.5.694.5.69pip install --upgrade 'praisonai==4.5.69'

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
praisonaipraison
≥ 4.5.15 && < 4.5.69
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for praisonai, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update praisonai to 4.5.69 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-34935 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `--mcp` CLI argument is passed directly to `shlex.split()` and forwarded through the call chain to `anyio.open_process()` with no validation, allowlist check, or sanitization at any hop, allowing arbitrary OS command execution as the process user. ### Details `cli/features/mcp.py:61` (source) -> `praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py:345` (hop) -> `mcp/client/stdio/__init__.py:253` (sink) ```python # source parts = shlex.split(command) # hop cmd, args, env = self.parse_mcp_command(command, env_vars) self.server_params = StdioServerParameters(command=cmd, args=arguments) # sink proces
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-34935: praisonai — Fixed in 4.5.69