CVE-2025-69207 is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.4) CWE-639 vulnerability in khoj. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.
Khoj has an IDOR in Notion OAuth Flow Enables Index Poisoning
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-69207.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
khojReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
An IDOR in the Notion OAuth callback allows an attacker to hijack any user's Notion integration by manipulating the state parameter. The callback endpoint accepts any user UUID without verifying the OAuth flow was initiated by that user, allowing attackers to replace victims' Notion configurations with their own, resulting in data poisoning and unauthorized access to the victim's Khoj search index.
This attack requires knowing the user's UUID which can be leaked through shared conversations where an AI generated image is present.
Details
When users share conversations which contain AI generated images, the file path for the image is constructed using the user's UUID. Knowing this UUID, an attacker is able to intercept the OAuth callback for Notion and replace the state parameter with the other user's UUID and sync notion onto their account.
PoC
The vulnerable line of code exists in src/khoj/routers/notion.py on the callback endpoint.
@notion_router.get("/auth/callback")
async def notion_auth_callback(request: Request, background_tasks: BackgroundTasks):
code = request.query_params.get("code")
state = request.query_params.get("state") # <-- Attacker controlled
if not code or not state:
return Response("Missing code or state", status_code=400)
user: KhojUser = await aget_user_by_uuid(state) # <-- No verification!
await NotionConfig.objects.filter(user=user).adelete() # <-- Deletes victim's config
# ... OAuth token exchange ...
access_token = final_response.get("access_token")
await NotionConfig.objects.acreate(token=access_token, user=user) # <-- Stores attacker's token
To exploit is relatively easy. Once we know the victim's UUID, we simply initiate the Notion sync process on our own account and intercept the callback, replacing the state parameter with the victim's UUID.
Impact
Deletes user's existing Notion sync and replaces it with attacker-controlled Notion. Could allow for index poisoning. I'm not entirely sure what Khoj does with synced files but if it's being passed as context to an LLM then I can imagine there's potential here.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | khoj | all versions | No fix |
Affected Products
khojkhojDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for khoj, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
The records we use list no patched version of khoj for CVE-2025-69207. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is CVE-2025-69207 in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.