CVE-2026-32038 — openclaw
Fix: openclaw/openclaw@14b6eeaCVE-2026-32038 is a CWE-284 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenClaw - Sandbox Network Isolation Bypass via docker.network=container Parameter
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-32038.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
openclawnpmDescription
Summary
In [email protected], sandbox network hardening blocks network=host but still allows network=container:<id>.
This can let a sandbox join another container's network namespace and reach services available in that namespace.
Preconditions and Trust Model Context
This issue requires a trusted-operator configuration path (for example setting agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network in gateway config). It is not an unauthenticated remote exploit by itself.
Details
Current validation blocks only host, while forwarding other values to Docker create args:
validateNetworkMode(network)only rejects values inBLOCKED_NETWORK_MODES = {"host"}.buildSandboxCreateArgs(...)validates then forwardscfg.networkinto--network.- Browser sandbox helper also treats
container:as an accepted mode in network preparation.
Effective behavior:
host-> blockedcontainer:<id>-> accepted and forwarded
Impact
Type: sandbox network isolation hardening bypass.
Practical impact depends on deployment:
- Requires ability to influence trusted sandbox network config.
- Higher impact when a target container exposes privileged/internal network reachability.
Remediation
Block namespace-join style network modes (including container:<id>) for sandbox containers, and keep strict allowlisting for safe network modes.
Patch Status
Fixed on main in commit 14b6eea6e:
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/14b6eea6e
Follow-up refactor/cleanup (no policy rollback): https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5552f9073
Publication Update (2026-02-25)
[email protected] is published on npm and contains the fix commit(s) listed above. This advisory now marks >= 2026.2.24 as patched.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | openclaw | all versions | 2026.2.24npm install openclaw@2026.2.24 |
Affected Products
openclawopenclawDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.24 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-32038 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-32038 in your dependencies?
Find it across npm, including transitive dependencies.