CVE-2026-105760 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in vllm. A fix is available for vllm — see the affected versions and patch details below.
vLLM: GLMGA video sampling permits request-driven CPU and memory exhaustion
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-105760.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
CVE-2026-105760 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
vllmReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The OpenAI-compatible chat endpoint accepts request-level video loader options through media_io_kwargs. A caller can select the GLMGA sampler and provide large fps and max_frames values. GLMGA first constructs an attacker-sized Python index list and then deduplicates it, even when the supplied video contains only a few frames. This work occurs in the shared media-loading executor before frame reads, allowing a tiny valid video and compact JSON options to consume disproportionate CPU time and memory and delay unrelated media requests.
The demonstrated impact is partial denial of service. No memory corruption, data disclosure, or code execution is claimed.
Affected configuration
The server must expose chat completions for a video-capable model and accept request-level media_io_kwargs. The model does not need to use GLMGA by default because the request value overrides the model's loader mapping. The proof of concept uses an inline two-frame video and explicitly selects the OpenCV decoder, so no external media host or GPU decoder is required.
The request is reachable without vLLM credentials when no API key is configured. With API-key authentication enabled, any caller holding a valid key can reach the same path.
Attack surface
A remote caller submits a valid chat-completion request with a small video and the following request-level options:
{
"media_io_kwargs": {
"video": {
"video_backend": "glmga",
"backend": "opencv",
"fps": 500000,
"max_frames": 500000
}
}
}
Increasing both numeric values increases temporary list construction and deduplication work even when the final decoded frame set remains unchanged.
Root cause
ChatCompletionRequestexposesmedia_io_kwargsas request-controlled nested values:protocol.py#L365-L371.- The request options are carried into chat parameters without a numeric work bound on GLMGA's
fpsormax_frames:protocol.py#L571-L599. - Media options are merged so request values override configured defaults, including
video_backend:connector.py#L577-L605. - The connector selects a registered video loader and runs media loading through the shared executor:
video.py#L28-L66andconnector.py#L44-L47. - GLMGA calculates
extract_t = min(int(duration * fps), max_frames), builds a list with that many entries, and deduplicates it before decoding frames:video.py#L667-L740. - The OpenCV decoder receives the already-deduplicated indices, so a two-frame file can trigger a large intermediate allocation while producing only two decoded frames:
opencv.py#L28-L50.
The missing invariant is a strict upper bound on sampling work before the index list is constructed. Bounding decoded output after deduplication does not bound the vulnerable intermediate computation.
Suggested remediation
Validate request-level video sampling options before dispatching work to the media executor. Enforce conservative absolute limits for fps, max_frames, and especially the computed candidate count. Reject non-finite, negative, or otherwise invalid numeric values.
Avoid constructing O(extract_t) intermediate Python lists. Generate bounded unique frame indices directly from the source frame count and output-frame limit. Apply the limit before list construction and before shared executor submission. Add tests showing that extreme request values are rejected or consume constant memory for a fixed output-frame count.
Workarounds
- Remove or filter request-level
video_backend,fps, andmax_framesoptions at the gateway. - Do not allow untrusted callers to select GLMGA.
- Apply authentication, rate limiting, request concurrency limits, and process memory isolation.
- Use a separate constrained media-loading worker pool where operationally feasible.
- Existing media byte, pixel, or decoded-frame limits do not necessarily bound this pre-decode candidate-index allocation.
Related advisory
GHSA-cqm8-jxg6-fqfq concerns partial denial of service in the DeepStream video backend through backend confusion and insufficient pixel guarding. This report concerns a different CPU-side GLMGA algorithm: request-controlled sampling values create a large redundant index list before the OpenCV decoder reads a fixed, tiny frame set. The vulnerable backend, resource sink, and required remediation differ.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | vllm | ≥ 0.23.0rc2&&< 0.30.0 | 0.30.0pip install --upgrade 'vllm==0.30.0' |
Affected Products
vllmvllmDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for vllm, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update vllm to 0.30.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-105760 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
A moderate-impact denial of service flaw was found in the vLLM inference and serving engine, which Red Hat ships in the Red Hat AI Inference Server and Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI) container images. A remote caller of the OpenAI-compatible chat completions endpoint can submit a small, valid video together with…
Until a fixed package is available, exposure can be reduced at the deployment level: place an authenticating API gateway or reverse proxy in front of the vLLM OpenAI-compatible chat completions endpoint that removes or filters request-level media_io_kwargs video options (video_backend, fps, and max_frames) so untrusted callers cannot select the GLMGA video sampler or supply extreme sampling values, and apply rate limiting and request concurrency limits. Note that existing media byte, pixel, or decoded-frame limits do not necessarily bound the vulnerable pre-decode frame-index allocation. The upstream project fixed this issue in vLLM 0.30.0; for the affected Red Hat products the fix is…Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2026-105760 (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2026-105760 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.