CVE-2026-12681 — go-attestation
Fix: google/go-attestation@b6e905eCVE-2026-12681 is a CWE-1285 vulnerability in github.com/google/go-attestation. A fix is available for github.com/google/go-attestation — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-12681.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/google/go-attestationReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip
SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST
signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.
Impact
For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.
Root Cause
After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.
Affected versions
All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).
Fix
Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502
- Add bound check:
SignatureHeaderSizemust not exceed remaining list space - Skip
SignatureHeaderSizebytes before both entry loops - Regression test:
TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/google/go-attestation | all versions | 0.6.1go get github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.6.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/google/go-attestation, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/google/go-attestation to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-12681 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-12681 in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.