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CRITICAL severity

CVE-2026-103922 — core

CRITICALFix: ionic-team/capacitor@430356a

CVE-2026-103922 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.3) CWE-346 vulnerability in com.capacitorjs:core. A fix is available for com.capacitorjs:core — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Capacitor Android and iOS: remote content can be loaded at the app origin via the internal HTTP proxy path

Also known asGHSA-rvm3-566m-v7fv
Published
Updated
Affected
20 pkgs
Patched
16 / 20
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-103922.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs11th percentile — riskier than 11% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-103922 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

20 pkgs affected
☕com.capacitorjs:core☕com.capacitorjs:core☕com.capacitorjs:core☕com.capacitorjs:core☕com.capacitorjs:core📦@capacitor/android📦@capacitor/android📦@capacitor/ios+12 more

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

Capacitor's WebView navigation guard validated only the host and scheme of a target URL, not its path. Because the internal HTTP proxy path (/_capacitor_http_interceptor_) is served at the application's own origin, a frame navigation to it was always treated as in-app navigation and allowed.

Loading that path as a document caused the native layer to fetch an arbitrary, caller-specified URL and return the response body to the WebView at the app's own origin. Script in that response then ran with full same-origin trust: access to localStorage, cookies, and every native capability the application exposes through its registered Capacitor plugins.

The proxy handler was additionally served regardless of whether the CapacitorHttp plugin was enabled, so applications that never enabled CapacitorHttp were also affected.

Exploitation requires a victim to activate a link inside the application's WebView. Any Capacitor application that renders user-controlled or unsanitized links (chat messages, comments, rich-text content) is a viable delivery surface.

Both Android and iOS are affected.

Patches

Two changes on each platform:

  1. The navigation guard now blocks frame navigations whose path is the internal proxy path.
  2. The proxy handler is served only when CapacitorHttp is enabled, and never for a document (main frame) request.

Legitimate CapacitorHttp usage is unaffected. fetch and XMLHttpRequest are subresource requests and do not pass through the navigation guard.

Upgrade to a patched version, then rebuild and redistribute your application.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, note first that disabling CapacitorHttp is not sufficient on affected versions, because the proxy path is served regardless of that setting.

Registered plugins are consulted before the navigation guard runs, so a small plugin can block the path. On Android, override shouldOverrideLoad(Uri url) and return true when url.getPath() starts with /_capacitor_http_interceptor_. On iOS, implement shouldOverrideLoad(_:) and return true for the same path. Returning true cancels the navigation; return null/nil for all other URLs so normal navigation is unchanged.

Independently, sanitize user-controlled link targets before rendering them in the WebView.

Affected Packages

20 total 16 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavencom.capacitorjs:core≥ 6.0.0&&< 6.2.26.2.2com.capacitorjs:core:6.2.2
☕Mavencom.capacitorjs:core≥ 7.0.0&&< 7.6.97.6.9com.capacitorjs:core:7.6.9
☕Mavencom.capacitorjs:core≥ 8.5.0&&< 8.5.18.5.1com.capacitorjs:core:8.5.1
☕Mavencom.capacitorjs:core≥ 8.3.5&&< 8.4.38.4.3com.capacitorjs:core:8.4.3
☕Mavencom.capacitorjs:core≥ 8.0.0No fix
📦npm@capacitor/android≥ 6.0.0&&< 6.2.26.2.2npm install @capacitor/android@6.2.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for com.capacitorjs:core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update com.capacitorjs:core to 6.2.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-103922 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact Capacitor's WebView navigation guard validated only the **host and scheme** of a target URL, not its **path**. Because the internal HTTP proxy path (`/_capacitor_http_interceptor_`) is served at the application's own origin, a frame navigation to it was always treated as in-app navigation and allowed. Loading that path as a document caused the native layer to fetch an arbitrary, caller-specified URL and return the response body to the WebView **at the app's own origin**. Script in that response then ran with full same-origin trust: access to `localStorage`, cookies, and every nati
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is CVE-2026-103922 in your dependencies?

Find it across Maven, npm, SwiftURL, including transitive dependencies.

CVE-2026-103922: core — Fixed in 6.2.2