Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
📦 npm
Not in CISA KEV

CVE-2026-32038 — openclaw

Fix: openclaw/openclaw@14b6eea

CVE-2026-32038 is a CWE-284 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenClaw - Sandbox Network Isolation Bypass via docker.network=container Parameter

Also known asGHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9
Published
Mar 19, 2026
Updated
Aug 17, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 24, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32038.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs38th percentile — riskier than 38% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

133other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
openclawnpm
2.5Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

In [email protected], sandbox network hardening blocks network=host but still allows network=container:<id>.

This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.

Preconditions and Trust Model Context

This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.

Details

Current validation blocks only host, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:

  • validateNetworkMode(network) only rejects values in BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {"host"}.
  • buildSandboxCreateArgs(...) validates then forwards cfg.network into --network.
  • Browser sandbox helper also treats container: as an accepted mode in network preparation.

Effective behavior:

  • host -> blocked
  • container:<id> -> accepted and forwarded

Impact

Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.

Practical impact depends on deployment:

  • Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.
  • Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.

Remediation

Block namespace-join style network modes (including container:<id>) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.

Patch Status

Fixed on main in commit 14b6eea6e: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e

Follow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback): https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073

Publication Update (2026-02-25)

[email protected] is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.24npm install openclaw@2026.2.24

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.24 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32038 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-32038 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to CVE-2026-32038. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In `[email protected]`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:<id>`. This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace. ### Preconditions and Trust Model Context This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself. ### Details Current validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args: - `validateNe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-32038 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds CVE-2026-32038 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

CVE-2026-32038: openclaw | O3 Security