CVE-2026-33766 — avideo
Fix: WWBN/AVideo@8b7e9daCVE-2026-33766 is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33766.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but url_get_contents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.
Root Cause
Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.
Use-time: url_get_contents() at objects/functions.php:1990 calls file_get_contents() with PHP's default follow_location=1 — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.
Affected endpoint: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']) && isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image'])) {
$content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']);
Proof of Concept
- Attacker sets up
https://attacker.com/redirto respond with302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ - Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&...
isSSRFSafeURL()resolvesattacker.com→ public IP → passes validationurl_get_contents()follows 302 redirect to169.254.169.254→ SSRF
Impact
- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
- Internal network service access
- Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack
Note
The curl path in url_get_contents() does NOT set CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION so it is not affected. Only the file_get_contents and wget fallback paths are vulnerable.
Suggested Fix
Set follow_location to 0 in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add isSSRFSafeURL() check inside url_get_contents() after resolving the final URL.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
avideowwbnDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of wwbn/avideo for CVE-2026-33766. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33766 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.