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HIGH severity

CVE-2026-33540 — distribution

HIGHFix: distribution/distribution@cc5d5fa

CVE-2026-33540 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. A fix is available for github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Distribution affected by pull-through cache credential exfiltration via www-authenticate bearer realm

Also known asGHSA-3p65-76g6-3w7rGO-2026-5094
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
1 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33540.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.01%
Lower risk than most CVEs21th percentile — riskier than 21% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.0%0.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/distribution/distribution/v3🐹github.com/distribution/distribution

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

hi guys,

commit: 40594bd98e6d6ed993b5c6021c93fdf96d2e5851 (as-of 2026-01-31) contact: GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/new)

summary

in pull-through cache mode, distribution discovers token auth endpoints by parsing WWW-Authenticate challenges returned by the configured upstream registry. the realm URL from a bearer challenge is used without validating that it matches the upstream registry host. as a result, an attacker-controlled upstream (or an attacker with MitM position to the upstream) can cause distribution to send the configured upstream credentials via basic auth to an attacker-controlled realm URL.

this is the same vulnerability class as CVE-2020-15157 (containerd), but in distribution’s pull-through cache proxy auth flow.

severity

HIGH

note: the baseline impact is credential disclosure of the configured upstream credentials. if a deployment uses broader credentials for upstream auth (for example cloud iam credentials), the downstream impact can be higher; i am not claiming this as default for all deployments.

impact

credential exfiltration of the upstream authentication material configured for the pull-through cache.

attacker starting positions that make this realistic:

  • supply chain / configuration: an operator configures a proxy cache to use an upstream that becomes attacker-controlled (compromised registry, stale domain, or a malicious mirror)
  • network: MitM on the upstream connection in environments where the upstream is reachable over insecure transport or a compromised network path

affected components

  • registry/proxy/proxyauth.go:66-81 (getAuthURLs): extracts bearer realm from upstream WWW-Authenticate without validating destination
  • internal/client/auth/session.go:485-510 (fetchToken): uses the realm URL directly for token fetch
  • internal/client/auth/session.go:429-434 (fetchTokenWithBasicAuth): sends credentials via basic auth to the realm URL

reproduction

attachment: poc.zip (local harness) with canonical and control runs.

the harness is local and does not contact a real registry: it uses two local HTTP servers (upstream + attacker token service) to demonstrate whether basic auth is sent to an attacker-chosen realm.

unzip -q -o poc.zip -d poc
cd poc
make canonical
make control

expected output (excerpt):

[CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth
[PROOF_MARKER]: basic_auth_sent=true realm_host=127.0.0.1 account_param=user authorization_prefix=Basic

control output (excerpt):

[CALLSITE_HIT]: getAuthURLs::configureAuth
[NC_MARKER]: realm_validation=PASS basic_auth_sent=false

suggested remediation

validate that the token realm destination is within the intended trust boundary before associating credentials with it or sending any authentication to it. one conservative option is strict same-host binding: only accept a realm whose host matches the configured upstream host.

fix accepted when

  • distribution does not send configured upstream credentials to an attacker-chosen realm URL
  • a regression test covers the canonical and blocked cases

addendum.md poc.zip PR_DESCRIPTION.md RUNNABLE_POC.md

best, oleh

Affected Packages

2 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/distribution/distribution/v3all versions3.1.0go get github.com/distribution/distribution/v3@v3.1.0
🐹Gogithub.com/distribution/distributionall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
distributiondistribution_project
< 3.1.0
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/distribution/distribution/v3, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/distribution/distribution/v3 to 3.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33540 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
Workaround published by Red Hat
To mitigate this issue, ensure that all upstream registries configured for Distribution in pull-through cache mode are trusted and secured. Implement network segmentation and firewall rules to restrict outbound connections from the Distribution instance to only known and trusted upstream registry endpoints. This reduces the risk of an attacker-controlled upstream or a Man-in-the-Middle attack redirecting authentication.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-33540 (CC BY 4.0)
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Openshift Data Foundation 4.22odf4/cephcsi-rhel9:1782932114RHSA-2026:37387

Frequently Asked Questions

hi guys, commit: 40594bd98e6d6ed993b5c6021c93fdf96d2e5851 (as-of 2026-01-31) contact: GitHub Security Advisory (https://github.com/distribution/distribution/security/advisories/new) ## summary in pull-through cache mode, distribution discovers token auth endpoints by parsing `WWW-Authenticate` challenges returned by the configured upstream registry. the `realm` URL from a bearer challenge is used without validating that it matches the upstream registry host. as a result, an attacker-controlled upstream (or an attacker with MitM position to the upstream) can cause distribution to send the co
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-33540: distribution — Fixed in 3.1.0