CVE-2026-101906 — axios

Summary

Axios shouldBypassProxy() normalizes hostnames with hostname.replace(/\.+$/, ''). For a hostname shaped as many dots followed by a non-dot, the anchored regex can perform quadratic backtracking. Because axios re-evaluates proxy bypass rules for redirected requests, a malicious server can trigger this synchronous work through a crafted redirect Location.

The issue affects Node.js applications that use environment proxy variables with NO_PROXY and allow redirects.

Impact

An attacker-controlled server can return a redirect whose hostname causes the axios process to spend significant CPU time in synchronous hostname normalization. During this time, the Node.js event loop is blocked and the application cannot handle other work on that thread.

This is an availability-only issue. It does not disclose request data or modify requests.

Affected Functionality

Affected:

• Node.js HTTP adapter.
• Environment proxy handling through HTTP_PROXY or HTTPS_PROXY.
• NO_PROXY or no_proxy set to a non-empty value.
• Redirects followed by axios or follow-redirects.

Not affected:

• Browser adapters.
• Requests with proxy: false.
• Requests with no NO_PROXY value.
• Requests with maxRedirects: 0, unless application code manually follows the malicious redirect and re-enters axios.

Technical Details

lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js contains:

return unmapIPv4MappedIPv6(hostname.replace(/\.+$/, ''));

When the hostname is "." * n + "a", the $ anchor causes the regex engine to retry the dot run from many positions before it fails. setProxy() invokes shouldBypassProxy(location) after getProxyForUrl(location) returns a proxy, including on redirect hops via beforeRedirects.proxy.

Local timing on axios 1.18.1 showed increasing cost for crafted hostnames: about 1 ms at 1000 dots, 6.9 ms at 3000 dots, and 34.5 ms at 6000 dots. The growth is consistent with the submitted quadratic claim while avoiding long-running payloads.

Proof of Concept of Attack

Constrained helper-level demonstration:

import shouldBypassProxy from 'axios/lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js';

process.env.NO_PROXY = 'example.com';
shouldBypassProxy('http://' + '.'.repeat(6000) + 'a/');

In the full adapter path, a malicious server can return that hostname in a 302 Location header while the client has proxy environment variables and NO_PROXY configured.

Workarounds

Disable automatic redirects for requests to untrusted servers, or avoid environment proxy handling for those requests with proxy: false when appropriate. Operators can also avoid broad untrusted redirect-following in services where event-loop availability is critical.

Summary

shouldBypassProxy normalizes a host with hostname.replace(/.+$/, ''). On a host of the shape <many dots><non-dot> (e.g. "." × 40000 + "a"), this anchored regex backtracks quadratically (O(N²)), synchronously starving the Node.js event loop. Because axios re-evaluates the proxy on every redirect using the new Location host, a malicious server can return a crafted 302 Location and freeze the client's event loop for seconds per redirect — a denial of service.

Details

• Affected code: lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js → normalizeNoProxyHost: hostname.replace(/.+$/, '') (one pass in 1.18.1). The open PR #11029 adds a second /.+$/ pass in normalizeIPAddress, doubling the cost (not the origin).
• Root cause: /.+$/ is O(N²) on a long run of dots that is not at the end of the string — the $ anchor forces the engine to backtrack the entire dot-run from every start position.
• Trust boundary (per THREATMODEL): the redirect Location is untrusted (T-2: "axios to network … redirect Location … untrusted"). The caller requests a benign URL; the malicious host arrives via the server's 302. This is not the T-1 caller-supplied-URL non-goal.
• Call chain: setProxy(options, configProxy, location, isRedirect, …) (lib/adapters/http.js) → env-proxy branch → getProxyForUrl(location) returns a proxy → if (!shouldBypassProxy(location)) → normalizeNoProxyHost(parsed.hostname.toLowerCase()) runs /.+$/. setProxy is re-invoked on the redirect hop with the untrusted Location; new URL() retains the long dot-run in .hostname.
• Preconditions: proxy configured via environment (HTTP_PROXY/HTTPS_PROXY, trusted per THREATMODEL T-3, common in CI/containers/enterprise) + NO_PROXY set + redirects followed (default maxRedirects: 5).

PoC

Self-contained, no network — imports axios's own helper: // node poc.mjs (run next to an axios install) import sbp from './node_modules/axios/lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js'; process.env.NO_PROXY = 'example.com'; for (const n of [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]) { const url = 'http://' + '.'.repeat(n) + 'a/'; // arrives as an untrusted 302 Location host const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); sbp(url); // returns false (correct no-bypass) — but O(N^2) slow console.log(N=${n}: ${(Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t0)/1e6)|0} ms); } // Measured on 1.18.1: N=5000 ~43ms, 10000 ~160ms, 20000 ~618ms, 40000 ~2499ms; benign host ~0.05ms. Driven through the real http-adapter __setProxy on the redirect path (setProxy(…, isRedirect=true)), a 10 ms timer fires 0 times during the ~2.4 s block at N=40000 — full event-loop starvation.

Impact

Denial of service (event-loop starvation) on any axios client that uses an environment proxy with NO_PROXY set and follows redirects, when a server it contacts returns a crafted redirect Location. No data exposure or RCE. Same impact class as the accepted DoS advisories GHSA-62hf-57xw-28j9 (toFormData recursion) and the maxContentLength response-size DoS.

Suggested fix

Replace the regex trailing-dot strip with a linear trim: let end = hostname.length; while (end > 0 && hostname.charCodeAt(end - 1) === 46 /* '.' */) end--; hostname = hostname.slice(0, end); Also drop the redundant second /.+$/ pass in PR #11029's normalizeIPAddress.