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CVE-2026-32038 — openclaw

Fix: openclaw/openclaw@14b6eea

CVE-2026-32038 is a CWE-284 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenClaw - Sandbox Network Isolation Bypass via docker.network=container Parameter

Also known asGHSA-ww6v-v748-x7g9
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 29, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32038.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk-0.20%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.32%0.65%0.97%0.1%0.3%Apr 26Aug 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

132other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
openclawnpm
3.5Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

In [email protected], sandbox network hardening blocks network=host but still allows network=container:<id>.

This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.

Preconditions and Trust Model Context

This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.

Details

Current validation blocks only host, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:

  • validateNetworkMode(network) only rejects values in BLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {"host"}.
  • buildSandboxCreateArgs(...) validates then forwards cfg.network into --network.
  • Browser sandbox helper also treats container: as an accepted mode in network preparation.

Effective behavior:

  • host -> blocked
  • container:<id> -> accepted and forwarded

Impact

Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.

Practical impact depends on deployment:

  • Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.
  • Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.

Remediation

Block namespace-join style network modes (including container:<id>) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.

Patch Status

Fixed on main in commit 14b6eea6e: https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e

Follow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback): https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073

Publication Update (2026-02-25)

[email protected] is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.24npm install openclaw@2026.2.24

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
openclawopenclaw
< 2026.2.24
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.24 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32038 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In `[email protected]`, sandbox network hardening blocks `network=host` but still allows `network=container:<id>`. This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace. ### Preconditions and Trust Model Context This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network` in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself. ### Details Current validation blocks only `host`, while forwarding other values to Docker create args: - `validateNe
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-32038 in your dependencies?

Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-32038: openclaw — Fixed in 2026.2.24