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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-23633 — gogs

MEDIUMFix: gogs/gogs@4894629

CVE-2026-23633 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) Path Traversal vulnerability in gogs.io/gogs. A fix is available for gogs.io/gogs — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Gogs has arbitrary file read/write via path traversal in Git hook editing

Also known asGHSA-mrph-w4hh-gx3gGO-2026-4453
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-23633.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.05%
Lower risk than most CVEs44th percentile — riskier than 44% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.34%0.67%1.01%0.0%0.5%0.5%0.5%0.5%Jun 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹gogs.io/gogs

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Vulnerability Description

In the endpoint:

/username/reponame/settings/hooks/git/:name

the :name parameter:

  • Is URL-decoded by macaron routing, allowing decoded slashes (/)
  • Is then passed directly to:
git.Repository.Hook("custom_hooks", name)

which internally resolves the path as:

filepath.Join(repoPath, "custom_hooks", name)

Because no path sanitization is applied, supplying ../ sequences allows access to arbitrary paths outside the repository.

As a Result:

  • GET: Arbitrary file contents are displayed in the hook edit page textarea (Local File Inclusion).
  • POST: Existing files can be overwritten with attacker-controlled content (Arbitrary File Write).

Attack Prerequisites

  • The attacker is an authenticated user
  • The attacker has Admin or higher privileges on the target repository
  • The attacker has the AllowGitHook permission (or is a site administrator)
  • The target file is readable/writable by the Gogs process OS permissions

Attack Scenario

  1. An attacker (with AllowGitHook + repository Admin privileges) accesses the Git hook edit URL
  2. A path containing ../ is supplied in :name, fully URL-encoded using %2f
  3. The server resolves custom_hooks/../../... without validation
  4. Arbitrary file contents are displayed and existing files can be overwritten

Potential Impact

  • Sensitive information disclosure: app.ini, databases, logs, environment variables, etc.
  • Configuration or data tampering: Overwriting existing files
  • Secondary impact: Extraction of SECRET_KEY and database credentials may allow token forging or further compromise

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogogs.io/gogsall versions0.13.4go get gogs.io/gogs@v0.13.4

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
gogsgogs
< 0.13.4
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for gogs.io/gogs, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update gogs.io/gogs to 0.13.4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-23633 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Vulnerability Description In the endpoint: ``` /username/reponame/settings/hooks/git/:name ``` the `:name` parameter: * Is URL-decoded by **macaron routing**, allowing decoded slashes (`/`) * Is then passed directly to: ```go git.Repository.Hook("custom_hooks", name) ``` which internally resolves the path as: ```go filepath.Join(repoPath, "custom_hooks", name) ``` Because no path sanitization is applied, supplying `../` sequences allows access to **arbitrary paths outside the repository**. ### As a Result: * **GET:** Arbitrary file contents are displayed in the hook edit page text
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-23633: gogs Info Disclosure — Fixed in 0.13.4