CVE-2026-27646 — openclaw
Fix: openclaw/openclaw@61000b8CVE-2026-27646 is a CWE-863 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenClaw < 2026.3.7 - Sandbox Escape via /acp spawn Command
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-27646.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
openclawnpmDescription
Summary
Sandboxed requester sessions could reach host-side ACP session initialization through /acp spawn.
OpenClaw already blocked sessions_spawn({ runtime: "acp" }) from sandboxed sessions, but the slash-command path initialized ACP directly without applying the same host-runtime guard first.
Affected Packages / Versions
- npm package:
openclaw - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.2 - Patched version:
>= 2026.3.7
Details
ACP sessions run on the host, not inside the OpenClaw sandbox. The direct ACP spawn path in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts already denied sandboxed requesters, but /acp spawn in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts called initializeSession(...) without first applying the same restriction.
In affected versions, an already authorized sender in a sandboxed session could use /acp spawn to cross from sandboxed chat context into host-side ACP runtime initialization when ACP was enabled and a backend was available.
Fix Commit(s)
61000b8e4ded919ca1a825d4700db4cb3fdc56e3
Fix Details
The fix introduced a shared ACP runtime-policy guard in src/agents/acp-spawn.ts and reused it from the /acp spawn handler in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp/lifecycle.ts before any ACP backend initialization. Regression coverage was added in src/auto-reply/reply/commands-acp.test.ts to prove sandboxed /acp spawn requests are rejected early, while existing ACP spawn behavior for non-sandboxed sessions remains unchanged.
Release Process Note
Patched version is pre-set to 2026.3.7 so the advisory can be published once that npm release is available.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | openclaw | all versions | 2026.3.7npm install openclaw@2026.3.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.3.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-27646 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like CVE-2026-27646 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to CVE-2026-27646. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-27646 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds CVE-2026-27646 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.