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CVE-2026-32637

CVE-2026-32637 is a security vulnerability in github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-32637 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

Velero vulnerable to file path traversal when extracting from backup's tarball

Published
Aug 20, 2026
Updated
Aug 20, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? If the attacker compromises the backup's object storage backend and uploads a malicious backup tarball including file names like the following:

  • ../../../tmp/escape_1 -> file created at /tmp/escape_1
  • ../../../../../../../../tmp/escape_2 -> file created at /tmp/escape_2
  • ../../../tmp/cron_poc -> would be /etc/cron.d/backdoor in real attack
  • ../../../tmp/ssh_poc -> would be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
  • ../../../tmp/kubeconfig_poc -> would be ~/.kube/config

It's possible that extracting files from the tarball during restore can overwrite sensitive files in the Velero pod filesystem.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

By far, there is no patch yet. We are working on the main branch, then cherry-pick to the release-1.18 for v1.18.1 patch.

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

There is no workaround, but the good news is that keeping your OSS safe will prevent the vulnerability.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/vmware-tanzu/veleroall versions1.18.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero to 1.18.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32637 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-32637 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-32637. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ If the attacker compromises the backup's object storage backend and uploads a malicious backup tarball including file names like the following: * ../../../tmp/escape_1 -> file created at /tmp/escape_1 * ../../../../../../../../tmp/escape_2 -> file created at /tmp/escape_2 * ../../../tmp/cron_poc -> would be /etc/cron.d/backdoor in real attack * ../../../tmp/ssh_poc -> would be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys * ../../../tmp/kubeconfig_poc -> would be ~/.kube/config It's possible that extractin
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-32637 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-32637 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.