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Not in CISA KEV
MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-10681 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-362 vulnerability. O3 Security confirms whether CVE-2026-10681 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

SMP race in `thread_idx_alloc()` lets concurrent `k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD)` callers share a kernel-object permission slot

Also known asGHSA-j693-5rh5-8g8h
Published
Jul 25, 2026
Updated
Aug 12, 2026
Affected
0 pkgs
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Aug 12, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Description

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock.

On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx.

The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool.

The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).

Detection & mitigation playbook

Vulnerability
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for the affected component. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of the affected component has shipped for CVE-2026-10681 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether CVE-2026-10681 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to CVE-2026-10681. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfie
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-10681 in your dependencies?

O3 detects CVE-2026-10681 across dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.