CVE-2026-33761 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Information Exposure vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
AVideo: Unauthenticated Access to Scheduler Plugin Endpoints Leaks Scheduled Tasks, Email Content, and User Mappings
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33761.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-33761 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,636 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Three list.json.php endpoints in the Scheduler plugin lack any authentication check, while every other endpoint in the same plugin directories (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) requires User::isAdmin(). An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve all scheduled tasks (including internal callback URLs and parameters), admin-composed email messages, and user-to-email targeting mappings by sending simple GET requests.
Details
The vulnerable files are:
1. plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:1-7
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
2. plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php:1-10
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Emails_messages.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Emails_messages::getAll();
$total = Emails_messages::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}
3. plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php:1-10
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Email_to_user.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Email_to_user::getAll();
$total = Email_to_user::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}
None of these files check authentication before calling getAll(), which executes SELECT * FROM {table} and returns the entire table contents.
In contrast, every sibling endpoint requires admin access. For example, plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php:12-15:
if(!User::isAdmin()){
$obj->msg = "You cant do this";
die(json_encode($obj));
}
The Scheduler_commands table (defined in plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php) stores fields including callbackURL (internal server URLs with query parameters), parameters (JSON blobs containing user IDs and email configuration), status, timezone, and cron scheduling fields. The Emails_messages table stores subject and message (full HTML email bodies composed by admins). The Email_to_user table maps users_id to emails_messages_id, revealing which users are targeted by which email campaigns.
PoC
# 1. Retrieve all scheduled tasks — exposes internal callbackURLs and parameters
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, callbackURL, parameters, status, type}'
# 2. Retrieve all admin-composed email messages — exposes subject and HTML body
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, subject, message}'
# 3. Retrieve user-to-email targeting mappings — reveals which users receive which emails
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {users_id, emails_messages_id, sent_at}'
All three return full database contents with no authentication required. No session cookie or token is needed.
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate internal infrastructure:
callbackURLfields expose internal server URLs and query parameters used by the scheduler, potentially revealing internal API endpoints and their parameter structures - Read admin email campaigns: Full email subjects and HTML message bodies composed by administrators are exposed
- Map user targeting: The
Email_to_usertable reveals whichusers_idvalues are targeted by which email campaigns, enabling user enumeration and profiling - Gather reconnaissance: Scheduling configuration (cron fields, execution status, timezone) reveals operational patterns and timing of automated tasks
The information disclosed could be used to facilitate further attacks (e.g., using discovered internal URLs for SSRF, or user IDs for targeted account attacks).
Recommended Fix
Add User::isAdmin() checks to all three list.json.php files, matching the pattern used by sibling endpoints. For each file, add the following after the require_once lines and before the data retrieval:
plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:
<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
if(!User::isAdmin()){
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Not authorized']));
}
$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
Apply the same pattern to Emails_messages/list.json.php and Email_to_user/list.json.php.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for CVE-2026-33761 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-33761 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-33761. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33761 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-33761 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.