CVE-2026-32629 — thorsten/phpmyfaq
CVE-2026-32629 is a Improper Input Validation vulnerability in thorsten/phpmyfaq. A fix is available for thorsten/phpmyfaq — see the affected versions and patch details below.
phpMyFAQ: Stored XSS via Unsanitized Email Field in Admin FAQ Editor
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
thorsten/phpmyfaq🐘phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely.
Details
- PHP FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts RFC-valid quoted local parts with dangerous characters
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/Api/FaqController.php:99 $email = trim((string) Filter::filterVar($data->email, FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL)); PHP accepts "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com as a valid email (RFC 5321 allows <, > inside quoted local parts). Confirmed: "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com => string (valid, not false)
- Email stored raw without HTML sanitization
phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Faq.php — email retrieved directly as $row->email from the database.
- Admin Twig template renders email with |raw
phpmyfaq/assets/templates/admin/content/faq.editor.twig:296 <input type="email" name="email" id="email" value="{{ faqData['email'] | raw }}" class="form-control">
Affected version: 4.2.0-alpha, commit f0dc86c8f
PoC
The reproduction of the vulnerability was implemented with the help of AI while reviewing the source code to generate the proof-of-concept. Please kindly note this for reference. Since the vulnerability has already been confirmed directly in the source code, the proof-of-concept code may be considered as a reference only.
Please extract the attached compressed file and proceed. poc.zip
- (docker compose -f docker-compose.yml down -v)
- docker compose -f docker-compose.yml up -d mariadb php-fpm nginx
- bash exploit.sh
- Access http://localhost:8888/admin/
- Log in with admin / Admin1234!
- After logging in, check whether the URL remains http://localhost:8888/admin/
- Go to Content → FAQ Administration → edit "poc" → alert popup should appear If it does not appear, you can also access it directly via: http://localhost:8888/admin/faq/edit/1/en
Impact
When an administrator opens /admin/faq/edit/{id}/{lang} to review the pending FAQ, the injected script executes in the admin's browser context. This allows an attacker to:
- Steal the administrator's session cookie → full admin account takeover
- Perform arbitrary admin actions (create users, modify content, change configuration)
- Pivot to further attacks on the server
The attack chain requires no authentication. By default, records.allowNewFaqsForGuests=true allows unauthenticated FAQ submission, and records.defaultActivation=false guarantees the administrator must visit the edit page to review it.
Note on captcha: The built-in captcha is enabled by default when the PHP gd extension is present (spam.enableCaptchaCode=true). This prevents fully automated exploitation but does not prevent a targeted manual attack — an attacker can solve the captcha once and submit the payload.
Credits
wooseokdotkim
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.1composer require thorsten/phpmyfaq:^4.1.1 |
| 🐘Packagist | phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq | all versions | 4.1.1composer require phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq:^4.1.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32629 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-32629 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-32629. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32629 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-32629 across Packagist dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.