CVE-2026-130007 — k8s-mcp-server
Fix: reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server@817d810CVE-2026-130007 is a Missing Authentication vulnerability in github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server. A fix is available for github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server — see the affected versions and patch details below.
k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-serverReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call
endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check.
Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the
server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials,
executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.
Affected
Commit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130) MCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0 Default mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0
Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)
- main.go L129:
server.NewSSEServer(s)is created with no auth option and no contextFunc; L130sse.Start(":"+port)binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0). - mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.
- handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable
sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before
s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage)dispatches to the tools/call handler. - Only
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *is present (CORS relaxation, not auth). Write tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback) are all registered unless-read-onlyis set (default readOnly=false).
Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)
Started: k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080 with a dummy non-routable
KUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).
GET /sse -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3... POST /message initialize -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE POST /message tools/list -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive) POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED: error -32603 "... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect"
The tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection
error, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the
getAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real
cluster data. ss -ltnp confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and invoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and, with default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).
Why this is a defect, not by-design
Default mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal scenario, and there is no "trusted client only" / auth-required note in the docs. MCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.
Suggested fix
- Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g. WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed when no token is configured in HTTP mode.
- Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.
- Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO by default.
Reproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path (not an extract).
Credit
bebold6133
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server | all versions | 1.1.0go get github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server@v1.1.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server to 1.1.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-130007 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-130007 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.