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MEDIUM severity

CVE-2026-100347 — kin-openapi

MEDIUMFix: getkin/kin-openapi@f1a5b52

CVE-2026-100347 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.3) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in github.com/getkin/kin-openapi. A fix is available for github.com/getkin/kin-openapi — see the affected versions and patch details below.

kin-openapi: Unauthenticated panic (DoS) in openapi3filter legacy router via non-canonical/unsupported HTTP method on a static path

Also known asGHSA-fh4f-47mf-f2gj
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 22, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2026-100347.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs43th percentile — riskier than 43% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

CVE-2026-100347 by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/getkin/kin-openapi

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The openapi3filter.ValidationHandler (the exported, documented request-validation middleware) hard-wires the legacy router (routers/legacy). That router matches the incoming request method verbatim against a trie built exclusively from upper-cased canonical HTTP methods. A request carrying a method token that is not one of the 9 standard methods — a legitimate-but-unsupported token such as PROPFIND, or a non-canonical case variant such as lowercase get — misses the trie, leaves route == nil, and for an existing static path falls through to PathItem.GetOperation(method), whose default: case calls panic(...). The panic fires inside route resolution, before any authentication runs. This is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service (recovered per-connection panic + unbounded error-log growth).

Root Cause

  • openapi3filter/validation_handler.go:39 — ValidationHandler.Load() always constructs legacyrouter.NewRouter(doc); there is no alternative router option on this path.
  • routers/legacy/router.go:109 — the request method is used verbatim (method, url := req.Method, ...); there is no canonicalization or rejection of unknown method tokens.
  • routers/legacy/router.go:69-70 — the trie is populated with strings.ToUpper(method) keys taken from pathItem.Operations() (canonical http.Method* constants only).
  • routers/legacy/router.go:141 — root.Match(method + " " + remainingPath) misses for a non-canonical/unsupported method → route == nil.
  • routers/legacy/router.go:146-150 — in the route == nil block, doc.Paths.Value(path) returns non-nil for an existing static path, and control reaches pathItem.GetOperation(method).
  • openapi3/path_item.go:174 — GetOperation's switch method has no matching case → default: panic(fmt.Errorf("unsupported HTTP method %q", method)).

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker sends a single request with a non-standard HTTP method token to any existing static path. The handler goroutine panics; Go's net/http recovers the panic per connection (process survives), aborts the connection (client sees a reset / 500), and logs a full stack trace. Repeated requests cause connection churn and unbounded http: panic serving log growth, and the request never reaches authentication. Availability impact (A:L) under the default synchronous ValidationHandler middleware; on non-net/http hosts or when reached on an application goroutine the ceiling is a full crash.

Proof of Concept

Serve any spec with a static path (e.g. /ping) behind openapi3filter.ValidationHandler, then:

printf 'PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080   # connection aborted (panic)
printf 'get /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n'      | nc target 8080   # connection aborted (panic)
printf 'GET /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n'      | nc target 8080   # 200 OK (process survived)

Reproduced end-to-end against a real net/http.Server + ValidationHandler: PROPFIND /ping and lowercase get /ping both abort the connection with a panic at path_item.go:174 (stack: GetOperation <- legacy.FindRoute router.go:150 <- ValidationHandler.validateRequest validation_handler.go:84); the process stays alive and subsequent GET /ping returns 200.

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: unauthenticated PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1 (any known static path). Guard: net/http method validation. Bypass proof: net/http accepts any valid HTTP token as a method — PROPFIND and lowercase get both reach the handler.
  2. Route match: legacy/router.go:141 root.Match("PROPFIND /ping"). Guard: trie match. Bypass proof: trie holds only upper-cased canonical methods → miss → route == nil.
  3. route == nil block: router.go:146 doc.Paths.Value("/ping") → non-nil for an existing static path (exact map lookup). Guard: pathItem == nil check (l.147). Bypass proof: static path exists → not nil → proceeds.
  4. Sink: router.go:150 pathItem.GetOperation("PROPFIND") → path_item.go:174 default: panic(...).
  5. Impact: handler goroutine panics; net/http recovers per connection; request never reaches auth.

Bypass Evidence

  • net/http does NOT reject non-standard method tokens — confirmed empirically: PROPFIND and lowercase get both reached the handler and panicked.
  • No canonicalization/rejection exists between FindRoute entry and GetOperation; req.Method is used verbatim (router.go:109).
  • git show v0.144.0:openapi3/path_item.go shows panic(...) at line 174; git show v0.144.0:routers/legacy/router.go shows verbatim method use and the unguarded GetOperation call. git log v0.144.0..HEAD on these files is empty (no post-tag fix).

Scoping Note

The panic requires the request path to be an exact static (non-templated) key in the served spec. A concrete path against a /{id} template returns a clean 500 (not a panic), because Paths.Value is an exact map lookup. Static paths (/health, /login, /version, /metrics, /ping, /) are ubiquitous in real specs and discoverable from public specs/standard endpoints, so a vulnerable target almost always exists. This makes the finding arguably broader than existing panic advisories, as it needs no special spec construct — any static path suffices.

Affected Versions

<= 0.144.0 (present on the latest release tag v0.144.0; long-standing; no patched version).

Suggested Fix

In the legacy router, canonicalize/validate the request method before route resolution and return ErrMethodNotAllowed/ErrPathNotFound for unknown methods, or make PathItem.GetOperation return an error (nil) for unrecognized methods instead of calling panic.


Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/getkin/kin-openapiall versions0.145.0go get github.com/getkin/kin-openapi@v0.145.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/getkin/kin-openapi, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/getkin/kin-openapi to 0.145.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2026-100347 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
ProductFixed inAdvisory
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana12-4-main-12.4.12-0.4.hum1RHSA-2026:76677
Red Hat Hardened Imageshugo-main-0.168.0-0.1.hum1RHSA-2026:82637
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-2-main-13.2.3-0.3.hum1RHSA-2026:85266
Red Hat Hardened Imagesgrafana13-1-main-13.1.8-0.3.hum1RHSA-2026:87077

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The `openapi3filter.ValidationHandler` (the exported, documented request-validation middleware) hard-wires the legacy router (`routers/legacy`). That router matches the incoming request method verbatim against a trie built exclusively from upper-cased canonical HTTP methods. A request carrying a method token that is not one of the 9 standard methods — a legitimate-but-unsupported token such as `PROPFIND`, or a non-canonical case variant such as lowercase `get` — misses the trie, leaves `route == nil`, and for an existing **static** path falls through to `PathItem.GetOperation(method
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2026-100347: kin-openapi DoS — Fixed in 0.145.0