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CVE-2026-12681 — go-attestation

Fix: google/go-attestation@b6e905e

CVE-2026-12681 is a CWE-1285 vulnerability in github.com/google/go-attestation. A fix is available for github.com/google/go-attestation — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()

Also known asGHSA-9r4w-jg96-92mvGO-2026-5298
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 14, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-12681.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs18th percentile — riskier than 18% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.51%0.77%0.2%0.2%0.2%0.3%0.3%Jul 26Sep 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/google/go-attestation

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.

Impact

For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.

Root Cause

After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.

Affected versions

All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).

Fix

Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502

  • Add bound check: SignatureHeaderSize must not exceed remaining list space
  • Skip SignatureHeaderSize bytes before both entry loops
  • Regression test: TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/google/go-attestationall versions0.6.1go get github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.6.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/google/go-attestation, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/google/go-attestation to 0.6.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-12681 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary `parseEfiSignatureList()` in `attest/internal/events.go` does not skip `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes before reading `EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST` signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1. ## Impact For `hashSHA256SigGUID` lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-12681 in your dependencies?

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CVE-2026-12681: go-attestation — Fixed in 0.6.1